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Abstract 
National studies have shown that most teachers receive summative evaluation ratings of 
“satisfactory” or “excellent,” but more are underperforming than evaluation data indicate (Kraft 
& Gilmour, 2017). Illinois enacted education reforms known as Senate Bill 7 (SB7) and the 
Performance Evaluation Reform Act (PERA) that required the inclusion of student growth as a 
significant factor in evaluation processes, and policy advocates called for rigorous teacher 
evaluations to improve or remove underperforming educators from the classroom (Regenstein, 
2011). Since the reforms have been enacted, Illinois policymakers have minimal information to 
determine whether these reforms have adequately addressed concerns about educator 
underperformance. 
The purpose of this study was to examine the phenomenon of teacher evaluation, 
focusing on how micropolitics have influenced the implementation of teacher evaluation reforms 
in Illinois. An explanatory sequential mixed methods design with the follow-up explanation 
variant was selected to collect data in two phases. The study examined two research questions: 
(a) to what extent has the implementation of teacher evaluation reforms affected the frequency of 
identifying underperforming teachers in Illinois public schools, and (b) how have micropolitical 
factors influenced principals in the identification of underperforming teachers in Illinois since the 
implementation of teacher evaluation reforms. The study used a conceptual framework based on 
education policy implementation theory (Honig, 2006) and micropolitics of personnel evaluation 
(Bridges & Groves, 1999). 
In the quantitative phase, 89 superintendents responded to a questionnaire requesting data 
from 2006-2007 through 2016-2017 on remediation plans, Professional Development Plans, and 
dismissals in their districts. Findings revealed trends showing small increases in the use of 
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improvement levers and teacher dismissals following implementation of teacher evaluation 
reforms, but the number of underperforming educators identified was low compared to estimates 
of underperformance by evaluators and the literature. In the qualitative phase, 20 principals were 
interviewed about the influence of micropolitics on their implementation of evaluation reforms. 
The principals reported that joint committees in their districts created procedures for student 
growth measures and summative ratings that were favorable to educators, which ultimately 
increased the teachers’ overall summative evaluation ratings. Second, strategic decisions by 
evaluators included deferral of low summative ratings due to pending retirements, avoidance or 
discomfort to hold difficult conversations regarding teacher underperformance, and the increased 
workload and paperwork involved with the teacher evaluation process and development and 
monitoring of improvement plans. Finally, principals reported that, although teachers and unions 
advocated for their interests in designing the procedures, they believed all parties shared a 
mutual interest in having quality teachers in the classroom. Several recommendations for policy 
development, professional practice, and further study are presented.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Recent public education reforms have been driven by political pressures to increase 
teacher accountability (Ravitch, 2016). To satisfy this demand, reform efforts have focused on 
teacher quality, measuring the influence teachers have on student achievement, and the methods 
used to evaluate teacher performance (Kraft & Gilmour, 2017; Ravitch, 2013). Meanwhile, a 
growing commitment to leadership for learning has shaped evolving roles and responsibilities for 
school leaders—as leaders who implement teacher evaluation reforms to improve teaching and 
learning (Copland & Knapp, 2006; Darling-Hammond, 2013). As their role expectations have 
become more complex, school leaders have been challenged to balance the numerous and 
competing responsibilities of leadership, evaluation, management, and supervision (Hazi & 
Rucinski, 2009) as well as the sheer workload of the position (Grubb & Flessa, 2006). As a 
result, some school administrators view teacher supervision and evaluation as a bureaucratic 
duty—something to check off their lengthy list of administrative tasks (Holland, 2004). In 
addition, the expansion of responsibilities puts increased pressures on leaders to be “super-
principals” who must have general expertise in all areas of school leadership to carryout myriad 
responsibilities (Grubb & Flessa, 2006).  
The work to improve teaching and learning practices is time consuming and challenging, 
and rather than address the performance issues of teachers, some school leaders choose to ignore 
or minimize the importance of this duty (Dandoy, 2012; Jacob, 2011). The local context and 
micropolitics within the school may reduce the willingness of school leaders to address teacher 
underperformance (Blase & Blase, 2002). Numerous political actors influence decisions and 
implementation of teacher evaluation systems within the school, and rather than to harm 
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relationships with these actors, school leaders may choose to evaluate teachers with leniency 
(Kimball & Milanowski, 2009; Reuland, 2012).  
To address the economic downtown that began in 2008, the U.S. Congress passed the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. ARRA included $5 billion in new 
funding for competitive Race to the Top (RttT) education grants. States could apply for a RttT 
grant if they agreed to adopt various policy reforms, including adoption of the Common Core 
State Standards, inclusion of student growth measures in summative evaluation ratings, 
expansion of charter schools, and improvement efforts in the lowest-performing schools. 
Preparing for the RttT applications deadlines, states implemented educational reforms at a much 
higher rate to satisfy the preconditions under the RttT competition (Howell, 2015; Ravitch, 
2013).  
In Illinois, the Illinois General Assembly enacted numerous statutory reforms to meet the 
RttT criteria. Under the Performance Evaluation Reform Act (PERA) enacted in January 2010, 
statutes were changed to permit additional charter schools, create an electronic longitudinal data 
system to track student achievement data from pre-K through college, and add student growth 
measures in teacher and principal evaluations (Illinois State Board of Education [ISBE], 2015). 
This legislation and subsequent modifications to administrative rules changed the required 
summative evaluation categories from three categories (excellent, satisfactory, unsatisfactory) to 
four (excellent, proficient, needs improvement, unsatisfactory), added a required Professional 
Development Plan (PDP) for any tenured teacher earning a “needs improvement” rating, and 
mandated a minimum number of formal and informal observations for probationary and tenured 
teachers (ISBE, 2015). Additional changes included inclusion of student growth measures 
factored into summative evaluation ratings—to be implemented in all districts by 2016-2017—
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and annual summative evaluations for any tenured teacher rated as “needs improvement” or 
“unsatisfactory,” instead of the 2-year evaluation cycle. A subsequent bill, Senate Bill 7 (SB7), 
was enacted in June 2011 connecting summative evaluation ratings to layoffs and streamlining 
rules for local boards of education to dismiss teachers (ISBE, 2015). Upon passage, lawmakers 
and education advocacy groups hailed these laws as significant reforms that would improve the 
teaching profession. Some advocates hoped a wider distribution of summative ratings would 
result, with fewer teachers marked as “excellent” and more teachers rated as “needs 
improvement” or “unsatisfactory,” and ineffective teachers removed from the classroom 
(Regenstein, 2011). Historically in Illinois, a minimal number of underperforming Illinois 
teachers had received “unsatisfactory” summative ratings, and even fewer had been remediated 
or released for inadequate performance (Reeder, 2005a). Reinforcing this claim in their RttT 
application (State of Illinois, 2010), Illinois cited data from The Widget Effect (Weisberg, 
Sexton, Mulhern, & Keeling, 2009) that found among teachers in the three largest Illinois school 
districts, 92.6% were rated “superior” or “excellent,” 7% were rated “satisfactory,” and only 
0.4% were rated “unsatisfactory.” 
Statement of the Problem 
National studies have shown that most teachers receive “satisfactory” or “excellent” 
summative evaluation ratings, but survey research of school administrators suggest more 
teachers are underperforming than evaluation data indicate (Kraft & Gilmour, 2017; Weisberg et 
al., 2008). When Illinois enacted SB7 and PERA reforms, policy advocates called for rigorous 
teacher evaluations—to improve or remove underperforming teachers from the classroom 
(Regenstein, 2011). However, a problem exists: Since the reforms were passed, Illinois 
policymakers have minimal contemporary or longitudinal data to determine whether these 
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reforms have addressed issues of teacher underperformance. First, comprehensive and complete 
data on teachers’ annual evaluation ratings, teacher dismissals, and remediation in Illinois are not 
reported to ISBE by local school districts. Data on teacher underperformance for the past four 
decades in Illinois is incomplete. Thus, researchers and journalists have utilized inaccurate data 
on dismissal hearings to estimate teacher underperformance levels (see Henry, 2010; Jones, 
1985; London, 1998; Reeder, 2005a; Seltzer, 1992). Second, dismissal data underestimated 
teacher underperformance numbers, as ineffective teachers resign their positions prior to a state 
hearing officer—the result of negotiated settlements and/or resignations prior to dismissal 
(Bridges, 1992; Whitaker, 1999). Finally, the most recent year that dismissal data were collected 
and reported by researchers was 2008, prior to the enactment of PERA (Henry, 2010). PERA 
legislation attempted to address this gap by requiring school districts to submit annual 
comprehensive teacher evaluation data to ISBE, including teacher and principal evaluation 
ratings from all Illinois public school districts (ISBE, 2015). However, ISBE has been slow to 
implement this component of the law. The first data were collected during the 2015-2016 school 
year, but only from the 20% of school districts identified as the lowest achieving and/or districts 
that voluntarily participated in the Illinois RttT initiative (ISBE, 2016). The first public release of 
statewide data for all schools occurred in November 2017, reporting on the 2016-2017 school 
year (ISBE, 2017d). 
Although state government bodies can pass laws and establish regulations, the 
implementation of educational policy still occurs in local schools and districts. Policymakers 
need accurate data on the effects of policy reforms, but they also need to understand local factors 
that affect the interpretation and implementation of policy. Local contexts can influence teacher 
evaluation processes, including the influence of politics within the local school and school 
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district (Malen, 2006). Therefore, researchers have called for the study of micropolitics—the 
“formal and informal transactions that shape policy implementation” (Kirst & Wirt, 2009, p. 
203)—and its influence on summative teacher evaluations. These micropolitical factors influence 
how evaluators interact with local personnel and make decisions in the teacher evaluation 
process (Blase & Blase, 2002; Bridges & Groves, 1999).  
To generate an accurate portrait of Illinois teacher evaluation reform, a mixed methods 
study was appropriate. This study addressed the problems of incomplete data on teacher 
underperformance and the influence of micropolitics on policy implementation. In the 
quantitative phase, personnel data were collected on PDPs, remediation plans, and teacher 
dismissals from all Illinois public school districts to determine if the reforms influenced the 
identification of underperforming teachers. In the qualitative phase, evaluators were interviewed 
to determine whether micropolitics affected the identification of underperforming teachers.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to examine the phenomenon of teacher evaluation, 
focusing on how micropolitics have influenced the implementation of teacher evaluation reforms 
in Illinois. An explanatory sequential mixed methods design with the follow-up explanation 
variant was used. This involved the initial collection and analysis of quantitative data and then 
expanding upon these findings through in-depth qualitative data from participants who were 
positioned to assist in illuminating the results (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Ivankova, 
Creswell, & Stick, 2006). In the quantitative phase, personnel data were collected and analyzed 
from all Illinois public school districts to assess whether evaluation policy reform (independent 
variable) affected the identification of underperforming teachers (dependent variables). The 
qualitative phase was conducted to unpack and provide depth to the quantitative results.  
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Illinois public school principals were interviewed to explore how micropolitics of 
personnel evaluation influenced the identification of underperforming teachers. Quantitative data 
provided a broad overview of the identification of underperforming teachers statewide, while the 
qualitative data provided specific details on micropolitical factors that influenced principals 
when identifying underperforming teachers in their local schools.  
Research Questions 
The following research questions guided this study: 
Research question 1: To what extent has the implementation of teacher evaluation 
reforms affected the frequency of identifying underperforming teachers in Illinois public 
schools? 
Research question 2: How have micropolitical factors influenced principals in the 
identification of underperforming teachers in Illinois since the implementation of teacher 
evaluation reforms? 
Conceptual Framework 
Two conceptual frameworks informed this study: micropolitics of personnel evaluation 
(Bridges & Groves, 1999) and education policy implementation theory (Honig, 2006). Education 
policies are created away from the local site, in state or federal capitals, but the failure or success 
of policies occurs at the local school level where most policies are implemented (Kirst & Wirt, 
2009). Education policy implementation theory describes the interaction of policies, policy 
actors, and policy implementation sites to understand how policies are implemented (Honig, 
2006). Policy change requires modifications to the local school culture, and policymakers often 
ignore the political realities of local implementation (Hess, 2013). The micropolitics of personnel 
evaluation framework describes how local policy actors influence the evaluation process at the 
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local school level (Bridges & Groves, 1999). The struggle is for power and control over “adult 
issues that supersede anything that goes on in the classroom” (Owen, 2006, p. 4). 
Methodology 
This study included both quantitative and qualitative methods. In the quantitative phase, 
questionnaires were emailed to 859 public school district superintendent in Illinois to gather data 
on the numbers of PDPs, remediation plans, and teacher dismissals between the 2006-2007 and 
2016-2017 school years. In addition, data were obtained from ISBE on the numbers of educators 
employed and student enrollments between the 2006-2007 and 2016-2017 school years. 
Additional demographic information, including the percentage of low income students, the 
percentage of students belonging to a particular racial/ethnic group, and contact information for 
district and school leaders for the 2016-2017 school year, was obtained. 
Information from the quantitative first phase was further explored in a second qualitative 
phase. In-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with 20 practicing evaluators from 
Illinois public schools who had experience before and after the policy reforms and who had 
identified an underperforming teacher. These interviews addressed micropolitical factors that 
may have influenced the principals while carrying out the evaluation reform policies in their 
local schools. The findings of the quantitative and qualitative phases were integrated during the 
interpretation phase of the mixed methods study (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). 
Researcher’s Statement 
For 11 years, I have served as a middle school principal in an Illinois public school 
district, during which time I have evaluated teachers annually. As a doctoral student/researcher 
and practitioner, I am interested in the issues surrounding supervision and evaluation and the 
identification and support of underperforming teachers. In my leadership practice, I have 
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conducted countless observation cycles; written numerous summative evaluation reports; made 
recommendations for employment, re-employment, and dismissal; and led and/or participated in 
the writing and implementation of PDPs and remediation plans for educators. When confronted 
with these high-stakes decisions, I have been challenged by the politics that influenced my 
decision making. 
Without the support of my superintendent and local board of education, these plans 
would not have been written. They establish and reinforce the parameters for an organizational 
culture demanding high-quality teachers for every student. However, I have experienced 
micropolitical pressures from local actors—including the teachers’ union, community and family 
members within the district, board of education members, and staff relationships—who 
interacted to influence my efforts to remediate underperforming teachers. Some actors were 
supportive, while others were opposed. In some cases, I was slower and more cautious in 
addressing underperformance, fearing disruptions to the school climate and fractured 
relationships between staff and myself. Due to my ongoing experiences, I have often wondered 
whether other school leaders experience similar challenges and, if so, how local politics 
influences their decisions. 
Limitations 
A perfect study is not possible. Therefore, the researcher must delineate the limitations 
associated with the study (Mertens, 2009). The teacher underperformance data used in this study 
was limited to ratings of all Illinois public school educators who are subject to Illinois teacher 
evaluation laws and are in non-administrative appointments. These personnel may include 
general education and special education teachers, counselors, social workers, certificated nurses, 
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psychologists, library/media specialists, and instructional coaches, among other certificated 
positions.  
The accuracy of the quantitative findings depended upon the accurate reporting of Illinois 
school districts subject to the FOIA request. Errors could include data entry, inaccurate 
calculations, and misunderstanding of the data collection criteria and procedures. In addition, 
resignations may skew the accuracy of the data. For example, teachers might resign their position 
due to a negotiated settlement, upon obtaining other employment, to avoid discipline, or to avoid 
initiation of a PDP or remediation plan.  
One limitation was the quantitative data did not reflect the identification of all non-
tenured teachers in Illinois. First, under Illinois statutes, Illinois school boards may remove a 
non-tenured teacher without the requirement of initiating a PDP or remediation plan (ISBE, 
2015); they may simply non-renew the teacher’s annual contract. Second, tenured and non-
tenured teachers may resign to avoid dismissal and will not be reflected in the quantitative 
dismissal, PDP, or remediation data. Finally, the voluntary questionnaire only represented only a 
sampling of Illinois public school districts; therefore, results cannot be generalized as 
representative of the entire state. 
The accuracy of the qualitative findings was dependent upon the willingness of 
participants to participate and provide candid and honest responses to the interview questions. 
First, participants self-selected or volunteered to participate in the interviews, which may have 
created self-selection bias influencing the findings (Robinson, 2013). Second, gaining access to 
interview participants was difficult if sensitive information about school politics could have been 
perceived as damaging for a potential study participant (Flessa, 2009). Third, a participant may 
have provided a response that he/she deemed as socially desirable, rather than one that was 
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representative of one’s true opinions. Fourth, the interview participants included only a small 
sample of the total number of evaluators in Illinois; also, the experiences of participants in the 
qualitative phase may not have been representative of the school districts whose data were 
reported in the quantitative phase. Although I hoped to obtain participants employed by the 
respondent districts from the quantitative phase, the criteria for inclusion—including 7 years of 
evaluation experience and experience implementing an improvement lever—resulted in a small 
pool of potential participants. In addition, member checks were conducted post-analysis. 
Therefore, the experiences of participants cannot be generalized as representative of all school 
districts or evaluators in Illinois. 
Delimitations 
This study was delimited to the study of the PERA and SB7 teacher evaluation reforms in 
Illinois. Teacher evaluation policies and practices vary across states, and the findings from this 
study may not apply to other states whose laws and implementation processes may differ. For 
example, Illinois statutes reflect more comprehensive requirements for school districts to bargain 
or consult with their local teachers’ unions on various aspects of the evaluation process than may 
be the case in many other states. The results of this study may not apply to states in which 
collective bargaining does not influence local evaluation policy.  
The population in the qualitative phase included 859 public elementary, high school, and 
unit districts in Illinois. The study excluded other public school entities, including the Illinois 
Department of Corrections statewide school district, 13 state-funded schools including 
university-affiliated schools and state-run facilities for special needs students, 110 special 
education districts, 77 vocational/technical cooperatives, and 38 Intermediate Service Centers 
and Regional Offices of Education that supervise and operate state-funded schools and regional 
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programs. Teacher evaluation processes in Illinois private and parochial schools are not 
regulated by Illinois law and therefore were excluded from the study. 
The participants in the qualitative phase were delimited to principals in Illinois public 
schools who have undertaken specialized training and assessments and engaged in the practice of 
evaluation. To become qualified evaluators, Illinois evaluation reforms required all potential 
evaluators to complete an online training course and pass interrater reliability exams (ISBE, 
2015). However, evaluators could include those working in positions besides principals and 
assistant principals—department chairpersons, teacher leaders, content area leads, and others so 
qualified and assigned to evaluate educators. Under Illinois law, qualified evaluators are not 
required to hold an administrative certification in order to evaluate teachers.  
Significance of the Study 
This study is significant because of the need to evaluate recent Illinois education policy 
reforms and the effects of their implementation. Using the frameworks of micropolitics in 
education and education policy implementation theory, the study informed Illinois teacher 
evaluation policy and practice by identifying the supports and barriers that influence evaluators 
when identifying underperforming teachers. In addition, Illinois makes an interesting case for 
studying teacher evaluation and policy reforms. The negotiation process for developing PERA 
and SB7 reform legislation was heralded as a new model for collaboration between advocacy 
groups, legislators, policymakers, and teachers’ unions (Regenstein, 2011). Thus, this study 
provided a mechanism to determine the extent to which this collaboration yielded the intended 
implementation outcomes. Finally, the findings can be useful, to help shape future policy and 
provide feedback to legislators and stakeholders on the effects of legislation.  
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Definition of Terms 
Advocacy group. A non-profit organization—including corporate reformers (Ravitch, 
2013), philanthropies, sociopolitical organizations, think tanks, and labor unions—that engages 
in political influence in education policy by using strategies such as publishing research reports, 
funding pilot projects, and/or engaging in direct political influence in public policymaking 
(Scott, Lubienski, & DeBray-Pelot, 2009). 
Certificated staff. In Illinois public schools, certificated staff includes teachers, 
administrators, school psychologists, social workers, school counselors, and school librarians 
holding specified teaching certifications through ISBE (2015). For the purposes of this study, the 
term “teacher” and “educator” are synonymous with “certificated staff”—but excluding 
educators employed under administrative contracts. 
Illinois State Board of Education. The Illinois State Board Education (ISBE) is the state 
agency responsible for creating administrative regulations for K-12 education based upon Illinois 
statutes. This agency oversees public school districts in Illinois, collecting annual school data, 
dispersing education funding, and overseeing regulatory compliance. 
Performance Evaluation Reform Act. Public Act 96-861, also entitled the Performance 
Evaluation Reform Act (PERA), is an Illinois statute passed in January 2010, which contained a 
variety of education reforms focusing on the evaluation of educators and principals, including 
student growth measures for teachers and principals (ISBE, 2015). 
Political actors. Political actors are persons or groups “with their resources seeking to 
accomplish distinctive goals within a context where conflict regularly prevails” (Kirst & Wirt, 
2009, p. 204). They may include philanthropic groups, advocacy organizations, educational 
interest-based groups such as labor unions or parent/teacher groups, administrators, professional 
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organizations, corporations and businesses, bureaucrats, legislators, teachers, students and 
parents (Kirst & Wirt, 2009; Marsh & Wohlstetter, 2013; Scott et al., 2009).  
Policy implementation. Educational policy implementation describes the interactions of 
policies, people, and places and how they shape the implementation result (Honig, 2006). 
Professional Development Plan. Under the Illinois PERA, a tenured teacher who 
receives a “needs improvement” summative rating must undertake a Professional Development 
Plan (PDP) for the following school year that contains improvement activities. Regulations have 
defined this plan to include frequent observations, classroom supports, and specific activities to 
improve performance (ISBE, 2015). 
Qualified evaluator. Any Illinois school educator who is approved to evaluate public 
school educators. Starting in the 2012-2013 school year, qualified evaluators were required to 
pass a comprehensive training program that contains information on the Danielson Framework 
for Teaching (Danielson, 2013), video observations, and content about Illinois teacher evaluation 
rules and procedures. Evaluators are not limited to principals, assistant principals, and other job 
titles with administrative contracts, but may include department chairpersons, teacher leaders, 
instructional coaches, and other non-administrative educators who have met the qualifications to 
evaluate educators (ISBE, 2015). Qualified evaluators may include any school positions that are 
responsible for evaluating educators—including principals, assistant principals, department 
chairpersons, directors, teachers, and others given the authority to engage in teacher evaluation in 
their districts. As of April 2018, 16,083 educators had passed the prequalification tests to 
conduct teacher evaluations with student growth measures in Illinois, but the number who 
actually conduct evaluations is much less (Growth Through Learning, 2018). 
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Race to the Top. Under the Obama administration, the federal government awarded $5 
billion in the Race to the Top (RttT) competitive grant program to states who applied and agreed 
to implement various educational initiatives addressing data management, college readiness, 
teacher effectiveness, and low-performing schools (Howell, 2015; Superfine, Smylie, 
Cummings, & Tozer, 2012). Illinois was awarded $43 million in the third round of the RttT 
competition (Howell, 2015; State of Illinois, 2010). 
Remediation plan. Under the Illinois Performance Evaluation Reform Act (PERA), 
tenured teachers who receive an “unsatisfactory” rating must complete a remediation plan. 
Illinois statutes have defined this plan to include frequent evaluation, classroom support, a 
consulting teacher, and specific activities to improve performance. Boards of education may 
initiate a state mandated process to dismiss a teacher who remains “unsatisfactory” after 
completing the remediation plan (ISBE, 2015). 
Senate Bill 7 (SB7). In Illinois, Public Act 97-0008 was enacted in June 2011. This 
legislation was connected to PERA, extending summative evaluation ratings to tenure and layoff 
decisions, as well as revising negotiation procedures between boards of education and their local 
teachers’ unions (ISBE, 2015). 
Underperforming educator. For the purposes of this study, an educator who receives a 
“needs improvement” or “unsatisfactory” rating shall be considered underperforming. In Illinois, 
these ratings mandate a PDP or a remediation plan (ISBE, 2015).  
Summary 
This dissertation includes five chapters. Chapter 1 provided an overview of the study, 
including an introduction to the problem, purpose, research questions, methodology, and 
significance. Chapter 2 contains a review of the literature about educator evaluation ratings and 
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the factors that influence them. Chapter 3 describes the research questions for the study, a 
description of the methodology, the population, sample selection, data collection methodology, 
and data analysis procedures that will be utilized. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the findings 
from the study. Chapter 5 focuses on interpretation of the research findings as related to the 
conceptual framework and literature review. Recommendations for policy, practice, and future 
research are discussed in detail. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
Over the past 30 years, state and federal policymakers have implemented myriad reforms 
intended to improve public education. Faced with political pressures and federal incentives to 
change, state policymakers enacted legislation to improve instruction through teacher evaluation 
reforms to create the conditions for school improvement (Darling-Hammond, 2014; Ravitch, 
2016). In 1983, A Nation at Risk called for higher standards for teacher preparation, 
accountability for teachers, and teacher pay structures tied to quality and performance (National 
Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). Described as “the all-time blockbuster of 
education reports” (Ravitch, 2013, p. 27), this task force decried that America’s schools were 
failing and in need of significant reforms. In response to public reaction to the report, some states 
initiated new systems of teacher evaluation, including enhanced evaluator training, new teaching 
standards, and early efforts at performance evaluation reforms (Hazi & Rucinski, 2009). 
Influenced by the reactions to A Nation at Risk, Illinois enacted the 1986 School Reform 
Act 24A, changing the process for teacher remediation and dismissal (London, 1998; McDonald, 
1992). Several years later, the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 was passed with the 
focused purpose of raising student test scores in reading and mathematics (Ravitch, 2013). This 
legislation implemented higher standards for new and current teachers, defining new standards 
for “highly-qualified” teachers in every classroom. The law also implemented mandatory student 
testing for accountability purposes, annual performance goals for schools, and the requirement 
that 100% of students meet proficiency standards by 2014 (No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 
[NCLB], 2002). In 2009, the RttT grant program (ARRA, 2009) provided financial incentives for 
states to implement new plans for college and workplace readiness, data systems to track student 
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growth, methods to address teacher effectiveness, and reforms for the lowest performing schools. 
RttT lured many states to implement reforms to satisfy the requirements for their grant 
applications, including teacher evaluation reforms. These changes included connecting teacher 
evaluation to student growth, requiring new professional development for teachers and 
principals, linking compensation to teacher retention/promotion, the intent to produce rigorous 
rules for granting tenure and certification, and rules for removing underperforming teachers from 
the workplace (Howell, 2015; Lavigne & Good, 2014). When Illinois enacted reforms to meet 
the RttT grant conditions, some advocacy groups hoped for outcomes that included the 
improvement or removal of underperforming teachers (Regenstein, 2011). 
This chapter reviews the literature on teacher evaluation and the role it plays on 
improving or removing underperforming teachers. First, research on leadership for learning 
describes the current focus of school leaders on teaching and learning. Next, the historical 
development and purposes of teacher evaluation are explored, followed by a review of teacher 
quality. The distribution of teacher evaluation ratings shows national data and trends on 
summative evaluation ratings, followed by the history of teacher evaluation processes in Illinois. 
To provide explanations for these outcomes, the literature on factors that influence evaluators 
when identifying underperforming teachers is explored to learn why evaluators may be 
influenced to issue performance ratings that do not align with actual teacher performance. 
Finally, to frame this study, the conceptual frameworks of micropolitics of personnel evaluation 
(Bridges & Groves, 1999) and education policy implementation (Honig, 2006) are presented. 
Leadership for Learning 
Throughout the past two decades, the practice of school leadership has shifted from 
responsibilities normally considered managerial toward models emphasizing student learning. 
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This shift has challenged school leaders to balance the often-conflicting roles of management 
tasks and instructional leadership (Grubb & Flessa, 2006; Hallinger & Murphy, 2013; Portin & 
Knapp, 2014). Meanwhile, research on school leader practices began to show correlations 
between effective leadership and improving student learning, recognizing that certain leadership 
behaviors were more likely to be observed in higher performing schools (Copland & Knapp, 
2006; Murphy, Hallinger, & Heck, 2013). A review of literature found leadership to be the 
second most important in-school factor influencing student achievement, second only to the 
classroom teacher (Leithwood, Lewis, Anderson, & Wahlstrom, 2004). Research estimated 
highly effective school leaders can add two to seven months of achievement in mathematics 
when effective leaders support the conditions for learning. This effect occurred as quickly as one 
academic year when effective leaders were compared to ineffective leaders (Branch, Hanushek, 
& Rivkin, 2013).  
Leaders create the conditions for learning in which “individual variables combine to 
reach critical mass” (Wallace Foundation, 2013, p. 5). In response to the emerging research on 
these variables, Copland and Knapp (2006) created a leadership for learning framework. 
Murphy, Elliot, Goldring, and Porter (2007) subsequently developed a taxonomy of dimensions 
and functions to define leadership for learning, including creating a vision for learning, 
instructional program, curricular program, assessment program, communities of learning, 
resource allocation and use, organizing culture, and social advocacy. A complementary model by 
Hallinger (2011) described leadership for learning through the four dimensions of values 
leadership, leadership focus, context for leadership, and sources of leadership. Although multiple 
terms for these models of this leadership exist—including leadership for learning, instructionally 
focused leadership, and leadership for school improvement—each model emphasizes the 
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essential role of the principal in promoting teaching quality and learning (Murphy et al., 2007). 
The next section will describe the leadership for learning framework through the five conditions 
leaders establish to support learning: (a) establishing a focus on learning, (b) building 
professional communities that matter for learning, (c) engaging external environments that 
matter for learning, (d) acting strategically and sharing leadership, and (e) creating coherence 
(Copland & Knapp, 2006). These conditions are addressed in this section. 
Establishing a focus on learning. Leadership for learning calls on school leaders to 
frame and embrace a common vision for learning focused on the alignment of curriculum, 
instruction, and assessment to promote student growth (Copland & Knapp, 2006). This vision is 
crucial, as “the ability to articulate a learning focused vision that is shared by others and to set 
clear goals creates a base for all other leadership strategies and actions” (Hallinger, 2011, p. 
137). The vision must come alive as the leader models and articulates its meaning to everyone in 
the school community (Copland & Knapp, 2006).  
Copland and Knapp (2006) described actions that school leaders can undertake to 
improve learning focus. Leaders for learning are visible in schools with frequent classroom 
observations—on a daily or weekly basis—to support teaching and professional development. 
Leaders use these observations to engage in professional conversations about instructional 
practices (Portin & Knapp, 2014). Research has found that administrative time spent on 
evaluations and coaching teachers for improvement is correlated to improved student 
achievement (Grissom, Loeb, & Master, 2013). Learning improvement is driven by assessment 
data from students to evaluate the effectiveness of the instructional program. Leaders for learning 
help teachers make sense of the assessment data through conversations and professional 
development. Both leaders and teachers develop plans to improve the results by setting goals and 
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planning strategies for improvement (Murphy et al., 2007). Leaders for learning provide 
continual staff development experiences for teachers by monitoring performance and targeting 
assistance based on data that informs areas of need (Hallinger, 2011). 
Building professional communities that matter for learning. Leaders for learning 
create a culture where a learning is valued by everyone in the school community. They promote 
this focus by visibly demonstrating their commitment to learning (Copland & Knapp, 2006). 
Leaders organize teachers in ways that promote natural collaboration and time for structured 
group work, including the formation of instructional teams that lead instructional improvement 
(Portin & Knapp, 2014). Effective leaders utilize the best models and research to provide quality 
staff development experiences (Murphy et al., 2007). Leaders for learning also hire and retain 
highly effective teachers whose values fit the culture of the school (Branch et al., 2013). 
Leaders must take specific steps toward building trusting relationships with their faculty 
and staff. This work includes changing the supervisory relationships between teachers and 
leaders, emphasizing informal classroom visits beyond the formal evaluation process. Portin and 
Knapp (2014) described several methods leaders utilize to promote this culture. Leaders for 
learning engage in informal conversations with teachers in hallways and outside of the school 
day. Leaders also promote an open-door policy to encourage teachers to share ideas freely and 
engage in professional learning conversations. In addition, leaders demonstrate a positive, 
optimistic tone that welcomes engagement from all members of the school community. 
Engaging external environments that matter for learning. Leaders for learning 
engage the external community to create opportunities for learning. This external community 
includes parents, community and neighborhood groups, advocacy groups, news media, 
taxpayers, and local governments. This engagement includes efforts to secure necessary funding 
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and other resources to improve learning in the school. Leaders also manage the politics of 
schools through relationships with outside policy actors. These policy actors provide 
opportunities for both support and resistance, and leaders for learning employ proactive 
strategies to build relationships with these actors, publicly promoting the vision of their school 
(Copland & Knapp, 2006; Kirst & Wirt, 2009). 
Acting strategically and sharing leadership. Leaders for learning strategically 
distribute leadership to teachers to improve learning. Leaders empower teachers to make 
effective decisions about the operations and management of the school (Copland & Knapp, 2006; 
Portin & Knapp, 2014). Teachers who are empowered to select their own professional learning 
goals may experience increased professional improvement (Sandholtz & Scribner, 2006). In 
addition, collaboration that distributes power between the teachers and leadership may improve 
implementation of teacher evaluation policies (Behrstock-Sherratt, Rizzolo, Laine, & Friedman, 
2013). Teacher input to design the evaluation process can result in higher implementation fidelity 
and increased validity of the evaluation results (Goe, Bell, & Little, 2008). 
Creating coherence. Leaders for learning also promote clarity and coherence in their 
efforts to improve learning. Within the school, coherence occurs on three levels. First, coherence 
involves the alignment of methods, activities, and resources to ensure quality instruction. 
Second, coherence involves the alignment of leadership and a common vision. Third, coherence 
requires a shared consensus between all members of the school community (Copland & Knapp, 
2006). 
Coherence is challenging when policies create conflicting demands on schools, especially 
when state and federal policies intersect with local initiatives. Many schools are challenged by 
myriad programs that work individually but do not align with the common vision (Superfine et 
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al., 2012). In their drive for learning improvement, leaders must engage their school community 
to ensure learning improvement efforts are working congruently towards the common goals: 
Improvement is the change with direction, sustained over time, that moves entire 
systems, raising the average level of quality and performance with at the same time 
decreasing the variation among units, and engaging people in analysis and understanding 
of why some actions seem to work and others don’t. (Elmore, 2000, p. 13) 
 
In the next section, the history of teacher supervision and evaluation will be explored, including 
the development of the purposes of these functions. 
History of Teacher Supervision and Evaluation in the United States 
Current educational literature defines teacher supervision through the lens of instructional 
supervision—a nonjudgmental process to help teachers improve their instructional skills. Hazi 
and Rucinski (2009) defined supervision as a professional development process to improve 
teacher quality. Marzano, Frontier, and Livingston (2011) defined supervision as “the 
enhancement of teachers pedagogical skills, with the ultimate goal of enhancing student 
achievement” (p. 2), citing research noting positive correlations between teacher skill and student 
achievement. Mette et al. (2017) described supervision as “focused on ongoing support, teacher 
improvement, and teacher professional growth” (p. 710) through formal and informal means. 
The process of teacher evaluation has evolved into a legally mandated and regulated 
personnel function to conduct observations and determine summative evaluation ratings over a 
defined time period. Although some researchers and practitioners conflate supervision and 
evaluation as the same activity, they should be considered as separate functions (Hazi & 
Rucinski, 2009). In general, teacher evaluations included elements of classroom observations, 
analysis of observation data, and interaction between the teacher and the observer. To conclude 
the evaluation process, the evaluator makes a summative judgement about the teacher’s 
performance and issues a final rating or score, potentially affecting future employment status 
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(Darling-Hammond, 2013; Mette et al., 2017). Early teacher evaluation was defined and 
regulated at the local level. However, following the release of A Nation at Risk in 1983 (National 
Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983) and later the passage of the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001, some states developed policies to connect evaluations with teacher 
accountability (Hazi & Rucinski, 2009). In 2009, through the RttT grant program, states were 
lured to reform their teacher evaluation policies to connect student growth scores to summative 
evaluation ratings, increase the rigor of teacher evaluation instruments, and use evaluation 
ratings to remove underperforming teachers from the classroom (Howell, 2015; Lavigne & 
Good, 2014). 
Tracy (1995) described seven phases in the historical development of teacher supervision 
in the United States. The first phase of community accountability occurred between the mid-
1600s and the early 1800s. Local committees of government officials or clergy supervised 
schools, with clergy playing a strong role because of their knowledge of religious curriculum, 
their own educational attainment, and the cultural norms of the community. These laypersons 
visited the school to inspect the content being taught, student progress, student discipline, 
teaching methods, and the physical classroom environment, with inspections occurring annually 
or monthly (Tracy). Criteria and standards for teacher performance did not exist, resulting in 
varied quality and types of feedback to teachers. In this phase, however, the primary role was 
helping the teacher improve teacher performance (Marzano et al., 2011). 
The second phase of professionalism occurred during most of the 1800s. School 
supervision emerged as a specialized role for professionals who were experts in teaching and 
content (Tracy, 1995). The growth in urban school systems spurred this movement, as schools 
consolidated into larger districts where specialized roles for content specialists and 
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administrators could be supported. This trend gradually influenced rural schools, as laypersons 
and clergy were determined to lack the knowledge and skills to measure teaching effectiveness 
(Marzano et al., 2011). Teacher institutes and college training were created to provide training to 
groups of teachers efficiently, but this decreased the individual assistance once provided to 
individual teachers (Tracy, 1995). 
The third phase was the scientific phase, occurring between the early 1900s through the 
1920s (Tracy, 1995). The work of Frederick Taylor influenced schools to adopt organizational 
practices from industry—known as the factory model—to increase productivity. Data could be 
collected to measure the performance of teachers and schools, including the early use of 
standards and aptitude tests to measure student learning (Lavigne & Good, 2014; Marzano et al., 
2011). In addition, the first teacher ratings scales were developed in 1915 (Lavigne & Good, 
2014). Teacher assignments became more specialized into content areas as school enrollment 
increased, similar to the division of labor on the assembly line (Tracy, 1995). The concept of an 
organizational structure containing an 8-year elementary school and 4-year high school also was 
developed (Fine, 1997). 
The fourth phase was human relations. Between the 1930s and 1940s, a greater focus on 
teachers as individuals emerged (Tracy, 1995). School supervision focused on both the 
professional and personal needs of teachers, including professional development and emotional 
support. Teachers were afforded greater autonomy and creativity in their classrooms. The roles 
of supervisors also widened to include curriculum, public relations, school lunches, and other 
management functions (Marzano et al., 2011). The dominant model for the next century of 
teacher evaluation was established: A school leader observes a teacher’s lesson using a checklist 
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or ratings tool, followed by a conference where the evaluator lists the teacher’s areas of strength 
and weakness (Lavigne & Good, 2014). 
The next two phases reemerged from the struggle to balance the emerging knowledge on 
the elements of effective teaching and the desire to maintain teacher autonomy within their 
classrooms (Marzano et al., 2011). Between the 1940s and 1960s, the fifth phase experienced the 
reemergence of the scientific phase (Tracy, 1995). In this era of clinical supervision, new 
teaching models emerged. The complexity of evaluations increased with prescriptive criteria and 
procedures to measure the effectiveness of teaching practices (Lavigne & Good, 2014; Marzano 
et al., 2011). The sixth phase returned to the human relations phase between the mid-1960s and 
mid-1980s (Tracy, 1995). Evaluators measured teaching performance through the lens of 
prescribed teaching models, using checklists to ensure the teacher followed the procedures and 
sequence of the models. These tools gave more direction and structure. This movement was 
driven by teachers’ unions who pushed for more objectivity—clear and consistent evaluation 
criteria—in teacher evaluation systems (Kersten & Israel, 1995). The clinical evaluation cycle of 
pre- and post-conferences emerged during the early 1980s, along with shared responsibility for 
teacher improvement between the teacher and their supervisor (Hazi & Rucinski, 2009). 
The seventh phase of human development started in the mid-1980s. An increased focus 
on the needs of teachers as adult learners emerged, including concerns over their career stages 
and personal development (Tracy, 1995). Some research proposed using different indicators of 
quality to define teachers at different stages of their career (Clayton, 2013). Differentiated 
evaluation and professional development models emerged to provide targeted supervision based 
on the experience level and needs of teachers, embracing multiple evaluation models and 
approaches to fit the needs of the teacher (Marzano et al., 2011). In addition, teacher reflection in 
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evaluation emerged during this phase (Hazi & Rucinski, 2009). Meanwhile, reports such as A 
Nation at Risk were published to highlight problems in education and call for education reforms 
(NCEE, 1983). State legislatures—including Illinois—began to pass laws to reform and 
standardize teacher evaluation practices, including new requirements to train evaluators. The 
amount of time and effort evaluators devoted to teacher evaluations increased the demands on 
school leaders (Kersten & Israel, 1995).  
Following the second human development phase, an additional teacher evaluation phase 
has emerged. Since 2009, over two-thirds of states engaged in significant teacher evaluation 
reforms (Hull, 2013). The role of supervision evolved into a comprehensive teacher evaluation 
process with alignment to uniform and rigorous teaching standards, a stronger focus on student 
learning outcomes, and multiple measures of teaching and learning (Donaldson & Papay, 2014; 
Lavigne & Good, 2015). Charlotte Danielson published her teaching framework in 1996, and it 
was considered the most detailed model of teaching and teacher evaluation available (Marzano et 
al., 2011). Danielson’s framework is the most popular model used by schools today (Donaldson 
& Papay, 2014) and was the teacher evaluation model suggested by Illinois state policy officials 
(ISBE, 2015). Other models used in Illinois and other states included the core propositions of 
National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, the Causal Teaching Evaluation Model 
developed by Robert Marzano, and the Classroom Assessment Scoring System (CLASS; 
(Donaldson & Papay, 2014; Lavigne & Chamberlain, 2017; Marzano, Carbough, Rutherford, & 
Toth, 2014). 
Many teacher evaluation reforms connected summative evaluation ratings to student 
scores on student tests (Lavigne & Good, 2014). Some reforms went further to connect teacher 
salaries to evaluation ratings and student test scores (Goldhaber & Walch, 2011). In 2013, 38 
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states required summative teacher evaluations to include or consider student achievement scores, 
while 23 states required student achievement to comprise at least half of the summative 
evaluation score (Hull, 2013). One early reform connecting student test scores to evaluations was 
the Tennessee Value Added Assessment System (TVASS), mandated by the 1992 Education 
Improvement Act in Tennessee (Sanders & Horn, 1994). The TVASS model uses a pre-test and a 
post-test for each measured course. Using a large database of present and historical information, 
statisticians developed a scoring model to measure the influence the teacher had on their 
students’ growth. This reform was attractive to policymakers because it quantified teaching into 
understandable, objective measures that could be reported to the public and used for 
accountability purposes (Hanushek, 2009; Mead, Rotherham, & Brown, 2012). Sanders’ early 
value-added models did not include controls to account for students’ demographic context 
because TVAAS argued the demographic information for a child’s performance already affected 
the pre-test scores. A student whose socioeconomic conditions affected her/his assessment scores 
already was experiencing these conditions at the time of the pre-test and in the longitudinal data 
collected over time (Ballou, Sanders, & Wright, 2004).  
Many studies suggested value-added models were statistically reliable and valid (Ballou 
et al., 2004; Sanders & Horn, 1998). Others found value-added measures could predict the future 
performance of both students’ and teachers’ performance (Aaronson, Barrow, & Sanders, 2007; 
American Statistical Association [ASA], 2014), predict high school students’ college readiness 
(Smalskas, 2013), and correlate with teachers’ content knowledge and instructional quality (Hill, 
Kapitula, & Urnland, 2011). Value-added measures were effective in other applications, 
including the assignment of students to specific teachers based on instructional and learning 
styles or content knowledge (McClellan, Donoghue, & Pianta, 2014), to ensure a student was not 
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assigned to an underperforming teacher for consecutive years (Mead et al., 2012), as the 
measurement criteria for salary systems connected to student test scores (Goldhaber & Walch, 
2011), and for allocating professional development resources to the teachers who needed them 
most (Ruzek, Hafen, Hamre, & Pianta, 2014).  
Other researchers, however, have questioned the utility of value-added measures (Baker, 
Oluwole, & Green, 2013). Researchers criticized the statistical methodology of TVASS, 
including the failure to account for prior student learning (Stronge, Ward, & Grant, 2011) and 
student socioeconomic status (Amrein-Beardsley, 2008; Mead et al., 2012). Sanders’ work 
initially excluded demographic characteristics from the calculations, but later models 
incorporated student characteristics such as poverty and race into the calculations (Ballou et al., 
2004). Value-added measures showed low reliability, calling into question their use for high-
stakes decisions such as teacher dismissal or tenure (ASA, 2014; Staiger & Kane, 2014). Value-
added measures may identify the strongest or weakest teachers but lack the sensitivity to 
distinguish between teachers whose scores lie outside these extremes (Mead et al., 2012). Greater 
reliability would result from using measurements throughout a teacher’s career to reduce the 
variability of year-to-year factors (ASA, 2014; Staiger & Kane, 2014). Value-added measures 
also suffer from low instructional sensitivity, described as the correlation of teaching inputs and 
student learning outputs (Goe et al., 2008; Polikoff, 2014), partly caused by unclear or divergent 
indicators of effective teaching (Darling-Hammond, 2013; Kimball & Milanowski, 2009). In the 
next section, the purposes of the teacher supervision and evaluation will be explored.  
Purposes of Teacher Supervision and Evaluation 
The current phase of supervision expands the role and importance of teacher evaluation 
processes. Besides rating teacher performance, evaluations should provide a comprehensive 
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system to connect professional development with teacher evaluation (Darling-Hammond, 2013; 
Goldrick, Zabala, & Burn, 2013). Darling-Hammond (2013) described an overall vision of an 
ideal evaluation system: 
What this country really needs is a conception of teacher evaluation as part of a teaching 
and learning system that supports continuous improvement, both for individual teachers 
and for the profession as a whole. Such as system would enhance teacher learning and 
skill, while at the same time ensuring that teachers who are retained and tenured can 
effectively support student learning throughout their careers. (p. 5)  
 
 In the next section, the purposes of teacher evaluation will be explored using the purposes 
delineated by Haefele (1993). He called for evaluation reforms to focus on formative and 
summative aspects of evaluation with the purposes of (a) screening teachers, (b) providing 
constructive feedback to individual teachers, (c) rewarding outstanding performance, 
(d) informing professional development, (e) providing legally defensible documentation, 
(f) terminating incompetent or unproductive personnel, and (g) unifying teachers and 
administrators in a common effort of educating students. The next section will explore the 
literature on each purpose. 
Screening teachers. Screening teachers for rehiring or continued employment is an 
essential summative function of teacher evaluation (Hanushek, 2009; Staiger & Rockoff, 2010). 
Leaders for learning apply this understanding to hire effective teachers, provide them the 
resources and supports to improve instruction, and support their ongoing development (Mason & 
Schroeder, 2010). Having a quality teacher in the classroom is important due to the influence 
effective teachers have on student achievement (Guarino, Santibañez, & Daley, 2006; Little & 
Miller, 2007). The presence of ineffective teachers is a significant reform challenge facing low-
achieving schools. Research shows low-achieving schools experience a high teacher turnover 
rate, making long-term reforms challenging to sustain (Garcia, Slate, & Delgado, 2009; Jacob, 
2007). The research connecting these teaching and leadership inputs to student learning helped 
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advance numerous reform movements around evaluation and improving or removing 
underperforming teachers (Ravitch, 2013). 
A teacher’s academic performance in high school or college may predict teacher quality 
and higher student achievement (D’Augostino & Powers, 2009). In the United States, only 23% 
of teachers graduated in the top third of their high school graduating class. In contrast, Singapore 
limits enrollment in teacher preparation programs to the top 30% of high school graduates. 
School officials in the United States are hindered in their ability to hire effective teachers when 
the labor pool includes many teachers who were moderate to low academic performers in high 
school and college (Auguste, Kihn, & Miller, 2010). Recent pressures from school reforms, 
decreased public school funding, and career teacher earnings has reduced the numbers of 
undergraduates who choose to graduate from college with a teaching degree (Sawchuk, 2014).  
For early career teachers, Staiger and Rockoff (2010) found quality teachers are best 
identified after they are hired, collecting evidence throughout their first year of teaching. They 
argued school leaders should aggressively monitor and support teachers in their early career and 
only grant tenure to those staff who are excelling as teachers. The importance of these decisions 
is magnified in states where tenure rights are granted within a short time after initial employment 
(Weisberg et al., 2009).  
Nationwide, teachers in 46 states can earn tenure after 1-5 years of employment, while 
teachers in four states do not have tenure rights (Thomsen, 2014). Since the passage of SB7 in 
Illinois, tenure can be granted after 3-4 years, depending on their ratings, but boards of education 
have an option for granting early tenure after 2 years for teachers were previously tenured in 
another district and who earned “excellent” ratings for 2 consecutive years. However, most 
tenure decisions in Illinois are made during a teacher’s fourth year (ISBE, 2015). Nationwide, 
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few early-career teachers are ever identified as underperforming—and few early-career teachers 
are denied tenure in their last year of tenure eligibility—questioning the rigor of tenure 
acquisition (Weisberg et al., 2009).  
Feedback to individual teachers. School leaders influence student learning and improve 
learning through feedback to teachers (Copland & Knapp, 2006). Formative feedback is an 
effective means to improve teaching performance, as one meta-analysis found formative 
feedback to teachers to have a .90 effect size on student achievement (Hattie, 2009). Feedback 
helps teachers understand how they are influencing students and student learning, and helps them 
to learn strategies and methods to improve their performance (Marzano et al., 2011). Danielson 
(2010) noted, “evaluator-teacher conversations, when conducted around a common 
understanding of good teaching—and around evidence of that teaching—offer a rich opportunity 
for professional dialogue and growth” (p. 39).  
Supervision and evaluation are more effective when leaders provide honest and specific 
feedback throughout the supervisory process (Copland & Knapp, 2006). For teachers to improve, 
they must have accurate information on the effectiveness of their classroom practices and how to 
improve (Firestone, 2014). Teachers have found specific feedback useful for their improvement, 
and when such feedback was offered in post-conferences, teachers were more likely to engage in 
activities to improve their professional practice. These practices included training, professional 
reading, peer observation, and experimenting with new strategies (Tuytens & Devos, 2011). 
Research also has shown leaders must build positive, trustful relationships with their staff, in 
order to be perceived as supportive and genuinely invested in helping them improve their 
performance (Copland & Knapp, 2006; Fullan, 2014).  
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Some school cultures are not receptive to honest and challenging discussions about 
teacher performance (Mead et al., 2012). Teachers may fear summative evaluations because of 
their potential to create job loss (Conley & Glasman, 2008). Summative evaluation ratings are 
required by state laws to rate and rank teachers, yet evaluators are expected to promote 
professional growth through nonjudgmental, formative supervisory processes. Teacher 
evaluation models are challenged to address the supervisory function to support educators’ 
professional growth and the accountability requirement to judge their competence for the 
purposes of continued employment decisions (Mead et al., 2012; Mette et al., 2017). Describing 
these contradictory goals, Danielson (2010) explained: “A system to ensure quality must be 
valid, reliable, and defensible—these are ‘hard-sounding’ qualities—whereas a system designed 
to promote professional learning is likely to be collegial and collaborative—these are much 
‘softer-sounding’ qualities” (p. 37). For example, evaluators may be reluctant to take an 
authoritative approach and mandate teachers change their classroom practices, fearing a loss of 
political capital among teachers within their schools. As a result, leaders may inflate summative 
evaluation ratings and/or provide inaccurate positive feedback for the sake of maintaining peace 
and collegiality (Yariv, 2006). Some school leaders have evaluated teachers more leniently, 
fearing the risk of their own employment (Bridges & Groves, 1999) or declines in staff culture 
and relationships (Mitchell, 2011). Evaluators often softened the evaluation process with 
language to reduce defensiveness, but the reluctance of leaders to provide negative feedback has 
often perpetuated a status quo in which teachers are satisfied with marginal performance or may 
inaccurately believe their marginal performance is actually superior (Yariv, 2006).  
Professional development. Improved teaching and learning practices require a clear 
process for improving teacher performance (Killion & Hirsh, 2011). Effective professional 
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development provides all teachers with time to collaborate, interact, and build trusting 
professional relationships with their colleagues (Copland & Knapp, 2006; Van Driel & Berry, 
2012). In some states or districts, administrators may refer underperforming teachers to a peer 
assistance program, a teacher-led program to match experienced, competent educators with those 
needing assistance (Darling-Hammond, 2013). 
Targeting professional development to the specific needs of teachers is crucial. 
Professional development may benefit from designs that differentiate the expectations based on 
experience, differentiating between the different performance expectations of novice and 
experienced teachers (Clayton, 2013). This alignment can provide a continuum of coordinated 
professional development extending throughout a teacher’s career (Darling-Hammond, 2014; 
Phillips, 2011). For example, alignment between new teacher induction programs and the district 
teacher evaluation process can help new teachers improve their practice at the crucial start of 
their career (Goldrick et al., 2013). Even with rigorous evaluation systems, financial and time 
resources must be devoted to building the capacity of teachers (Darling-Hammond, 2014). 
Terminating incompetent or unproductive personnel. The summative evaluation 
rating is used for identifying teacher effectiveness differences and removing underperforming 
teachers who are less effective (Mead et al., 2012). Some researchers have expressed skepticism 
about the improvement of mediocre or ineffective teachers through staff development processes 
(Little & Miller, 2007). Administrators can work with teachers to implement improved 
instructional practices, but teachers may be slow or resistant to change (Murphy & Meyers, 
2008). Therefore, improved hiring practices reduce the need remove ineffective and 
underperforming teachers later (Rose, English, & Finney, 2014). Hanushek (2009) argued for a 
one-time “deselection” to remove the lowest performing 10% of the teaching workforce. Rather 
 34 
than taking time to improve teacher competence through professional development and training, 
the permanent removal of the lowest-performing staff may yield performance gains. According 
to Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005), “a one standard deviation increase in average teacher 
quality for a grade raises average student achievement in the grade by at least 0.11 standard 
deviations of the total test score distribution in mathematics and 0.095 standard deviations in 
reading” (p. 434). 
Unifying teachers and administrators in a common effort of educating students. The 
final purpose of evaluations is to develop a shared understanding of effective teaching and 
learning practices. For leaders to supervise and evaluate teachers accurately, there must be a 
common understanding of teacher effectiveness (Danielson, 2010; Marzano et al., 2011). Having 
district-defined teaching standards creates a common, unified definition of quality teaching 
(Darling-Hammond, 2013; Marzano et al., 2011). Coherence is created when the evaluation 
process adheres to and reinforces these standards (Copland & Knapp, 2006). Standards may 
facilitate an “accountability relationship” (Holland, 2004, p. 7) between teachers and 
administrators, and this common language provides a framework to help evaluators hold 
professional conversations about student learning and classroom practices with teachers (Kraft & 
Gilmour, 2016). The growth of teaching models such as the Danielson (2013) teaching 
framework and Marzano’s teacher evaluation model (Marzano et al., 2014) aligned teacher 
evaluation systems to uniform standards, defining a common understanding of quality teaching 
and learning. In the next section, the research on defining teacher quality will be explored. 
Defining Teacher Quality 
Recent scholarship has focused on defining teacher quality through perceived classroom 
effectiveness. Darling-Hammond (2013) defined teaching quality as “strong instruction that 
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enables a wide range of students to learn” (p. 12) within the context and conditions where 
learning and teaching occur. Whitcomb and Rose (2008) defined an effective teacher as one 
whose teaching practices lead to improved student learning. Teaching is a complicated endeavor, 
and confounding variables limit the ability to prove causation between teaching inputs and 
student learning. Many complex factors influence student learning, and isolating single factors 
may result in misleading findings (Darling-Hammond, 2013). Some teaching inputs are difficult 
to measure, including a teacher’s effect on student social outcomes such as cooperation and work 
ethic (Goe et al., 2008). Research has attempted to identify variables to predict quality teachers, 
but children and schools are difficult to study—considering the challenges of researcher access 
and student mobility (Whitcomb & Rose, 2008).  
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Gates Foundation) funded $696 million for 
teacher-related programs between 2008 and 2013, funding many teacher evaluation programs, 
including the Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) project. The foundation-supported research 
attempted to define and measure teaching quality through observations of over 3,000 teachers in 
an effort to capture the elements of teaching effectiveness (Phillips, 2011). This research 
determined the research-based teaching frameworks developed by Danielson (2013) and 
Marzano et al. (2014) provided a common terminology for describing quality teaching, and when 
combined with student feedback and student growth measures, trained evaluators could reliably 
measure teaching performance (Ruzek et al., 2011). Goe et al. (2008), writing for the National 
Comprehensive Center for Teaching Quality, presented this definition of effective teaching based 
on their analysis of empirical research on teaching:  
1. Effective teachers have high expectations for all students and help students learn, as 
measured by value-added or other test-based growth measures, or by alternative 
measures. 
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2. Effective teachers contribute to positive academic, attitudinal, and social outcomes for 
students, such as regular attendance, self-efficacy, and cooperative behavior. 
3. Effective teachers use diverse resources to plan and structure engaging learning 
opportunities; monitor student progress formatively, adapting instruction as needed; and 
evaluate learning using multiple sources of evidence. 
4. Effective teachers contribute to the development of classrooms and schools that value 
diversity and civic-mindedness. 
5. Effective teachers collaborate with other teachers, administrators, parents, and education 
professionals to ensure student success, particularly for the success of students with 
special needs and those at high-risk for failure. (p. 8) 
Research has challenged assumptions that a teacher’s age, certification, experience, and 
education level can predict teacher quality (D’Augostino & Powers, 2009). Although teachers’ 
unions have promoted experience as a measure of teaching quality, additional teaching 
experience beyond the early induction phase of a teacher’s career provides no additional benefit 
to improving student learning (Rivkin et al., 2005). One study of urban high schools estimated 
just 10% of the variation in teacher effects were attributed to teacher attributes such as pay, 
tenure, or experience (Aaronson et al., 2007). Jacob’s (2007) research in urban schools found 
few differences among the traditional credentials used to define quality teachers, finding 
“certified teachers are not consistently more effective than uncertified teachers, older teachers 
are not more effective than younger teachers, and teachers with advanced degrees are not more 
effective than those without such degrees” (p. 138). To increase professional accountability, 
NCLB included criteria to define a “highly qualified” teacher: the individual has a bachelor’s 
degree, holds a state teaching license, and has subject-matter expertise (NCLB, 2002). However, 
this reform was seen as largely bureaucratic and ineffective, failing to improve student learning 
(Mead et al., 2012). In the next section, research on the distribution of summative evaluation 
ratings will be explored. 
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Identification of Underperforming Teachers  
Reports such as The Widget Effect (Weisberg et al., 2009) highlighted the disparity 
between student performance and summative evaluation ratings assigned to teachers in schools. 
Referred by some scholars as a “Lake Wobegon” effect, many evaluators have been criticized for 
rating most teachers as satisfactory or higher, inflating summative ratings as if all teachers were 
“above average” (Tucker, 1997; Zirkel, 2010). Tucker (1997) provided a detailed breakdown of 
teacher competency, explaining “the typical principal with a staff of 100 teachers identifies 1.53 
incompetent tenured teachers per year and remediates 0.68 teacher, encourages 0.37 teacher to 
resign or retire, reassigns 0.29 teacher, and recommends dismissal for 0.10 teacher” (p. 1).  
Research studies used a variety of methods, including survey research of principals, to 
determine an estimated number of underperforming teachers—those teachers identified for 
remediation or improvement. Bridges (1992) cited estimates that 5% of teachers were 
“incompetent” and harming student achievement. Lavely, Berger, and Follman (1992) conducted 
a meta-analysis of prior research studies to conclude 10% of teachers were “incompetent.” 
Tucker (1997) interviewed Virginia principals, concluding 5% of teachers in that state were 
underperforming but only .68% had undergone a remediation plan. Thompson (2006) surveyed 
principals in California, concluding 3.5% of California teachers were underperforming but only 
0.70% were in a remediation plan.  
In 2009, The New Teacher Project (TNTP) published a national report studying teacher 
evaluation in 12 low performing, urban school districts (Weisberg et al., 2009). In this national 
sample, approximately 99% of teachers were rated positively, using ratings such as good or 
great, or satisfactory or excellent. Officials in over half of these schools had not dismissed a 
tenured teacher during the 2-5 year survey period. This report was an influencing factor in the 
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creating of SB7, as three Illinois districts—Elgin, Rockford, and Chicago—were among the 12 
districts studied. In these Illinois districts, 92.6% of teacher were rated “superior” or “excellent,” 
7% were rated “satisfactory,” and only 0.4% were rated “unsatisfactory.” The report 
recommended adopting comprehensive evaluation systems, training evaluators, connecting 
evaluations to personnel functions, and creating dismissal policies (Weisberg et al., 2009). 
Critics of the report, however, cited irregularities, noting one of the districts studied—Toledo, 
Ohio—had a robust program for eliminating underperforming teachers whose data were not 
included in the findings. The district had removed or remediated 12.9% of tenured teachers 
during 2008 and 8.5% of probationary teachers over a 5-year period (Thompson, 2010). In a 
follow-up study, Kraft and Gilmour (2017) analyzed statewide evaluation ratings data from 19 
states, finding 2.7% of teachers received a rating of unsatisfactory performance. In follow-up 
interviews with principals from one district, the study found a discrepancy between the number 
to teachers perceived as underperforming (27.8%) and the number of teachers rated as 
underperforming (6.5%). Table 1 summarizes the actual ratings and estimated rates of teacher 
underperformance, as shared through these studies. 
Table 1 
Rates of Teacher Underperformance 
Study 
Teachers rated 
underperforming 
Tenured 
teachers in 
remediation  Population surveyed 
Estimates of 
underperforming 
teachers 
Illinois Report Card 
(ISBE, 2017d) 
3.0% n/a Data from all Illinois public 
schools 
 
n/a 
Kraft and Gilmour 
(2017) 
6.5% n/a Administrators surveyed in 
one large urban district 
27.8% 
 2.7% n/a Data from 19 states 
 
n/a 
(continued) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Study 
Teachers rated 
underperforming 
Tenured 
teachers in 
remediation  Population surveyed 
Estimates of 
underperforming 
teachers 
Weisberg et al. 
(2009) 
0.4% n/a Administrators in Chicago, IL 7.5% 
 0.9% n/a Administrators in Rockford, 
IL 
3.8% 
 0.5% n/a Administrators in Elgin, IL 
 
1.9% 
Thompson (2006) n/a 0.70% California high school 
principals 
3.5% 
Tucker (1997) 1.1%-1.53% 0.68% Virginia principals 
 
5% 
Bridges (1992) n/a n/a Unknown 
 
5% 
Lavely et al. (1992) n/a n/a Meta-analysis 10% 
 
In November 2017, ISBE released the first statewide report of summative evaluation 
ratings—as required by SB7 legislation. Illinois public school districts reported the number of 
teachers earning an “excellent” or “proficient” rating during the 2016-2017 school year. This 
information was published on the Illinois Report Card website, allowing public access to this 
data for any public school district (ISBE, 2017d). Statewide, with 771 districts reporting, 97% of 
teachers were rated in the highest two categories. In the state’s largest school system, Chicago 
Public Schools, 89% of teachers were rated in the highest two categories. In analyzing these 
reports, a Chicago Tribune editorial praised the transparency but concluded, “Evaluations alone 
don’t drive superior performance. But honest appraisals give teachers feedback so they can 
improve. They may encourage the best teachers to stay and the worst to leave” (“What the report 
card says,” 2017, para. 11). 
Summative evaluation ratings distribution in Michigan. Michigan presents an 
interesting case of evaluation policy reform. Michigan, a state with collective bargaining laws 
similar to Illinois, underwent similar reform efforts in 2009 and 2011, including changing to 
four-tiered summative evaluation rating system, with ratings of “highly effective,” “effective,” 
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“minimally effective,” and “ineffective” (Lenhoff, Pogodzinski, Mayrowetz, Superfine & 
Umpstead, 2017). Advocacy groups promoted the reforms as addressing teacher 
underperformance by identifying more underperforming teachers. Education Trust-Midwest 
pushed for broader feedback and a wider distribution in the evaluation scores, explaining, “When 
nearly all teachers are told they are doing well, expectations are lowered or remain ill-defined 
and teachers miss-out on the opportunities to help students learn” (Lenhoff, 2012, p. 3).  
Data from two studies provided summative evaluation ratings from the first year of 
implementation. When Education Trust-Midwest studied 8,600 summative evaluation ratings 
from a sample of Michigan school districts during the 2011-2012 school year—the year after the 
new ratings system went into effect statewide—less than 1.2% of teachers were rated as 
minimally effective or not effective (Lenhoff, 2012). Data from the Michigan Department of 
Education supported this conclusion, finding less than 3% of teachers rated as minimally 
effective or not effective (Keesler & Howe, 2012). The Education Trust-Midwest report 
questioned these results as being too lenient and not representing the broad distribution for which 
they had hoped (Sawchuk, 2012). Yet, the Michigan Department of Education defended the 
results as “appropriate, particularly given that this is the first year of implementation” (Keesler & 
Howe, 2012, p. 9). These incongruent interpretations reflect the tenor of the teacher reform 
movement as internal stakeholders defend the status quo while external groups demand 
aggressive reforms with demonstrable results. Table 2 compares the distribution ratings from 
these two Michigan reports. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Ratings in Michigan after Year One of Four-Tier Evaluation (2011-2012) 
Rating 
MI Department of Education 
Keesler & Howe (2012) 
Education Trust-Midwest 
Lenhoff (2012) 
Highly effective 23% 11.60% 
Effective 75% 87.75% 
Minimally effective 2% <1% 
Ineffective <1% 0.2% 
 
In 2017, a Michigan study found 97% of Michigan teachers were rated in the two highest 
ratings categories. An analysis of statewide evaluation data from 2011-2012 and 2014-2015 
found trends in the identification of underperforming teachers consistent with the earlier findings 
reported in The Widget Effect. The study concluded the stricter teacher evaluation policy reform 
in Michigan—a policy similar to SB7 and PERA in Illinois—failed to meet the policymakers’ 
objective to increase the identification of underperforming teachers (Lenhoff et al., 2017). 
Teacher dismissals in Illinois. Illinois statutes have included a process for remediating 
and dismissing teachers underperforming since 1982. However, historical data are limited, as 
ISBE did not collect data on the number of teachers with underperforming ratings and/or 
remediation plans, nor data on teachers who were terminated or resigned. Therefore, Illinois 
researchers attempted to estimate the distribution of unsatisfactory ratings given to 
underperforming teachers. Scholars examined the number of teacher dismissals and/or 
remediations through analysis of dismissal hearings and survey research of school 
administrators. However, none of this data included teachers who resigned rather than face 
dismissal, those who agreed to financial settlements and confidentiality agreements in exchange 
for resigning, nor probationary teachers who were non-renewed (Henry, 2010; London, 1998; 
Seltzer, 1992; Thompson, 2010). Summarizing the difficulty of gathering data, London 
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concluded, “There is no way to determine the total number of tenured teachers were either 
dismissed or negotiated to leave the district” (p. 11). 
Seltzer (1992) surveyed Illinois principals whose schools had one or more teachers under 
a remediation plan. First, data from ISBE indicated 92 districts had issued an unsatisfactory 
rating, but when contacted later, eight districts reported no one had received a remediation plan. 
Next, the study surveyed 61 principals in those identified districts. The principals reported 22 of 
their remediation plans resulted in teacher resignations while nine were dismissed. 
Three studies examined teacher dismissal hearings in Illinois. Thurston (1990) reviewed 
180 teacher dismissal hearings from 1976-1989. Over this 25-year period, an average of 12.3 
teachers were dismissed annually through dismissal officer hearings. The review concluded 
Illinois lacked a common definition of incompetency—with each local board of education 
defining local standards of teacher underperformance. London (1998) studied 118 teacher 
dismissal hearing records from 1985-1994, finding an average of 11.8 teachers were dismissed 
annually through dismissal hearings. The study recommended ISBE should collect data on 
teacher dismissals. Henry (2010) examined teacher dismissal hearing records from 1990-2008. 
During that period, 219 tenured teachers were dismissed from 62 school districts after 
undergoing remediation, with 138 of those dismissed teachers coming from the Chicago Public 
Schools, averaging 11.5 teachers dismissed annually. Table 3 summarizes the Illinois teacher 
dismissal hearing data from these three studies. 
Table 3 
Average Annual Teacher Dismissals from Dismissal Hearing Data in Illinois 
Author Time period Years Average annual dismissals 
Henry (2010) 1990-2008 19 11.5 
London (1998) 1985-1994 10 11.8 
Thurston (1990) 1976-1990 25 12.3 
 43 
Newspaper reporter Scott Reeder (2005a, 2005b)—a statewide reporter for the Small 
Newspaper Group, a publisher with local newspapers in Moline, Ottawa, and Kankakee, 
Illinois—mailed FOIA requests in 2005 to each of the 876 Illinois public school districts, 
requesting disclosure of information regarding remediation plans and teacher dismissals during a 
10-year study period between 1995 and 2005. By using the FOIA procedure, Reeder achieved a 
100% response rate, publishing his findings in the Illinois regional newspapers owned by Small 
Newspaper Group—including the Daily Journal (Kankakee, Illinois), The Times (Ottawa and 
Streator, Illinois), and Argus-Dispatch (Moline and Rock Island, Illinois). The study found few 
teachers beyond the probationary period are ever dismissed, consistent with findings that have 
been reported by Hanushek (2009). For both tenured and non-tenured teachers, the number of 
annual unsatisfactory ratings—as measured by the number of remediation plans—averaged one 
for every 930 teacher evaluations, with a statewide average of 51 unsatisfactory ratings annually. 
The study also found 83% of schools did not issue an unsatisfactory rating during the 10-year 
study period (Reeder, 2005a). In the next section, the history of evaluation policy and reforms in 
Illinois will be discussed. 
Illinois Evaluation Policy and Reforms 
Illinois has undergone five periods of teacher evaluation policy. In the first phase, prior to 
1975, boards of education enjoyed broad freedoms in dismissing teachers, as state laws provided 
few teacher employment rights. The second period began in 1975 when Illinois passed Article 
24-12, adding the hearing officer process to teacher dismissals when the dismissed teacher 
requested a hearing. In the third period, beginning in 1986, the Illinois School Reform Act 24A 
was passed. The law added additional processes for remediation and teacher dismissal (London, 
1998). This law was passed partly in response to negative attention from A Nation at Risk, a 
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federal report that questioned student achievement in America’s schools. The law included a 
three-tiered evaluation rating system: “excellent,” “satisfactory,” and “unsatisfactory.” A tenured 
teacher who received an “unsatisfactory” rating would complete a 180-day remediation plan 
intended to help the teacher improve his or her performance (Seltzer, 1992). The fourth period of 
Illinois reform began in December 1997 when Illinois revised the school code, reducing the 
remediation period to a 90-day plan (Henry, 2010). In either case, a teacher could be dismissed 
only after they failed to meet the requirements of the remediation plan.  
The fifth and current period of evaluation reform began in 2010 when, driven by the 
option to apply for RttT funding, the Illinois legislature passed the Performance Evaluation 
Reform Act (PERA). The law required all schools to include student growth in their summative 
teacher evaluations by 2015-2016 (ISBE, 2015). The law was passed during a veto session in 
January 2010 to meet the deadline for legislative changes required to qualify for a federal RttT 
grant. Under RttT, many decisions about implementation were left to state and local 
policymakers (Hill, Charalambous, & Kraft, 2012). Illinois applied for RttT funding, and by the 
conclusion of third funding round, 19 states were awarded RttT grants, including $43 million for 
Illinois’ third round award (Howell, 2015; Regenstein, 2011). 
PERA reformed teacher evaluation in many significant ways. Prior to PERA, Illinois law 
called for three evaluation rating categories: “excellent,” “satisfactory,” and “unsatisfactory.” An 
“unsatisfactory” rating trigged a remediation plan. PERA created a new evaluation rating 
category—”needs improvement”—that requires teachers to complete a PDP, changing the 
previous evaluation ratings under 24A from three categories to four. In addition, PERA included 
new requirements to evaluate teachers using objective student growth data, with various 
timelines and requirements leading to full implementation in 2015-2016 (ISBE, 2015). Besides 
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to goal of increasing the likelihood the state would win RttT funding (Howell, 2015), advocates 
hoped the law would increase student achievement through the identification of underperforming 
teachers and their resulting improvement or dismissal.  
In June 2011, the Illinois legislature followed-up with passage of a second reform 
package. Under SB7, the Illinois Superintendent of Schools may take action on removing teacher 
certificates for incompetence. Incompetence is defined as having two or more unsatisfactory 
evaluations within a 7-year timeframe. In determining an incompetence case, the State 
Superintendent must consider the remediation steps undertaken, the time between evaluations, 
and whether the evaluations occurred prior to PERA. A state certification board makes the final 
determination regarding revocation. The law also broadened the definition of who could evaluate 
teachers. Anyone who passes the required training could evaluate teachers starting on September 
1, 2012. These qualified evaluators could include teacher-leaders, assistant principals, deans, 
department chairpersons, and others besides the principal. However, schools were warned 
against expanding the practice whereby a member of the teachers’ union would be evaluating a 
peer member of their union, complicating potential documentation of underperforming teachers 
in the future (ISBE, 2015). Table 4 summarizes the major components and changes found in 
PERA and SB7 legislation. 
Table 4 
Summary of Components of PERA and SB7 Legislation 
PERA (enacted January 2010) SB7 (enacted June 2011) 
• Evaluations using four rating categories 
• Non-tenured teachers evaluated annually, 
tenured teachers evaluated every two 
years 
• Reduction in Force incorporates teacher 
evaluation into position lists to determine 
order of layoffs 
• Potential for tenure portability when 
teachers with switch employers 
(continued) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
PERA (enacted January 2010) SB7 (enacted June 2011) 
• Annual evaluations for tenured teacher 
who received the needs improvement or 
unsatisfactory ratings 
• Professional Development Plan (PDP) 
triggered when teacher receives a needs 
improvement rating 
• Dismissal when teachers received two 
unsatisfactory ratings within 36 months 
• Mandatory training for evaluators 
• Expands the ability to evaluate teachers 
beyond licensed administrators to teachers 
who complete training 
• Student growth scores incorporated into 
evaluation ratings for both teachers and 
principals 
 
• Potential for school boards to grant tenure 
after three years for a teacher rated 
excellent in each of their first three years  
• Streamlined teacher dismissals, including 
the new Optional Alternative Evaluation 
Dismissal (OAED) Process 
• Required school board member training 
• Defines incompetence as two 
unsatisfactory evaluations within a seven-
year period and permits the State 
Superintendent to revoke a teaching 
license for that reason 
• State Superintendent may act to require 
professional development for a teacher 
• Survey of teaching and learning 
conditions must be conducted  
• Statewide collection of teacher and 
principal evaluation ratings data 
• Mandatory public disclosure of collective 
bargaining proposals prior to initiating a 
labor strike  
 
Note. Adapted from Illinois Education Association [IEA] (2011) and ISBE (2015) 
The lobbying for both PERA and SB7 included multiple stakeholders, including 
advocacy groups that hoped the final bills would result in more aggressive reforms (Regenstein, 
2011). While advocacy groups played an influential role, some critics have questioned the 
influence of advocacy groups, especially regarding politically controversial subjects (Lubienski, 
Weitzel, & Lubienski, 2009; Scott et al., 2009). During lobbying efforts for PERA and SB7, 
advocacy groups such as Stand for Children and Advance Illinois infused campaign donations, 
lobbying efforts, and public media spending into public relations campaigns advocating for 
evaluation reforms. Numerous Chicago philanthropists, including current Illinois governor Bruce 
Rauner, real estate investor Sam Zell, businessperson Penny Pritzker, and other well-known 
business leaders backed these reforms with financial and political support (Long, 2011).  
 47 
Some questioned whether the reforms were watered down and unlikely to produce the 
desired outcomes, citing the complex union entanglement and local decisions on how to 
implement many aspects of the reforms. For example, a district’s PERA student growth plan 
must be negotiated with the local teachers’ union, creating a potential obstacle for rigorous 
implementation. Education blogger Alexander Russo (2011) questioned the motives of PERA 
reform when he asked, “Is this model legislation developed through a model process, as is being 
claimed, or is it reform ‘lite,’ setting the bar extremely low and letting everyone declare victory 
without doing any of the really hard work?” (para. 4). Following the first year of reform 
implementation in their district, Chicago Public School teachers raised questions about the 
effectiveness of PERA and described their student growth performance tasks as easy to “game” 
(Jiang, Sporte, & Luppesco, 2015). Russo argued the reforms were compromises with teacher’s 
union who were faced with more unfavorable legislative proposals that could have become law. 
Karen Lewis (2011), president of the Chicago Teachers Union, issued a statement supporting the 
passage of SB7, explaining how the final bill avoided harsher anti-union reforms such as the 
repeal of collective bargaining rights and the right to strike. In the next section, the research on 
factors that influence evaluators when issuing summative ratings will be reviewed.  
Factors Influencing Identification of Underperforming Teachers 
Factors beyond teaching quality explain how evaluators are influenced in making 
decisions about teacher performance ratings. Kimball and Milanowski (2009) found ratings were 
influenced by three factors: skill, motivation, and context. Skill was described as the competence 
and training of the administrator, motivation—the desire and will to act, and context—the 
characteristics of the school environment in which the administrator was working. The local 
context includes procedural, personal, and logistical barriers influencing the decision making of 
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teacher evaluators. The next section will describe several of these factors and their influence on 
evaluators when determining summative ratings. 
Workload and time constraints. Leaders’ workloads presented barriers to implementing 
evaluation policy reform. Evaluation reforms required leaders to make time for evaluations—
classroom observations, documentation, and conferencing—in addition to meeting the other 
needs of students and staff (Donaldson & Papay, 2014; Drake et al., 2016). Leaders may lack the 
time in their workday to conduct effective evaluations given the myriad demands and 
responsibilities of their positions (Hallinger & Murphy, 2013; Kraft & Gilmour, 2017). This time 
pressure leads to increased work hours for leaders who are hindered by myriad interruptions and 
non-instructional responsibilities (Lavigne & Chamberlain, 2017). Leaders can reevaluate their 
management responsibilities and distribute non-instructional decision-making and managerial 
duties to others—redirecting their time toward activities to improve student achievement 
(Donaldson & Papay, 2012). Furthermore, when leaders need to need to address an 
underperforming teacher, the amount time needed for documentation, observations, and 
professional development may cause evaluators to issue a higher rating than was earned (Kraft & 
Gilmour, 2017). Leaders simply may “give-up” and approach evaluations with indifference 
(Fullan, 2014).  
Low confidence in effectiveness of remediation. School leaders are skeptical or 
indifferent on the effectiveness of remediation efforts. Scholars also have questioned their 
ultimate potential to improve student learning, which is the primary goal of teacher evaluation 
(Murphy, 2013). When surveyed in 1992, Illinois principals who had written a remediation plan 
felt the process was effective (Seltzer, 1992), and among Wyoming principals, 61% found 
remediation plans to be effective (Range, Scherz, Holt, & Young, 2011). However, other 
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research has found principals have low confidence in remediation plans and prefer to bypass the 
formal evaluation process to handle improvement activities outside the evaluation process (Kraft 
& Gilmour, 2016). Teachers can meet the minimal requirements of the plan, but the plan may not 
result in sustained improvement (Holland, 2004). Principals may wait for the teacher to retire 
rather than engage a process whose outcome is uncertain or likely to foster change (Reuland, 
2012). Principals may also use “harassing supervision practices” (Stoelinga, 2010, p. 58) to force 
a voluntary separation. One study from the Chicago Public Schools found examples of principals 
who used techniques such as reassigning teachers to undesirable grades or assigning undesirable 
classroom locations that, for example, required teachers to climb several flights of stairs each day 
(Stoelinga, 2010).  
When remediation leads to short-term improvement, principals perceive these changes to 
be temporary (Reuland, 2012). Improving existing teachers takes time; meanwhile, students may 
suffer from poor instruction by an underperforming teacher (Hallinger & Murphy, 2013). One 
Illinois superintendent expressed his cautious reservations that remediation could lead an 
“unsatisfactory” teacher toward improvement, explaining, “I wouldn’t say these teachers became 
good teachers, but after they finished remediation, they weren’t doing any harm” (Reeder, 
2005b, para. 26). Because of their low perceptions of the effectiveness of remediation, many 
principals have low motivation to pursue remediation of unsatisfactory teachers. Some feel they 
are unlikely to find a better teacher than the one who needs improvement (Kraft & Gilmour, 
2017). Danielson (2010) admitted the limited potential of evaluation to improve student learning 
when she wrote, “principals need to devote time to the evaluation process—despite the fact that 
it often produces few benefits” (p. 39).  
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Challenge of legal issues. Myriad legal rules are daunting for administrators, including 
labor-management structures such as collective bargaining rights and union representation 
(Menuey, 2007; Reuland, 2012), tenure rules (Dandoy, 2012), laws and school code (Reuland, 
2012), and the time requirement to document unsatisfactory performance (Dandoy, 2012; 
Menuey, 2007). These legal rights vary from state to state, and in some states, vary based on the 
collective bargaining agreements in effect within local districts. Labaree (2010) summarized this 
challenge: 
The contract with the teacher union makes it extraordinarily difficult to fire a teacher 
after she has completed an initial probationary period of three years or so. American 
teachers enjoy a form of tenure guarantee that, though weaker than the tenure rights of 
American college professors, is much stronger than in nearly any other occupational 
setting. To fire a teacher after being tenured is so onerous in its requirements for 
documentation, due process, and battles with the union that most principals don’t even 
try. (p. 126) 
 
Administrators cited the lack of funds and budgetary constraints to process and defend 
legal cases for dismissal. From 2001-2005, Illinois school districts engaged in dismissal litigation 
spent an average of $219,504.21 in legal costs for each tenured teacher dismissal proceeding 
(Reeder, 2006). In some states, dismissed teachers continue to earn their salary during the legal 
processes of hearings, litigation, and appeals (Bireda, 2010). In an era of shrinking funding for 
schools, administrators must weigh the financial costs against the other outcomes—including 
student achievement losses from an underperforming teacher (Rivkin et al., 2005).  
The pressures of legal concerns influenced administrators when deciding whether to 
pursue remediation, especially the additional time needed to write and implement remediation 
plans (Range et al., 2011; Reuland, 2012). The burden of proof in dismissal cases is high, and 
lack of time to carry out these mandates was cited by 74% of California high school principals as 
a significant deterrent to dismissals (Thompson, 2006). Balancing an existing workload with 
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time needed to write the remediation plan and follow the necessary legal rules creates an 
enormous burden on the principal. One Illinois middle school principal described participation in 
the remediation process as a significant “investment” (Reuland, 2012, p. 164) of his time. Most 
schools simply lack the capacity and time needed to evaluate all teachers frequently (Chait, 
2010). One New York attorney estimated principals would spend 10-15% of their work time 
managing a remediation, and summarized the frustration of administrators by asking,  
what rational person would invest 15 percent of her time for two years just to get the 
teacher back in her building? It is taken as a given that when it comes to incompetent 
tenured teachers, the best you can do is to tell them to go to another school. (Levin, 
Mulhern, & Schunck, 2005, p. 18)  
 
Reeder (2005a) concluded it was “almost impossible” to remove an underperforming teacher in 
Illinois. Reeder interviewed educational leadership professor Richard Manatt, who articulated his 
interpretation of Illinois’ evaluation system: 
What we are looking at in Illinois is scandalous. Evaluations have turned into ritualistic 
endeavors–everybody receives a good evaluation. Teacher unions like it because it 
protects their members. Most administrators like it because they don’t like to rock the 
boat and that’s the sort of evaluation they get from their superintendents. (Reeder, 2005a, 
para. 37) 
 
Before removing a low-performing staff member through the evaluation process, 
administrators might explore alternative dismissal options. For example, Whitaker (1999) 
recommended using other documentation strategies to build the legal case of insubordination 
prior to moving to remediation. As opposed to teaching performance that may be considered 
remediable and not subject to termination, insubordination is irremediable and subject to 
dismissal in most states. They may use “harassing supervision” (Stoelinga, 2010, pp. 57-58) 
tactics such as pressure, assignment changes, and voluntary separation agreements to remove an 
underperforming teacher. Novice principals are more likely to pursue the formal remediation 
process, while experienced principals are more likely to pursue other methods to achieve a 
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similar outcome (Reuland, 2012). While the barriers of remediation and dismissal in Illinois are 
significant, Henry (2010) stated, “(Illinois) school districts that are willing to accept the time and 
financial responsibility associated with dismissing a tenured teacher can effectively do so” (p. 
125).  
Low confidence in correlations between evaluation ratings and student achievement. 
Research has studied the linkage between student achievement outcomes and the evaluation 
rating of the teacher(s) and their students. For example, scholars raised numerous challenges to 
the validity and reliability of value-added measures to accurately account for student differences 
and questioned their role in evaluation reforms and teacher accountability (Amrein-Beardsley, 
2008; ASA, 2014; Newtown, Darling-Hammond, Haertel, & Thomas, 2010). According to 
Popham (2007), “there is ample evidence that, instead of improving instructional quality, ill-
conceived accountability programs can seriously diminish it” (p. 147). Additionally, even with 
rigorous evaluator training and specific evaluation criteria tools, evaluation ratings and student 
achievement may not correlate. Evaluators may have difficulty distinguishing practice from 
performance (Lenhoff et al., 2017). 
Politics and organizational culture. The literature finds political barriers and school 
cultural factors have influenced administrators in their efforts to address teacher 
underperformance (Bridges & Groves, 1999; Reuland, 2012). The evaluation process sometimes 
creates a negative relationship between teachers and the administrators. The administrators may 
face negative perceptions from the staff and/or community as some persons may support and 
advocate for the underperforming teacher (Whitaker, 1999).  
The value school districts place on teacher dismissal correlate with the likelihood a 
principal will move towards teacher dismissal, suggesting the importance of district culture to 
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address underperformance (Thompson, 2006). Among Illinois middle school principals, 20% 
reported being told or having perceived they could not place a teacher on a remediation plan at 
one time in their career (Reuland, 2012). District leadership must support administrators in their 
work to confront teacher dismissal and support the work of their evaluators during teacher 
evaluation conflicts (Bridges & Groves, 1999). As one study of the political climate in California 
schools concluded that 
few principals anywhere risk losing their jobs if they are less than forthright with a poor-
performing teacher. However, if they evaluate a teacher negatively, the teacher may sow 
seeds of discontent and lower morale in the school. Thus, principals have incentives to 
bite the marshmallow, not the bullet; by doing their jobs properly, they heighten their 
vulnerability. (Bridges & Groves, 1999, p. 331) 
 
Lenient ratings to avoid staff conflicts. Maintaining the dual roles of leader and 
evaluator, some evaluators may be motivated to rate leniently (Kraft & Gilmour, 2017). When 
they perceive the school culture could be disrupted, administrators may rate some teachers with 
higher ratings (Manatt & Daniels, 1990). They seek to maintain positive relationships with staff 
and feel lower evaluation ratings will affect those relationships, especially with veteran teachers 
(Kraft & Gilmour, 2017). Evaluators may also fear their own job security when conflicts with 
staff develop (Bridges & Groves, 1999). Lenient ratings may reduce or prevent conflict with 
teachers’ unions who might intervene on behalf of a teacher who is upset or disappointed by their 
evaluation rating (Mitchell, 2011).  
Even teacher evaluations in high-stakes situations—such as merit pay—are subject to this 
leniency “because principals have to work with the teachers after their evaluation is complete, 
principals may still tend to inflate ratings . . . to maintain collegiality” (Kimball & Milanowski, 
2009, p. 63). This sentiment may reflect the dichotomy of principals who are expected to 
motivate and lead their staff while also carrying out supervisory and evaluative duties (Holland, 
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2004). Principals are expected to use the evaluation process to lead school improvement in their 
schools but may question the influence of their work on actually improving achievement (Mead 
et al., 2012; Murphy, 2013). 
Supervision, the formative nature of the evaluation process, may contribute to leniency 
(Haefele, 1993). Rather than viewing evaluation as strictly summative, some evaluation systems 
are used as a professional development process (Marzano et al., 2011). The resulting written 
feedback given to teachers tends to be positive and descriptive—with minimal constructive 
criticism (Bernstein, 2004; Yariv, 2006). Although principals may perceive this process as 
helping the teacher and building positive relationships, some teachers perceive it as unhelpful: 
At best, the evaluations I received were a mild form of feedback: I’m doing okay, I’ll 
have a job next year, I’ve met my professional development goals, and so forth. At worst, 
the current evaluation system was used as a tool for compliance and as a threat so that 
teachers did not ‘make waves’. As a union president, I have found that teacher evaluation 
is implemented inconsistently from school to school and even among the same 
administrators within the same school. (Bernstein, 2004, pp. 80-81) 
 
Supportive and trusting relationships between leaders and teachers are crucial for productive 
school culture (Fullan, 2014), but leaders are challenged to maintain positive relationships with 
the same teachers who earned low performance ratings on evaluations (Mead et al., 2012).  
Personal discomfort with difficult staff conversations. Developing a school culture 
that embraces challenging conversations about teaching performance in an important element of 
teacher improvement (Mead et al., 2012). However, leaders were uncomfortable confronting 
teachers about their low performance and avoided giving negative feedback (Kraft & Gilmour, 
2017; Yariv, 2006). Evaluators may soften the language of feedback to reduce their discomfort 
(Danielson, 2010; Yariv, 2006). The cultural expectation of teachers’ autonomous independence 
in their classrooms may contribute to this reluctance, as “leaders avoid interfering with the work 
of teachers. They buy compliance with the currency of autonomy” (Murphy, 2013, para. 5). 
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Gaps in the Literature 
Because the legislative changes are relatively recent, the literature is limited on the effect 
of PERA and SB7. It is too early to find peer-reviewed studies in educational journals. The 
literature regarding Illinois’ evaluations relies upon limited evidence from adjudicated 
remediation cases under the previous 24A laws that did not include the “needs improvement” 
category and the PDPs enacted under PERA (Henry, 2010). 
The state of Illinois historically has not collected data on evaluation ratings. The research 
studies that attempted to measure the number of remediation plans or teacher dismissals were 
limited by incomplete data. Newspaper reporter Reeder (2005a, 2005b) generated the most 
thorough evaluation analysis available in Illinois, having collected data from 100% of Illinois 
schools from a 10-year timespan. Despite the national attention and professional awards his 
reporting earned, the work was not peer-reviewed and the results were published in the mass 
media instead of scholarly publications; however, his work has been cited in the literature (see 
Chait, 2010; Mitchell, 2011). The limited scholarly work on Illinois evaluations comes mostly 
from dissertation research (Henry, 2010; London, 1998).  
Quantitative analysis of current evaluation data in Illinois will fill a significant research 
gap (Henry, 2010; London, 1998; Reeder, 2005a, 2005b; Seltzer, 1992; Thurston, 1990) and 
inform our understanding of the conditions under new policies, including the distribution of 
evaluation ratings. The SB7 law included provisions for collecting this data: 
Section 24A-20(c) of the School Code requires that “districts . . . submit data and 
information to the State Board on teacher and principal performance evaluations and 
evaluation plans in accordance with procedures and requirements for submissions 
established by the State Board. Such data shall include, without limitation, (i) data on the 
performance rating given to all teachers in contractual continued service, (ii) data on 
district recommendations to renew or not renew teachers not in contractual continued 
service, and (iii) data on the performance rating given to all principals.” (ISBE, 2015, p. 
32) 
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ISBE (2015) explained why this provision was included in the law: 
Since SB7 required all teachers, including non-tenured teachers, to be rated in accordance 
with the four rating categories, ISBE will collect data on performance rating for all 
teachers. In the state’s application for State Fiscal Stabilization Funds (as part of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act), the state had to commit to collecting data on 
the performance component, the student growth component, and the final summative 
performance evaluation rating. 
 
It is nevertheless important to note that, pursuant to Section 24A-20(a)(1) of the School 
Code, the data collected may only be publicly reported in a manner whereby no teacher 
or administrator can be personally identified. (p. 32) 
 
These data were supposed to be published by schools in their annual school report cards: 
Section 10-17A of the School Code [105 ILCS 5/10-17A] requires ISBE to annually 
publish a report card. As part of that report card, ISBE is to publish the combined 
percentage of teachers rated as proficient or excellent in their most recent evaluation. 
State law prohibits the personal identification of any individual teacher. (ISBE, 2015, p. 
32) 
 
However, by the 2015-2016 school year, the only evaluation data collected was for the RttT 
school districts and school districts identified in lowest 20% of student performance (ISBE, 
2016). 
Conceptual Framework 
Two conceptual frameworks informed and framed this study: education policy 
implementation theory (Honig, 2006) and micropolitics of personnel evaluation (Bridges & 
Groves, 1999). Changing policies require educators to study policy implementation “to uncover 
their various dimensions and how and why interactions among these dimensions shape 
implementation” (Honig, 2006, p. 14). These outcomes of policy implementation have been 
defined as 
the product of interactions between polices, people, and places—the demands specific 
policies place on implementers; the participants in implementation and their starting 
beliefs, knowledge, and other orientations toward policy demands; and the places or 
contexts that help shape what people can and will do. (Honig, 2006, p. 2) 
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Therefore, research on policy implementation must extend beyond the structural policy itself and 
examine the localized conditions and processes in which the policy succeeded or failed. First, the 
policy itself may influence implementation (Malen, 2006). For example, Hill (2006) found the 
language of policy influenced implementation of mathematics reform, especially when 
terminology lacked precision. Actors interpreted different meanings of the policy’s language, 
resulting in implementation that was misaligned to the policy’s intent. Second, people who are 
involved with policy implementation have great influence on the policy’s success or failure 
(Malen, 2006). For example, Spillane (2008) found significant differences in policy 
implementation within and across school districts. In his study, school- and district-level leaders 
within the same district communicated different ideas about policy, resulting in mixed 
implementation results with varying degrees of fidelity and intensity observed at each school. 
Finally, the location and local context influences policy implementation (Malen, 2006). For 
example, Marsh and Crocker (1991) found local context influenced implementation of middle 
school reforms in eight California middle schools. Local conditions such as labor relations, 
leadership effectiveness, and collegial trust influenced the successes and challenges of 
implementation.  
Policy implementation is influenced by political challenges that accompany change, and 
these challenges occur throughout implementation (Malen, 2006). Politics has been defined as 
“decisions related to the allocation of values for a given society or social organization; that is 
who gets what, when, and how” (Blase & Blase, 2002, p. 7). To examine the politics occurring in 
local contexts, micropolitics describes the public and private transactions that occur between 
actors who seek power and influence over decisions (Kirst & Wirt, 2009). Micropolitics appears 
often in the education literature to describe factors influencing decision making at the local level. 
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As democratic organizations, schools are localized venues for political debate and lobbying by 
actors who influence decision making and policy outcomes (Brosky, 2011; Malen, 2006).  
Although researchers have focused on how state and local politics influence education 
policy outcomes, the study of micropolitics in education examines the “conditions, if any, 
various education policies get implemented and work” (Honig, 2006, p. 2) in the local schools. 
For example, Marsh (2012) examined the development of site-based, performance compensation 
policies in the New York City schools. Local school committees implement a system of 
incentive pay for educators and administrators based on student performance. The study found 
political actors—educators and administrators—used strategies to suppress conflict and hide or 
manipulate information. As a result, most schools implemented quality in pay rather than the 
differentiated pay intended by policymakers. Micropolitics research also examines how power is 
used to achieve goals in schools. Blase (1992) surveyed 836 educators who perceived their 
principals as open and effective. The study found these principals used a wide range of control 
and empowerment strategies including exchange, rewards, principal’s visibility in the school, 
and empowerment to influence teachers to meet the principal’s goals. Grissom, Kalogrides, and 
Loeb (2015) studied the micropolitics of assigning students to teachers and classrooms in one 
urban school district. The study found veteran educators used their influence and power to 
determine which students were assigned to their classrooms. Veteran educators received fewer 
disadvantaged students in their classrooms, resulting in inequalities when the neediest students 
were assigned to less experienced educators. 
Political influence can impede the evaluation process (Blase & Blase, 2002; Bridges & 
Groves, 1999). To examine this influence, Bridges and Groves (1999) defined a micropolitical 
framework to describe the interactions of educational politics in teacher evaluation. First, 
 59 
decisions interact with actors who possess different levels of access. These actors have interests 
that evolve into goals and objectives. Next, conflicts may occur as actors use the power of their 
influence. In addition, actors may form coalitions with other actors who share common interests. 
Finally, actors use strategies to reach their goals, and outcomes are the decisions made. 
Education evaluation involves decisions regarding the ground rules, the procedures, and the 
evaluation itself, including the summative evaluation rating. Bridges and Groves noted: 
We argue that each type of personnel evaluation decision involves multiple actors with 
access to these decisions and particular interests and goals. When the interests of actors 
conflict, the opposing parties mobilize their power, form coalitions, and pursue strategies 
to affect the outcome. The outcomes of the conflict reflect the interests of those actors 
with the greatest power and most effective strategies. These outcomes may limit the 
discretion that can be exercised regarding future decisions, or they may lead to 
unanticipated negative consequences that trigger a new round of decisions. (p. 322) 
 
Recent policy trends—such as Illinois’ evaluation reforms—have changed the balance of power 
in evaluation relationships, becoming more evenly distributed between the teacher and evaluator 
roles. In examining this trend, Bridges and Groves (1999) posed five questions for investigating 
these changes. 
• How have the ground rules, procedures, and performance evaluations changed over time? 
• Whose interests have predominated or been frustrated by these changes? 
• How have the sources and levels of power, coalitions, and strategies of various actors 
stimulated these changes? 
• To what extent have the excesses and abuses of dominant actors stimulated these 
changes? 
• What political forces, if any, eventually lead to ground rules, procedures, and 
performance evaluations that more adequately balance the interests of prime beneficiaries 
(i.e., parents and students) in quality and the interests of employees in job security and 
fair treatment? (Source: Bridges & Groves, 1999, p. 336) 
The interaction of education policy implementation theory and micropolitics of personnel 
evaluation framed this study. This interaction is embedded in Kirst and Wirt’s (2009) definition 
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of micropolitics: the “formal and informal transactions that shape policy implementation” 
(p. 203). It is important to understand local policy implementation through micropolitics, and 
researchers have used micropolitics as a lens to describe the complexities of policy 
implementation (Marsh, 2012). As just one dimension of policy implementation, politics can 
influence the success or failure of policy reforms (Kirst & Wirt, 2009). Malen (2006) asserted 
that politics is always present in policy implementation, proposing a framework that examines 
“reciprocal relationships” between policy implementation and politics, with the challenge for 
researchers “to unpack how politics creates policy, and to uncover how policy creates politics” 
(p. 85). An as example, Malen described how policy actors may pushback during implementation 
to alter the intended outcome of the policy. Marshall and Scribner (1991) described the 
policymaking process as a central concept of micropolitics, focusing on “the processes of 
arriving at decisions, policies, regulations, and decrees emanating from power relationships and 
conflict situations” (p. 349). Micropolitics is important in policy implementation research 
because conflicts can reveal the values of leaders and stakeholders in the organization, not just 
“managerial conflicts to overcome” (Flessa, 2009, p. 346). Schools are often considered to be 
positive (or neutral) institutions in which the presence of conflict is not normal; addressing the 
micropolitics of schools may expose difficult social justice or equity issues that were hidden 
previously but need to be illuminated (Datnow, 2001; Flessa, 2009). Therefore, in order to 
understand the implementation of teacher evaluation reform in this study, a micropolitics lens 
was used to illuminate the decisions, actors, and outcomes of policy implementation. 
Conclusion  
Policy reform advocates promoted teacher evaluation reform in Illinois as a mechanism 
to improve student learning through the identification and improvement of underperforming 
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teachers (Regenstein, 2011). However, teachers and leaders hold low confidence in the ability of 
evaluation reforms generally to influence changes in teaching and learning practices (Donaldson, 
2012). As one scholar bluntly explained, “The reality is that there is very little evidence to 
suggest that it [teacher evaluation] has done anything to improve schooling” (Murphy, 2013, 
para. 3). The literature suggests that few underperforming teachers are identified through the 
formal evaluation process (Bridges, 1992).  
The implementation of education policy is affected by local context, including the 
complex interactions of policies, people, and places (Malen, 2006). Micropolitics of personnel 
evaluation provide one lens for examining the interactions of local actors who may influence 
evaluators when identifying underperforming teachers (Bridges & Groves, 1999). This chapter 
presented an overview of leadership for learning, teacher evaluation, and the policies and 
practices of teacher evaluation in Illinois. In addition, the conceptual frameworks of education 
policy implementation (Honig, 2006) and micropolitics of personnel evaluation (Bridges & 
Groves, 1999) were described as frameworks to guide the study. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
The ability of policymakers to measure the outcomes of policy reforms is vital to the 
development of future policies. Because policies are implemented at the local level, research that 
includes local data and local policy actors can illuminate policy implementation and 
micropolitics. This chapter describes the research questions for the study in addition to the 
research design, population, development and validation of the instruments, data collection, 
ethical considerations and validity, and the data analysis procedures. 
Research Questions 
The following research questions guided this study: 
Research question 1. To what extent has the implementation of teacher evaluation 
reforms affected the frequency of identifying underperforming teachers in Illinois public 
schools? 
Research question 2. How have micropolitical factors influenced principals in the 
identification of underperforming educators in Illinois since the implementation of teacher 
evaluation reforms? 
Research Design 
This study utilized a two-phase, explanatory sequential mixed methods design to answer 
two research questions. A visual model of the study design is included in Appendix B. The 
literature uses many terms that are synonymous with mixed methods—including mixed 
methodology, synthesis, and multimethod—to describe a research design that incorporates the 
use of both quantitative and qualitative data (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Mixed methods is 
common in policy research as an approach to examine a phenomenon while also measuring the 
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outcomes and implementation of policy (Burch & Heinrich, 2016). For this study, the mixed 
methods design was chosen for the purpose of complementarity—using multiple methods to gain 
a deeper understanding of different facets of a single phenomenon (Greene, 2007).  
In the quantitative phase, data were collected to determine whether the policy reform 
caused a significant difference in the identification of underperforming teachers. In the 
qualitative phase, data were collected to explain whether micropolitics influenced the 
implementation of the policy reform. The explanatory sequential variant was chosen so 
participants in the qualitative phase with knowledge of the mechanisms behind the quantitative 
data could explain and illuminate the quantitative data (Cameron, 2009). This design also 
integrated the quantitative and qualitative results into a cohesive analysis to strengthen and 
justify the overall conclusions of the study (Ivankova et al., 2006).  
Mixed method studies reflect worldviews unique to each phase of the study. Although the 
literature includes debate on the nature and role of worldviews (Greene, 2007), four commonly 
discussed worldviews are postpositivist, constructivist, participatory, and pragmatist. The 
quantitative study reflects a postpositivist worldview, focusing on a narrowly defined, empirical 
data set regarding teacher evaluation and the identification of underperforming teachers (Teddlie 
& Tashakkori, 2009). The qualitative portion reflected a constructivist worldview. The analysis 
sought to understand the data on teacher evaluation by gathering credible descriptions from 
multiple evaluators. The epistemology of the constructivist worldview co-constructs the reality 
with participants (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). These 
postpositivist and constructivist worldviews supported the explanatory sequential mixed methods 
design for this study. The quantitative data provided empirical evidence of teacher evaluation 
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outcomes while the qualitative data illuminated the influence of micropolitics on the 
implementation of teacher evaluation reform.  
The unit of analysis in this study was principals who evaluate of teachers. The study 
examined the micropolitical factors that influence their decisions in teacher evaluation. 
Population, Site Selection, and Participants 
The site for both phases was the state of Illinois. This state was chosen as an interesting 
case of teacher evaluation policy implementation (Regenstein, 2011). In addition, prior Illinois 
studies on teacher dismissal conducted by Henry (2010), Reeder (2005a, 2005b), and Weisberg 
et al. (2009) were available for historical comparison.  
Quantitative phase population. In the quantitative phase, the population (N = 859) 
included all public elementary, high school, and unit districts in Illinois identified from the 
Directory of Educational Entities provided to the researcher in September 2017 (ISBE, 2017a). 
These entities are required to evaluate teachers according to the regulations for all public schools 
in Illinois. Upon request, ISBE provided the email addresses for all district superintendents and 
principals. The accuracy of these addresses is dependent upon the timely uploading of updated 
administrator contact information by the school district. Because the administration of 859 
electronic questionnaires was feasible, the entire population of public school superintendents 
identified for this study was contacted by email to complete the questionnaire Superintendents 
were chosen because, as leaders of their school districts, they have access to the data and 
administrative support staff needed to gather the requested information. The study did not require 
superintendents to work in the district during the years studied, and respondents could choose to 
provide partial data. 
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Ideally, all 859 Illinois superintendents would have replied to the questionnaire request. 
However, the questionnaire required data collection and time resources from the district to 
complete it, which may have discouraged superintendents from participating. Overall, 183 
superintendents initiated the online questionnaire while 91 superintendents completed it. Six 
superintendents declined consent. Upon visual analysis, two questionnaires included data that did 
not conform to expected norms and were excluded from the study. Therefore, the final sample 
population for the quantitative phase was 89 school district superintendents responding, 
representing 10.36% of the 859 districts statewide.  
Qualitative phase population. To define the population for the qualitative interview 
phase, a four-step analysis was used (Robinson, 2013). First, criteria were established to identify 
participants whose experiences are most likely to provide them the knowledge to illuminate the 
research questions (Palinkas et al., 2013). The population consisted of currently practicing 
principals in Illinois public schools who worked in roles as evaluators of educators for at least 7 
years. Because the study sought participants whose experiences could illuminate the research 
questions, potential participants must have identified one or more teachers for a remediation 
plan, a PDP, or dismissal during their Illinois public school careers. The size of the qualitative 
sample for interviewing was established at 20 participants.  
Third, a sampling strategy for the quantitative phase was selected. Purposeful criterion-i 
sampling was used to identify participants who met the predetermined criteria for inclusion in the 
study (Palinkas et al., 2013). Expert judgment was used to identify the participants to be invited 
for interviews, seeking respondents would provide the most insight (Robinson, 2013). In 
addition, a diverse pool of participants was identified to increase the generalizability of the study 
sample, representing diverse demographics, including gender, race/ethnicity, geographic regions 
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of the state, and district demographics (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Finally, the methods for 
recruiting and identifying participants were established. First, during the qualitative phase, 
superintendents offered suggestions for school leaders who would meet the criteria for the 
qualitative phase and whose experiences may provide rich data for the study. In addition, all 
principals in Illinois public schools were invited by e-mail to review the criteria and volunteer 
for consideration as a participant (Appendix F).  
Telephone screening interviews were conducted with 28 volunteers who responded via 
email. This screening interview determined if volunteers met the criteria for inclusion and which 
cases had the greatest potential for rich and thick description relevant to the qualitative research 
question (Appendix G). From these screeners, 21 participants were interviewed by telephone or 
in person between December 6, 2017 and January 16, 2018. During one interview, it was learned 
one participant did not meet the criteria for the study, and this interview was excluded from the 
study and replaced with another participant. Therefore, the final number of interviewees was 20 
principals. One participant served a dual role as a principal/superintendent and was included in 
the study. Pseudonyms and school district names were chosen by the participants or assigned by 
the researcher.  
Each interview participant’s gender, race/ethnicity, years of evaluating educators in 
Illinois public schools, and their current roles were obtained during screening interviews (Table 
5). Information on district size-type and region was obtained from ISBE (2017b; 2017c). 
Participants’ evaluation experience in Illinois public schools ranged from 7 years to 18 years 
(M = 12.15 years). Fourteen participants were from large school districts, four from medium-
sized districts, and two from small districts. Eight participants were from elementary districts, 
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one from a high school district, and 11 from unit districts. Participants included 10 males and 10 
females, representing equal gender representation.  
Participants represented districts throughout the state of Illinois. The six districts of the 
ISBE Statewide System of Support were used to classify the geographic region of Illinois 
represented by the participants (Figure 1). Eleven participants (55%) represented Area 1 
(Northeast), including Cook County and Chicago Public Schools, four participants (20%) 
represented Area 2 (West Central), no participants represented Area 3 (West Central), three 
participants (15%) represented Area 4 (East Central), one participant (5%) represented Area 5 
(Southwest), and one participant (5%) represented Area 6 (Southeast) with one participant (5%). 
(Table 5). Although respondents were more heavily represented in Area 1, this region is the most 
populous in Illinois and has the most school districts. 
 
Figure 1. ISBE Statewide Systems of Support (https://www.isbe.net/Pages/Statewide-System-of-
Support-Fiscal-Agents.aspx) 
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Table 5 
Participants in Qualitative Phase 
Participant 
School 
district Gender 
Race 
ethnicity 
Years as 
evaluator 
in Illinois 
District size-  
type 
SSOS 
area/region 
Aidan O’Brien Irving Male Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
White 
11 Large-
elementary 
1 
Amanda Ashbee Sunfields Female Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
White 
9 Medium-unit 2 
Ann Keaton Napa 
River 
Female Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
White 
17 Large-unit 5 
Charlie Ramirez Churchill Male Hispanic/Latino 
White 
10 Large- 
elementary 
1 
Corey Hammer Ferndale Male Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
White 
14 Large-unit 4 
Diana Legend Rosedale Female Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
White 
17 Large-unit 4 
Dustin Ross St. Paul Male Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
White 
8 Large-unit 2 
Emma Moore Gregson Female Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
White 
7 Large-
elementary 
1 
Eric Graves Founders Male Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
White  
9 Medium-
elementary 
2 
Frank Steele Bayview Male Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
White 
17 Large-unit 1 
Glen Tucker Crater 
Bay 
Male Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
White 
17 Large-unit 1 
Harold Cooper Kappel Male Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
Black or African-
American 
9 Large-high 
school 
1 
Jeffrey Shannon Highlane Male Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
Asian 
18 Large-unit 4 
Jordyn Harris Hillman Female Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
Black or African-
American 
10 Medium-
elementary 
1 
Melody Roberts Pittman Female Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
White 
10 Large-unit 1 
Michelle Hale Austin Female Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
White 
13 Large-unit 1 
Molly Martin Logan Female Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
White 
8 Small-
elementary 
6 
Rebecca Silver Jasper Female Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
White 
10 Large-unit 2 
Stephen Pierce Maple 
Ridge 
Male Not Hispanic/Not Latino  
White 
14 Medium-
elementary 
1 
Vickie Wells Abbidale Female Not Hispanic/Not Latino 
White 
15 Large-unit 1 
Note. Pseudonyms used. Some data from ISBE (2017b; 2017c). 
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The diversity of interview participants closely paralleled the overall diversity of all 
principals in Illinois, as reported by White and Brown (2010). Table 6 lists race and ethnicity 
data for participants in comparison to all principals in Illinois.  
Table 6 
Participant Race and Ethnicity 
Demographic 
Number of 
participants 
Percentage of  
participants Statewide in 2008 
Race    
 Hispanic/Latino 1 5% 3.9% 
 Not Hispanic/Not Latino 19 95% 94.1% 
    
Ethnicity 
 American Indian or Alaska Native 
 Asian 
 Black or African-American 
 Native Hawaiian 
 White 
 Hispanic/Latino 
 
0 
1 
2 
0 
16 
1 
 
0% 
5% 
10% 
0% 
80% 
5% 
 
< 0% 
0.5% 
14.8% 
n/a 
80.1% 
3.9% 
    
Gender 
 Male 
 Female 
 
10 
10 
 
50% 
50% 
 
52% 
48% 
Note. Data from 2008 study by White and Brown (2010). 
Development and Validation of the Questionnaire 
Prior to data collection in the quantitative phase, a pilot study with three districts was 
conducted to test the reliability and validity of the survey instrument (Appendix E). In addition, a 
practicing Illinois school law attorney was consulted about the questionnaire items and process 
for data collection. 
Data Collection 
The data for this study were collected in two phases as summarized in the data collection 
matrix in Appendix A. In phase one, data were obtained from two sources. First, in September 
2017, a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request was emailed to the Illinois State Board of 
Education. FOIA requests are often used in mixed methods research to identify the topics for 
further study in the second stage (Savage & Hyde, 2014; Walby & Larsen, 2012). Electronic 
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records were requested to obtain data on public school districts and the contact names and email 
addresses of district superintendents and school principals (Appendix D). Second, during 
October 2017, requests (Appendix C) were emailed to the superintendents of 859 Illinois public 
school districts. These notices informed and alerted participants that an online questionnaire 
would be emailed the following week. The email included an attachment with a copy of the 
questionnaire, allowing the superintendent or other staff member to begin gathering the data 
prior to receiving the questionnaire. Data included the number of teachers placed on remediation 
plans, teachers assigned to PDPs, and teacher dismissals for the 11 school years between 2006-
2007 and 2016-2017. In addition, survey participants were asked for the school year when the 
district initiated PDPs triggered by a “needs improvement” rating required by Section 24A-5(h) 
of the School Code following the passage of PERA. One week after the worksheet was emailed, 
a link to the online questionnaire was sent by electronic mail. Survey Monkey was used to 
communicate with participants and collect data for the online questionnaire. One week later, a 
follow-up email was sent requesting superintendents who had not completed the questionnaire to 
do so. Data from responding districts were supplemented with data from ISBE (2017b). By 
collecting data back to the 2006-2007 school year, this study helps to fill a gap in the literature 
on Illinois teacher dismissals since 2008 (Henry, 2010) and extend the data collected by Reeder 
(2005a, 2005b). Additionally, the study was strengthened by analyzing data before and after the 
implementation of policy reforms.  
Information from the quantitative phase was explored further in the qualitative phase. 
During December 2017 and January 2018, in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with 20 participants to explore the micropolitical factors that influenced principals when 
evaluating teachers (Appendix K). Semi-structured interviews provide in-depth examination of 
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participants as they share their individual experiences and stories in their own words (Merriam & 
Tisdell, 2016; Seidman, 2013). The interview protocol (Appendix I) was designed to address the 
questions for further study of micropolitics of personnel proposed by the framework of Bridges 
and Groves (1999). The questions were open-ended, allowing the participants to reflect on and 
reconstruct their experiences rather than simply recall memories (Seidman, 2013). The interview 
lengths ranged from 18 minutes to 70 minutes (M = 36 minutes). Two in-person interviews were 
conducted, and 18 were held via telephone. The interview protocol contained a list of common 
questions and potential follow-up questions, allowing me to respond and interact with the 
participants’ responses (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).  
Each interview was recorded digitally to preserve the original spoken words of the 
participant. The recordings were transcribed by a professional transcription service to capture the 
accurate verbatim text of the participants. The audio recordings were deleted once the transcripts 
were verified. A copy of the themes and findings was provided to each participant for member 
checking, allowing participants to verify the inferences and interpretations (Seidman, 2013). 
Follow-up questions were emailed to all 20 participants to illuminate and explain the quantitative 
results. Responses were received from 12 participants and reported in the integrated findings 
section. 
Ethical Considerations and Validity 
The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Illinois 
(Appendix J). Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to interviews, as 
confidentiality is desirable when the topics are controversial or when identifying information 
potentially could harm the participants (Creswell, 2014; Yin, 2014). Approved consent forms 
clearly stated the rights of participants as human subjects in research, including the right to 
 72 
discontinue their participation at any time (Appendix H). All case information was converted to 
pseudonyms and other fictitious identifiers will be included to protect the identity of the 
participants (Yin, 2014). Without these protections, gaining access to interview participants 
would have been difficult (Flessa, 2009). All individually identified information was kept 
confidential. 
Although critics of mixed methods approaches cite inherent difficulties in maintaining a 
rigorous design that uses both quantitative and qualitative methodologies (Bogdan & Biklen, 
2007), these challenges are mitigated by collecting and analyzing all data using rigorous 
procedures to ensure validity and reliability (Ivankova, 2014). Therefore, this study applied 
several strategies to ensure the validity and reliability of the findings. First, in mixed methods 
studies, analyzing data from multiple sources is one mechanism to confirm the accuracy of the 
data and findings (Creswell, 2014). In this study, data on underperforming teachers was collected 
separately in the quantitative phase, then further explored by the use of qualitative interviewing 
with evaluators separately in phase two. Validity is strengthened when data are collected 
independently of one another and when the phenomenon studied—in this instance, teacher 
evaluation—is consistent in both phases (Greene, 2007). Second, the coded results and emergent 
interview themes were shared with the participants to confirm if their viewpoints were accurately 
represented. Third, a peer debriefer reviewed the coding and interview analysis to confirm their 
accuracy and increase the validity of the findings. Finally, rich narration provided detailed 
descriptions to increase the validity of the findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Data Analysis 
In the quantitative phase, the data were analyzed using quantitative data analysis 
procedures as described by Creswell and Plano Clark (2011). First, the data were prepared for 
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analysis using software—Microsoft Excel 2013 for the Windows computer platform. This 
preparation included aligning data from the questionnaires with data collected on the district 
from ISBE, coding data with numeric values, checking the data set for entry errors, calculating 
any new variables for data to be combined for analysis, and maintaining a codebook within the 
software to list and describe the variables. Second, I visually reviewed the data, prepared a 
descriptive analysis, and inspected the data for any interesting trends or distributions. Third, the 
data were analyzed to illuminate interesting findings and patterns. To begin this analysis, 
descriptive tables and graphs helped organize the data to show the frequency counts of educators 
who (a) started a PDP, (b) started a remediation plan, and (c) were dismissed from their 
positions. Aggregate data from 2006-2011 and 2011-2017—representing the years before and 
after the required implementation of PDPs—were analyzed to determine whether the 
identification of underperforming teachers was significantly different following the 
implementation of reforms. Because the total number of teachers represented in the population 
changed in each year of this analysis, ratios were calculated to show the number of teachers 
represented by each PDP, remediation, or dismissal. Fifth, the results were interpreted to 
illuminate the research questions. These findings were compared against other findings in the 
literature regarding the identification of underperforming teachers in Illinois (e.g., Henry, 2010; 
ISBE, 2017d; Reeder, 2005a, 2005b; Weisberg et al., 2009). Finally, the findings were checked 
for validity through consultation with the peer debriefer. 
In the qualitative phase, the data were analyzed using the qualitative analysis procedures 
described by Creswell and Plano Clark (2011). First, interviews were transcribed by a 
professional transcription service. The transcriptions were uploaded and cataloged for analysis 
using computer software—HyperRESEARCH version 3.7.3 for the Windows computer platform. 
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Second, I read through all transcripts to form a general impression of the data. Within the 
software, a codebook maintained a database of codes that evolved during data analysis. Third, 
the data were analyzed using a categorical approach to data analysis, with the narrative text 
reorganized and categorized into codes for easier comparisons (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). 
These codes guided me to identify the “salient themes, recurring ideas or language, and patterns 
of belief that link people and settings together” (Marshall & Rossman, 2011, p. 214). Fourth, I 
explained the results through discussions of the themes in the next chapter with a table to 
summarize the results. The oral speech recorded during the interviews was edited for written 
presentation to preserve the dignity and confidentiality of the participants and to avoid any 
sensitive or vulnerable issues (Seidman, 2013). Fifth, the results were interpreted to illuminate 
the research questions. This interpretation was guided by my personal perspective and the 
conceptual frameworks of education policy implementation theory (Honig, 2006) and 
micropolitics of personnel evaluation (Bridges & Groves, 1999) presented in Chapter 2. The 
interpretation identified the major lessons from the narrative. Finally, the data and results were 
checked for validity through member checking. Participants were provided copies of the 
descriptions of the themes and results and given the opportunity to provide comments on their 
accuracy (Creswell, 2014). 
The results of the quantitative and qualitative phases were integrated during the 
interpretation phase of the study to discuss the results of the entire study (Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2011). As a sequential explanatory design, this section explained how the qualitative data 
explained the quantitative data, as well as how the overall research question is addressed 
(Ivankova et al., 2006). The study used a systematic process to ensure the validity of the meta-
inferences (Ivankova, 2014). First, participants for the qualitative phase were selected to ensure 
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they met the identified criteria. Second, the phase two follow-up questions were informed by the 
results from phase one. Finally, I observed the interaction between the qualitative and 
quantitative phases. Data from follow-up questions to illuminate the quantitative findings were 
analyzed and reported as integrated findings. I monitored data throughout the study, formulated 
tentative themes, and continually revisited themes throughout data collection and analysis. The 
participants were invited to review the overall research findings at the conclusion of the study. 
Conclusion 
This chapter described the methodology for a mixed methods study to examine the 
influence of micropolitics on the implementation of teacher evaluation reforms in Illinois. In the 
quantitative phase, Illinois public school superintendents were surveyed to collect data on the 
number of educators identified as underperforming. In the qualitative phase, 20 principals were 
interviewed to determine the role of micropolitics on the implementation of evaluation policy 
reform and to expand upon the quantitative findings. In the next chapter, the results of each 
phase will be discussed separately, followed by a discussion of the integrated results. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
This mixed methods study examined the phenomenon of teacher evaluation, focusing on 
how micropolitics have influenced the implementation of teacher evaluation reforms in Illinois. 
The following research questions guided this study: 
1. To what extent has the implementation of teacher evaluation reforms affected the 
frequency of identifying underperforming teachers in Illinois public schools? 
2. How have micropolitical factors influenced principals in the identification of 
underperforming teachers in Illinois since the implementation of teacher evaluation 
reforms? 
First, this chapter provides a description of the quantitative data collected for this study 
and the findings of the relevant descriptive statistics analysis to address the first research 
question. Second, the results of the qualitative phase will be described to address the second 
research question. Finally, the results of the qualitative phase will be integrated to more fully 
explain the data collected in the quantitative phase.  
Research Question 1: To what extent has the implementation of teacher evaluation reforms 
affected the frequency of identifying underperforming teachers in Illinois public schools? 
Data regarding PDPs, remediation plans, and educator dismissals were collected from 89 
respondents, which represented 10.36% of Illinois’ 859 public school districts. In this section, 
the results of this questionnaire are described with narrative description and visual charts and 
graphs. 
Respondent demographics. Data on student enrollment and educator counts were 
obtained from ISBE (2017b). For the purposes of this study, “educator” includes all certificated 
employees in non-administrative appointments (e.g., teachers, counselors, librarians, social 
workers, psychologists, deans, instructional coaches, etc.) who are evaluated under the Illinois 
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state teacher evaluation requirements. Based on enrollments during the 2016-2017 school year, 
respondent school districts comprised 5.82% of total student enrollment in Illinois 
(N = 118,137). Based on 2016-2017 educator counts (ISBE, 2017b), respondent school districts 
employed 6.37% of educators in Illinois (N = 8,113). Thus, although respondents represented 
10.36% of districts statewide, respondents represented a smaller percentage of statewide student 
enrollment and educator count. Two factors explain this difference. First, the three largest school 
districts in Illinois did not complete the questionnaire. Second, the state of Illinois contains many 
small, rural districts with small enrollments and small staff sizes (Table 7).  
Table 7 
 
Respondents for Quantitative Phase 
 
Demographics  
Respondent 
districts 
All districts 
statewide 
Percentage of 
respondents among all 
districts statewide 
Districts  89 859 10.36% 
Student enrollment   118,137 2,000,730 5.90% 
Educator count  8,113 127,310 6.37% 
Note. Using 2016-2017 student enrollment and educator data from ISBE (2017a, 2017b). 
Table 8 compares student enrollment of respondent districts with overall Illinois public 
school district enrollments. Respondents included a higher proportion of districts with smaller 
enrollments than the statewide averages. In addition, the student enrollment range was much 
narrower than district enrollments across the state, attributed to the absence of the three largest 
school districts in the respondent group. 
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Table 8 
Enrollment Comparisons Between Respondents’ Districts and All Illinois Public School Districts 
Districts 
Range (number of 
students) Mean Median 
Respondents 56-12,246 1,326.54 462 
Statewide Total 40-340,668 23,374.69 727 
Note. Using 2016-2017 student enrollment and educator data from ISBE (2017a; 2017b). 
When comparing the enrollments of responding districts to overall public school district 
enrollments in Illinois, district type and size were considered. First, Illinois school districts are 
organized by three grade-level configurations: unit (K-12), elementary (K-8), or high school (9-
12). Respondents included 44 elementary (49.44%), seven high school (7.87%), and 38 unit 
districts (42.70%). The distribution of responding districts by school district type generally was 
similar to the statewide distribution (Table 9). Next, the enrollment size of respondent districts 
by organization type was compared to overall Illinois district enrollments by type. ISBE 
classifies district sizes based on fall enrollment counts taken on September 30 of each school 
year. The 25% of districts with lowest enrollments are classified as “small,” the 25% with 
highest enrollments are “large,” and the remaining districts are “medium” (ISBE, 2017b). 
Among respondents, 26.97% represented small districts (N = 24), 58.43% represented medium 
districts (N = 52), and 14.61% represented large districts (N = 13). Compared to the statewide 
data, the sample population had fewer large districts and more medium-enrollment districts 
(Table 9). 
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Table 9 
Frequency of School District Types and District Size in Quantitative Phase 
District type Respondents Respondent 
district 
distribution (%) 
Statewide district 
distribution (%) 
District type    
   Elementary (K-8) 
   High School (9-12) 
   Unit (K-12) 
44 
 7 
38 
49.44% 
7.87% 
42.70% 
43.02% 
10.12% 
44.53% 
District size    
  Small 24 26.97% 25% 
  Medium 52 58.43% 50% 
  Large 13 14.61% 25% 
Note. Using 2016-2017 data (ISBE 2017a, 2017b) 
To examine the geographic distribution of the respondents throughout Illinois, the six 
ISBE Statewide System of Support areas were used (Figure 1). Area 1 (Northeast) included 28 
respondents (31.46% of respondent group); Area 2 (Northwest), 14 (15.73%); Area 3 (West 
Central), 12 (13.48%); Area 4 (East Central), 14 (15.73%), Area 5 (Southwest), (6.74%); and 
Area 6 (Southeast), 15 (16.85%). Respondents represented all of the SSOS education 
areas/regions in Illinois. Although respondents were more heavily represented in Area 1, this 
region is the most populous in Illinois and has the most school districts. 
Professional Development Plans: Staggered implementation. The 2010-2011 school 
year represented the first full school year of the PERA law requiring districts to implement a 
Professional Development Plan (PDP) in their evaluation plan for educators. The PDP is 
developed in collaboration with the board of education and the collective bargaining agent 
representing educators. Districts could begin implementing these plans following the passage in 
PERA in January 2010 (ISBE, 2015). Respondents were asked to indicate which school year 
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they implemented the PDP requirement of PERA. The rollout of PDP implementation occurred 
over several years in school districts (Table 10). Only 3.37% of districts implemented in the first 
year (N = 3) and an additional 5.62% implemented in the second year (N = 5). By the 2016-2017 
school year, 84.27% of districts had implemented the PDP requirement of PERA (N = 75). 
However, 13 respondent districts indicated they have not implemented the required PDPs into 
their evaluations, representing 14.60% of respondent districts—even though PDPs are state-
mandated for all Illinois public school districts. 
Table 10 
Year When Respondent Districts Implemented Professional Development Plans  
School year 
implemented Respondents 
% of 
Respondents 
2010-2011 3 3.37% 
2011-2012 5 5.62% 
2012-2013 14 15.73% 
2013-2014 15 16.85% 
2014-2015 16 17.98% 
2015-2016 13 14.61% 
2016-2017 9 10.11% 
Not implemented 13 14.61% 
Other 1 1.12% 
 
Respondents provided data on the frequency of PDPs created with tenured educators; 
these tenured faculty members would have been rated as “needs improvement” in their 
summative evaluation ratings. During the first full year after PERA passage (2010-11), 
respondent districts implemented 6 PDPs with tenured educators; in 2016-2017, 24 PDPs were 
developed. The number of PDPs ranged from two (during 2009-2010) to 26 (during 2014-2015). 
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Respondents were not required to provide data for every year but were encouraged to provide 
whatever data they had available. Therefore, calculations were made to determine percentages 
and ratios based on the number of educators represented by respondents who reported data in 
each year. The number of educators reported to ISBE (2017b) was used. By calculating ratios in 
the sample population, estimates of frequency in the Illinois public school educator population 
can be calculated. These percentages, ratios, and statewide estimations are provided below 
(Table 11). 
Table 11 
Tenured Staff Assigned a Professional Development Plan in Respondent Districts 
School year 
Number of 
PDPs in 
respondent 
districts 
Number of educators 
in respondent 
districts 
Percentage of 
educators in PDP 
in respondent 
districts 
Ratio of 
PDP:Educators in 
respondent districts 
Estimated 
frequency of 
PDPs in all 
district statewide 
2009-2010 2 6,786 0.023% 1:3,393 39 
2010-2011 6 7,250 0.083% 1:1,208 106 
2011-2012 14 7,282 0.192% 1:520 246 
2012-2013 13 7,834 0.166% 1:602 216 
2013-2014 19 7,719 0.246% 1:406 320 
2014-2015 26 7,973 0.326% 1:306 423 
2015-2016 25 8,115 0.308% 1:324 392 
2016-2017 24 8,113 0.296% 1:338 377 
Note. Data on number of educators from ISBE (2017b). 
When these data are charted in a line graph, omitting the 2009-2010 school year when the 
reform was passed mid-year, a declining trend line in the ratio of PDPs to Illinois public school 
educators is shown (Figure 2). However, districts implemented PDPs in a staggered fashion since 
passage of the legislation, gradually increasing with each subsequent year; thus, fewer districts 
implemented plans in the early years following PERA. By 2016-2017, when 75 (84.27%) of 
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respondent districts had implemented the PDPs, one PDP was implemented for every 338 
educators working in the respondent school districts. As a result, a lower frequency of PDPs 
would be expected early in this reform because fewer districts had implemented their plans.  
 
 
Figure 2. Ratio of educators to each PDP started. 
Caution must be taken when interpreting these results, because these data may be skewed 
due to the absence of the three largest school districts in Illinois. During the 2016-2017 school 
year, for example, Chicago Public Schools (CPS) officials reported a higher frequency of 
educators identified with underperforming ratings than the overall statewide data showed (“What 
the report card says,” 2017). If the CPS schools experienced a higher frequency of identified 
underperformance in years prior to the 2016-2017, the data would not reflect educators 
statewide, but would be limited to downstate schools excluding the three largest districts.  
Remediation plans started. Respondents were asked to report the number of educators 
starting a remediation plan during each school year between 2006-2007 and 2016-2017. Unlike 
1208
520
602
406
306 324 338
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 2015-2016 2016-2017
Ed
uc
at
or
s p
er
 P
DP
School Year
Number of Educators for Each PDP Linear (Number of Educators for Each PDP)
 83 
PDPs, remediation plans have been a required component in Illinois legislation since 1986 
(London, 1998). Therefore, there were no concerns about staggered implementation of 
remediation plans. Respondents were not required to provide data for every year and were 
encouraged to provide whatever data they had available—including partial data. Therefore, 
calculations were made to determine percentages and ratios based on the number of educators 
represented by the respondents who reported data in each year. If a respondent did not report 
data, their district’s educator counts were excluded from calculations. The number of full-time 
educators reported annually to ISBE was used in these counts (2017b). By calculating ratios for 
respondents, estimates of frequency in all Illinois public school districts could be calculated. 
These percentages, ratios, and statewide estimations are provided (Table 12).  
Table 12 
Remediation Plans Started in Respondent Districts 
School year 
Number of 
remediation 
plans 
implemented 
Number of 
educators 
represented 
Educators 
starting a 
remediation 
(%) 
Ratio of 
remediation: 
educators 
Estimated statewide 
frequency of remediation 
plans implemented based 
on ratio of remediation 
2006-2007 2 6,201 0.032% 1:3,101 41 
2007-2008 1 6,361 0.016% 1:6,361 21 
2008-2009 2 6,438 0.031% 1:3,219 41 
2009-2010 2 6,786 0.029% 1:3,393 39 
2010-2011 7 7,250 0.097% 1:1,036 124 
2011-2012 7 7,282 0.096% 1:1,040 123 
2012-2013 12 7,834 0.153% 1:653 199 
2013-2014 2 7,719 0.026% 1:3,856 34 
2014-2015 4 7,973 0.050% 1:1,993 65 
2015-2016 8 8,115 0.099% 1:1,014 125 
2016-2017 7 8,113 0.086% 1:1,159 110 
Note. Data on number of educators from ISBE (2017b). 
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The aggregate number of remediation plans started by respondent districts ranged from 
one (during 2007-2008) to 12 (during 2012-2013). During the 11-year study period, a mean of 
4.91 tenured educators were placed on a remediation plan annually. If this annual rate was 
applied statewide, the estimated statewide mean would be 83.79 tenured educators across all 
Illinois public school districts. However, examining the data since the passage of PERA, between 
2009-2010 and 2016-2017, a mean of 6.25 tenured educators were placed on remediation plans 
annually. When data between 2009-2010 and 2016-2017 are charted in a line graph, the data 
show a declining trend line in the ratio of educators to remediation plans, indicating an increase 
in the number of tenured educators placed on remediation plans (Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 3. Ratio of educators for each remediation plan. 
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Because a remediation plan is triggered by an unsatisfactory summative evaluation rating, 
these results can be compared to evaluation data. Examining evaluation data from 1995-2005, 
Reeder (2005b) estimated 51 unsatisfactory ratings were issued statewide annually with a ratio of 
one educator rated unsatisfactory for every 930 evaluations of tenured and untenured educators. 
However, these data were reported prior to the PERA reforms that expanded the required 
evaluation categories to four, adding the needs improvement rating (ISBE, 2015). Between 2006-
2007 and 2016-2017, 62 (69.66%) respondent school districts did not issue a remediation plan, 
while 27 (30.33%) districts had initiated one or more remediation plans. In comparison, Reeder 
(2005b) found 83% of districts did not issue a remediation plan from 1995-2005.  
All educator dismissals (tenured and non-tenured educators). Respondents were 
asked to provide the number of educator dismissals (both tenured and non-tenured) for the school 
years between 2006-2007 and 2016-2017. Respondents were not required to provide dismissal 
data for every year and were encouraged to provide whatever data they had available—including 
partial data. Calculations were made to determine percentages and ratios based on the number of 
educators represented by respondents who reported data in each year. The number of educators 
reported to ISBE (2017b) was used. By calculating ratios in the respondent group, estimates of 
frequency in the population could be estimated. These percentages, ratios, and statewide 
estimations for dismissals of educators (tenured and non-tenured) are provided (Table 13). 
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Table 13 
Educator Dismissals in Respondent Districts (Tenured and Non-tenured) 
School year 
Number of 
educator 
dismissals 
Number of 
educators 
represented 
Percentage of 
educators 
Ratio of 
dismissal:educators 
Estimated statewide 
frequency of educator 
dismissals based on 
ratio of dismissals 
2006-2007 4 6,201 0.065% 1:1,550 82 
2007-2008 13 6,361 0.204% 1:489 269 
2008-2009 19 6,438 0.295% 1:339 393 
2009-2010 16 6,786 0.236% 1:424 312 
2010-2011 18 7,250 0.248% 1:403 318 
2011-2012 16 7,282 0.220% 1:455 281 
2012-2013 19 7,834 0.243% 1:412 315 
2013-2014 14 7,719 0.181% 1:551 236 
2014-2015 23 7,973 0.288% 1:347 374 
2015-2016 34 8,115 0.419% 1:239 533 
2016-2017 35 8,113 0.431% 1:232 549 
Note. Data on number of educators from ISBE (2017b). 
When the data on tenured and non-tenured dismissals are charted in a line graph, the data 
show a slight declining trend line in the ratio of dismissals to educators in Illinois. The decline 
indicates a slight increase in the number of tenured educators dismissed during the 11-year study 
period (Figure 4). However, examining the trend since the implementation of PERA and SB7 
reforms, the ratio decreased from 1:424 in 2009-2010 to 1:232 in 2016-2017. The small number 
of dismissals reported in 2006-2007 may be an outlier that skews the trend. When the linear 
trend line was calculated using just the years since PERA was passed in January 2010, the linear 
trend showed a decrease in the number of educators dismissed since PERA was enacted 
(Figure 5). This decline in educator dismissals possibly may be explained by the increase of 
PDPs as an additional lever for educator improvement during the same period. 
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Figure 4. Ratio of educators per dismissal (2006-2007 through 2016-2017). 
 
Figure 5. Ratio of educators per dismissal since PERA (2009-2010 through 2016-2017). 
Statewide evaluation data from 2016-2017. In November 2017, ISBE released 
statewide educator evaluation data from the 2016-2017 school year. This annual collection from 
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districts and the public release of evaluation data were mandated under SB7 (ISBE, 2015). For 
each school and district, the online Illinois Report Card (www.illinoisreportcard.com) listed the 
percentage of educators receiving an excellent or satisfactory rating on their evaluations during 
2016-2017. Statewide, 97% of educators were rated as “excellent” or “satisfactory” during 2016-
2017 school year (ISBE, 2017d).  
Evaluation data reported by ISBE from respondent school districts in the quantitative 
phase was compared to the statewide data for all districts. Among respondent districts, ISBE 
reported 2016-2017 evaluation data for 78 respondent districts while 11 respondent districts did 
not have data available from ISBE. After removing the non-reporting districts, calculations were 
made to compare the respondent districts with the statewide data. In 2016-2017, 98.75% of 
educators (N = 7,740) in respondent districts were rated as “excellent” or “satisfactory,” with 
1.25% of educators (N = 98) in respondent districts rated as “needs improvement” or 
“unsatisfactory.” Across all Illinois public school districts statewide, however, 3% were rated as 
“needs improvement” or “unsatisfactory” in 2016-2017. Data from Chicago Public Schools—the 
state’s largest school district—were included for comparison (Table 14).  
Table 14 
ISBE Statewide Evaluation Data for 2016-2017 
Rating Number of educators Reported percentage 
Educators rated as excellent or satisfactory   
    Respondent districts 7,740 98.75% 
    All Illinois public school districts 
    Chicago Public Schools  
 
123,491 
17,383 
97% 
89% 
Educators rated as needs improvement or unsatisfactory   
    Respondent districts 98 1.25% 
    All Illinois public school districts 
    Chicago Public Schools 
3,819 
2,149 
3% 
11% 
Note. ISBE (2017d). 
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Research Question 2: How have micropolitical factors influenced principals in the 
identification of underperforming teachers in Illinois since the implementation of teacher 
evaluation reforms? 
The qualitative phase examined the second research question, which involved the role of 
micropolitical factors in evaluators’ identification of underperforming teachers. Semi-structured 
interviews with 20 experienced Illinois public school evaluators were conducted. In the next 
section, the results of the interviews are presented to support four identified themes from the 
framework of Bridges and Groves (1999): (a) decisions about procedures of the evaluation plan; 
(b) decisions by evaluators; (c) actors and their access, interests, and power; and (d) outcomes of 
policy reforms. Each theme has subthemes described with narrative from the participant 
interviews (Table 15). 
Table 15 
Themes/Subthemes of Qualitative Phase 
Theme/Subtheme Frequency 
 
Decisions about procedures of the evaluation plan 
 
Joint committee collaboration: Local policy 
implementation 
   
19 participants’ districts’ joint committees created 
the procedures; 1 was created by the administration. 
Adoption of the Danielson teaching framework 
 
19 participants’ districts adopted the Danielson 
teaching framework. 
 
Selection of Type III assessments 
 
4 participants described problems with Type III 
assessments. 
 
Assessment quality and approval 
 
9 participants described student growth assessments 
that required the minimum amount of growth or 
effort. 
 
Procedures for student growth scores and the summative 
rating 
 
15 participants described student growth procedures 
leading to inflated summative ratings. 
Procedures influencing evaluators’ workload and focus 
 
11 participants discussed procedures that increased 
evaluators’ workload. 
 
(continued) 
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Table 15 (continued) 
 
Theme/Subtheme Frequency 
 
Decisions by evaluators 
  
Interrater reliability 
 
4 participants described concerns with interrater 
reliability in their districts. 
 
Deferral of low ratings due to retirement/seniority 
 
5 participants deferred low ratings due to the 
educators’ proximity to retirement or seniority. 
 
Unwilling to issue a low rating 
 
9 participants were unable or unwilling to issue a low 
rating to an underperforming educator. 
 
Conversations about teaching and learning 
 
9 participants described improved conversations 
about teaching and learning following the reform. 
 
Reduction in Force (RIF) 
 
5 participants utilized the RIF lever following the 
reform. 
 
Intermediate lever of Professional Development Plans 
(PDP) 
 
11 participants implemented a PDP following the 
reform. 
Remediation plans 12 participants implemented remediation plans 
following the reform, with 3 participants 
experiencing remediation plans that resulted in 
teacher improvement. 
 
Actors and their access, interests, and power 
 
Union influence 
 
11 participants described neutral to positive union 
influence when identifying underperformance. 
 
School board influence 
 
20 participants were not hindered by the school 
board in identifying underperformance. 
 
Superintendent and central office influence 
 
19 participants were not hindered by the 
superintendent or central office in identifying 
underperformance. 
 
Parent and student influence 
 
20 participants were not hindered by parents or 
students in identifying underperformance. 
 
Educator influence and building climate 
 
6 participants discussed how improvement plans 
ultimately improved building climate. 
Outcomes of policy reforms 
 
Value of improvement plans 
 
20 participants answered affirmatively when asked if 
they would implement improvement levers again. 
 
Mixed perceptions of policy reforms 
 
20 participants felt educators had been treated fairly 
under the new evaluation plans, but perceptions of 
the policy’s outcomes were mixed. 
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Decisions about procedures of the evaluation plan. Decisions about procedures of 
teacher evaluation are the local “manner in which evaluations should be conducted” (Bridges & 
Groves, 1999, p. 322). The review of the literature described the regulations for teacher 
evaluation processes in Illinois (ISBE, 2015). In this section, decisions about the procedures of 
policy reform are explored. The subthemes included the work of the joint committee, adoption of 
the Danielson teaching framework, selection of Type III assessments, assessment quality and 
approval, procedures for student growth scores and the summative ratings, and procedures 
influencing evaluator workload and focus. 
Joint committee collaboration: Local policy implementation. The rules of teacher 
evaluation reform delegated many decisions for local implementation to joint committees in each 
district. The joint committees, comprised of educators and administrators, were tasked with 
developing the procedures for student growth and teacher evaluation in their districts. Nineteen 
participants’ districts had active joint committees that created the procedures while one joint 
committee delegated the responsibility to the administration to create the procedures. Participants 
shared varied experiences as joint committees developed the procedures—ranging from 
collaboration to defensiveness. 
Vickie described how her joint committee worked collaboratively to develop the student 
growth measures: “It was very collaborative. We had building representatives and different grade 
levels—and being a K-12 district, you’ve got everything from kindergarten, self-contained 
elementary, special education . . . all the way up to departmentalized in the high school.” Aidan 
concurred, describing his district’s positive process: 
I’ve been really pleased with the conversations we’ve had. I don’t feel like its 
administrators want X and teachers want Y and we are at a gridlock or we’ve got to 
negotiate. I think it’s pretty open conversation.  
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There’s five administrators, five staff members across the district that are on it. I’m 
actually leading, I’m the chair of that committee right now. We have really good 
conversations. Throughout the year, we meet three times. . . . I don’t feel like anything 
has been politicized. It’s nice when one of the teacher members has this perspective on 
student growth or this perspective on the number of observations and another one has a 
very different perspective. 
 
However, other participants described a less collaborative process where educators were 
entrenched to protect their interests or indifferent to the results. Amanda described the joint 
committee as a “defensive process” for educators. She found educators became entrenched 
protecting their interests against low evaluation ratings and potential job loss: 
A very defensive process where the teachers are like, “We’re going to protect our own 
against this new system and these evaluators, to make sure that no one is going to just be 
out to get people to reduce expenditures in the district. To reduce either money that 
they’re spending on teachers’ salaries,” etc. That’s another way that the system just 
became a little more complicated. 
 
Ann concurred, stating educators on the joint committee made the process “more complicated” to 
protect themselves from the possibility of receiving low ratings. Ann explained the educators and 
the teachers’ union wanted to protect their members from repercussions:  
I think their concern was that their administrators could decide they just don’t like 
somebody and make it very personal and find a way to get rid of that teacher through this 
process. They made it a little difficult for me because I really couldn’t disagree with 
them. I guess from that standpoint, there was a little bit of, I don’t want to say contention, 
but kind of. We had lots and lots and lots of meetings and conversations before we came 
to an agreement. Then the document has been revised one time since then. 
 
In contrast, Molly dealt with indifference from educators regarding the joint committee 
process. Educators were comfortable allowing the administration to create the plan—absent the 
involvement and input of the joint committee. Molly explained,  
The problem is they trusted me so much to be fair. You know what I mean, because they 
knew me from previously. Even my parents in the community, they know me. They 
know I am going to be fair. I am not going to play one side or the other. So they trusted 
me to the point they were going to let me do it all, which really wasn’t fair, and that’s 
what I said. I said, “Number one, it’s not fair to me. And number two, if there is 
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something on there you don’t like . . . don’t even come back and tell me you don’t like 
it!” 
An evaluation framework clarifies expectations of effective teaching. Among 
participants, 19 districts adopted the Danielson Framework for Teaching (Danielson, 2013) for 
their evaluation framework. Nine participants felt the district’s decision to utilize a framework, 
with its clearly articulated descriptions of teaching performance, made identifying 
underperforming educators easier. Evaluators easily could justify low ratings, supported by the 
language of the framework components.  
Michelle felt using a teaching framework was a significant improvement over a checklist 
previously used in the Austin district, because the framework’s focus on teaching and learning 
made evaluations more objective. Jordyn discussed the depth of teaching behaviors described by 
the framework:  
I think it’s easier, just because, again, the tool itself that most districts have to use, like 
Danielson, allows you to look at many aspects of an effective teacher in a detailed way. If 
you’re looking at planning, all these pieces that go into planning that, perhaps, you didn’t 
consider, before you maybe just say, “Okay, does the teacher even turn in plans?” and 
more of the compliance kinds of things. Some things of substance, but I think just being 
able to use a rubric to give you more of an in-depth look at what effective teacher looks 
like has been helpful. 
 
In addition, Frank explained how the framework helped communication through specific criteria 
and expectations: 
I think it provides some definite observable actions and the framework for people to be 
able to have conversations to improve, but also provides some specific behaviors and 
observations and data that people can look and see if things aren’t happening. I think 
being able to clearly articulate some of those expectations, and then reflect on what is 
happening in the classroom and beyond is very helpful to be able to communicate with 
staff and help them continue to grow. 
 
Next, participants discussed that some educators need more training with the Danielson 
framework to understand their evaluation ratings and how teaching behaviors are measured. 
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Harold felt the framework made identifying underperforming educators easier, but described 
steps needed to improve educators’ understanding of the framework language: 
I think it makes it easier to identify. I think what is required, though, is some more 
understanding, more calibration around that. Really unpacking what some of those words 
mean, some of those descriptors. What if schools and districts take the time to really 
unpack those rubrics with teachers around Danielson? It makes it a lot easier. I don’t 
think we’ve put enough time into helping teachers understand the rubrics. 
 
Charlie agreed that educators lacked understanding of the evaluation framework language: 
For the general population of teachers, they don’t understand it well enough. They think 
they do, but they really don’t. And they can’t get to that level, so they are not 
understanding that it’s a pretty high demand in order to get that excellent. They still want 
to get that distinguished or excellent rating, even though they’re not performing at that 
level on a regular basis, so they’re not quite understanding the rubric. 
 
Use of Type III student growth assessments. Joint committees determined what 
assessment types were acceptable for use in their districts. Four participants cited the decisions to 
use teacher-created Type III assessments as easy for teachers to demonstrate student growth. 
First, the pre- and post-test model inherently creates growth. Second, most Type III tests were 
single-response question formats, rather than open-ended, constructive response assessments. 
Charlie explained:  
It creates a system where if teachers are creating their own stuff—let me give you this 
test in French, let’s see what you know, which is going to be zero to almost nothing, and 
now I’m going to teach you French. Okay, now take the same test. Ah, amazing, you 
grew! 
 
Later, Charlie expanded on his experiences with student growth assessments: 
The student growth is not really giving us much of any value. We use teacher-created 
assessments, so they’re all pretty much Type III. Some are considered Type II because 
they’re (given) here and at our sister school or department-wide or grade level wide. But, 
in general, they’re created by teachers and they’re graded by teachers and then they’re 
scored by teachers and reported by teachers. And you (the evaluator) basically say “thank 
you!” for that information, and pretty much everybody’s getting either “meets” or 
“exceeds” in that component (student growth).  
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In Jeffrey’s school, the union favored using teacher-created and teacher-graded Type III 
assessments. He shared, “I don’t necessarily think that creates the most rigorous of assessments.” 
Harold described how evaluation procedures in Kappel school district gave educators “total 
autonomy” over the student growth process: 
In our district—and even in my previous district—we decided to go to the two Type III 
assessments for student growth. The teachers pretty much have total autonomy around 
what those measures are going to be and the feedback. Their partners who are looking at 
the data tend to be other teachers. That’s how it has been set up . . . where administration 
has been pulled away from looking at that data. Teachers are looking at it, they’re 
looking at the student growth, and they’re making the determination with very little 
administrative input into how well they’re doing or how well their students are growing. 
They’re giving themselves higher scores because they have complete autonomy about 
what it is that they want to measure in terms of their growth. 
 
The administration has been pulled away from being able to say, “Hey, these are the 
measures we want to take a look at, or want to use a Type 1 or Type 2 measure.” They’re 
basically sandbagging it, to be honest with you. 
 
The joint committee process created student growth procedures favorable to teachers. 
Joint committees established local procedures for creating and approving the assessments used 
for student growth. Some student growth measures and scoring criteria resulted in low-rigor 
assessments—requiring the minimum amount of student growth, so that they were low-stress for 
teachers and permitted them to attain “proficient” or “excellent” student growth ratings with 
minimal effort. Vickie explained that the Abbidale school district joint committee was “very 
accommodating” of educators’ choices of assessments to utilize, while intending for the 
evaluators to encourage educators to increase the rigor of their student assessments: 
Everybody had their own agenda in terms of student growth and what they wanted to 
count as student growth . . . it was very accommodating. It was accommodating on the 
teachers’ ends. It was what they wanted and the administrators were to agree with. 
During the evaluation process it was in agreement that it was still the teacher brought 
their idea to the administrator and the administrator would help them tweak it and try to 
make it a little more rigorous, if possible. 
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Glen explained that educators did not understand what rigor means: “There is a lot of 
confusion and there is a lot of debate about what constitutes a rigorous enough evaluation.” He 
often sent back assessments for teacher revisions “because they’re simply not rigorous enough.” 
In contrast, Rebecca felt her preschool educators created rigorous student growth assessments. 
She described her educators’ assessments as “developmentally age appropriate, but . . . 
rigorous.” 
According to Aidan, his district’s joint committee set low targets to encourage teacher 
risk-taking. However, educators did not take risks; instead they adopted less rigorous goals 
because they feared a negative result on their summative evaluations. Aidan explained,  
I don’t think we are at the point where it’s very rigorous. The teacher evaluation 
committee established through PERA had agreed to set the bar, what I think is relatively 
low in terms of the excellent and proficient percentages. . . . The thinking for the teacher 
evaluation committee was—if you set the bar too high then people aren’t going to be 
willing to take risks and really try something different and tinker with their assessments, 
because they’ll feel like, “Well, geez, why am I gonna set a real rigorous goal with the 
kids and set a high standard when obviously it’s going to put me at needs improvement?”  
 
Jeffrey shared his observations of educators and student growth: 
I have some teachers who I will say their SLOs have been extremely rigorous, and they 
haven’t been playing the numbers game of trying to get an excellent, but I have some 
teachers who’ve really looked at that closely and have tried to do that. I think, if 
anything, teachers have become a lot more savvy with data. In some cases, it’s a little too 
savvy and that they’re trying to game it. 
 
Teacher-created and teacher-graded tests challenged participants. Corey and Charlie 
explained their districts’ decisions to use Type II and Type III assessments—tests selected, 
graded, and/or created by educators, as opposed to standardized Type I assessments created and 
scored by an external source —made it easier for their educators to manipulate the system. 
Charlie explained: “It’s trying to create ownership so that the teachers are owning it and doing it 
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themselves, but . . . it’s hard to police. It’s hard to monitor. That’s I think the biggest fallacy of 
the entire structure.” 
Ann perceived that educators from another building in her district were “gaming” the 
procedures by “teaching to the test.” Harold shared an example from his previous district, noting 
how teachers used the student growth procedures to their benefit: 
Yes, there are a number of teachers in my experience, primarily from my previous 
District, where their Type III assessments were vocabulary tests. They would give their 
students a vocabulary pre-test, they would teach a unit, give them a post-test on the same 
vocabulary and obviously those kids would grow significantly on that measure and they 
would say, “Here’s proof that I’m teaching my students. I’m an excellent teacher.” 
 
Judging the quality of student growth assessments was challenging for joint committees 
and evaluators. Some decision makers lacked sufficient knowledge of the content or 
developmental level of the students being tested. For example, Charlie explained the difficulty of 
judging assessments when joint committee members were not specialists that content area:  
Even though it’s gone through PERA [the joint committee], not everybody is a science 
teacher. Not everybody understands the sequence of math, and is that really at the right 
level of rigor? But then, you throw in all the other [subjects], like Spanish and art and 
music and food and consumer and P.E. Where is the commonality then? 
 
Vickie also described the difficulty of understanding of assessment quality across different 
grades and developmental levels. She shared her experience of fifth grade teachers who were 
comparing their assessments to language goals set for kindergarten, English-language learners: 
I’m in a K-3 building, so what a kindergarten teacher thinks is rigorous and a 5th grade 
teacher thinks is rigorous are two different things. When we’re writing SLOs, you have 
your kindergarten teacher who wants to increase the number of sight words. We have a 
baseline and they need 10 sight words in the beginning of the year and by February 
they’re going to know this amount of sight words, and trying to explain to them that that 
is not rigorous is hard because where is rigor in kindergarten when it comes to reading, 
and when you have kids that are not native Spanish speakers to begin with. When you’re 
talking comprehension and writing, that’s just a tough skill for our kids to begin with 
based on our poverty and where they have come. It takes a long time to get them to that, 
being able to put rigor into their curriculum. It’s been tough. 
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Procedures for student growth scores and the summative rating can inflate summative 
ratings. Joint committees established local procedures for determining the student growth scores 
used in the summative evaluation rating. These decisions included procedures for how student 
growth scores would be calculated and how the student growth and classroom observation 
ratings would be combined to calculate a final summative rating. State rules provided some 
direction for the joint committee’s decisions. In the first year of student growth implementation, 
joint committees could assign no lower than 25% weighting to the student growth scores, 
increasing to a minimum of 30% in the second year of student growth implementation. Joint 
committees who chose the default state model were required to weight student growth scores at 
50% (ISBE, 2015). Among participants, 15 described problems with the procedures for student 
growth measures, including the growth targets set by educators, the procedures for calculating 
the summative evaluation, and the exclusion rules set by joint committees. 
In many districts, educators typically earn the highest score on their student growth 
component. In her first year in her current district, Jordyn observed “probably 100% of the 
teachers always get four—‘excellent’—for student growth.” As a result of this experience, 
Jordyn set a goal in her second year to change the student growth assessments and goals to 
require more effort to earn an “excellent” or “proficient” rating. One educator who served on the 
Napa River joint committee admitted it was very easy to earn a high student growth score, as 
paraphrased by Ann: “The way this process is, if a teacher isn’t bright enough to figure out a way 
to show growth through this process, then they’re not really bright enough to be teaching 
anybody!”  
Participants discussed two factors related to student growth scoring procedures. First, 
educators set student growth goals based on scoring targets and how many students will achieve 
 99 
them. These procedures were established by the joint committee. Glen described the joint 
committee’s mindset when planning for student growth targets. While rigorous targets were 
intended, he described how an educator who sets challenging growth targets could be penalized:  
We use an SLO (Student Learning Objective) model in my district, and I think the initial 
thinking, as to why the PERA joint committee wanted to go with an SLO model was, 
they thought it would foster more in-depth conversations around student assessments, 
how we analyze students’ assessments, and how teachers use those assessments to 
improve their instruction. All of which would be great practice, but I think tying that 
student growth model to their evaluation, actually puts those certified teachers in harm’s 
way when they try to create a rigorous SLO, because if they create one that’s too 
rigorous, that may be negatively reflected on their evaluation. 
 
This potential penalty could discourage educators from setting higher targets. Instead, educators 
could set safer targets to lower their risk of earning a low student growth score. Jeffrey described 
how setting the targets was “like a game of just trying to meet the goal.” He felt sometimes he—
as the evaluator—was to blame for not pushing the educators hard enough to set higher targets. 
Jeffrey also worked with educators who “worked really intentionally, and they’re really worthy 
goals. They’ve really helped to improve the learning of these students.” Glen questioned how 
educators could balance the mutual interests of setting challenging targets for learning while 
earning a high student growth score for their summative evaluation rating:  
If I’m a teacher whose overall summative is . . . tied to how students perform on that 
particular assessment, I think the question becomes, “How rigorous do they really want to 
make it?” Can I say that I definitely got evidence of teachers gaming the system? No. 
Have I had conversations with teachers that have explicitly said, “Not only do I expect, 
but I want a 100% of my students to meet this growth target.” Yes, I have had teachers 
say that. And I don’t think that was really the intent of the legislation. 
 
Second, participants explained how high student growth ratings—when combined with a 
low classroom observation rating—often resulted in a “satisfactory” summative rating. By their 
second year of implementation, most districts implemented the state minimum weighting for 
their summative evaluations: 70% for the classroom observation rating and 30% for the student 
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growth scores (ISBE, 2015). However, the procedures for combining these scores was a local 
decision, and many participants described how these procedures created “ratings inflation” that 
inhibited the assignment of underperforming ratings. Vickie summarized her frustration that 
student growth scores were driving the summative ratings: “If they get a high percentage on their 
student growth component, they won’t be in the ‘unsatisfactory’ or the ‘needs improvement’ 
category.” Charlie concurred: 
When 30% of scores are already going to be proficient or excellent—for some teachers 
that are performing at a proficient level or maybe a little bit less—it’s hard to get 
anything less than proficient (on the summative rating). So, the system is kind of setup, in 
a sense, to create a large pool of “proficient,” hardly any “needs improvement,” and a few 
“excellent.” 
  
Harold agreed underperforming educators would likely attain a higher summative 
evaluation rating in his district, overriding lower classroom observation scores from the 
evaluator: 
Overall, the final evaluation or the final determination of the category that they fall into 
now with the student growth segment of it that is really left up to the teachers to control, 
they can essentially give themselves an excellent rating, with then offsets everything else 
that has been observed the administration. They end up becoming proficient instead of 
needs improvement or unsatisfactory. 
 
As a result of summative ratings inflation, evaluators were hindered in identifying 
underperforming educators. For example, Charlie described his frustrations with summative 
ratings which prevented the use of improvement levers created by PERA and SB7: 
It’s a little bit more of a challenge to get someone into a PDP because they would have to 
be pretty significantly low on Danielson, and I don’t see anyone really being classified 
that low on Danielson in order to qualify for a PDP. And so, to me it’s like I’ve got at 
least two people right now that I’m thinking of that I should put them on a PDP, but one 
day when you do the (summative) evaluation, they’re proficient. They might get a basic 
(“needs improvement”) here and there, but based on their evaluation, they end up 
squaring up proficient, and as long as that’s happening, they’re not going to get on a 
PDP. 
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Corey felt it was easier to identify underperforming educators before the policy reforms. In 
Ferndale school district, the summative rating procedures caused this difficulty: 
By the time you have averaged domains one and four, which are not very dependent on 
the actual performance in a classroom, and you have thrown in what is almost always—at 
least—proficient student growth . . . in our district it is thirty percent of the overall 
year. . . . It’s like everybody comes out at proficient. By the time you average everything, 
even if you are underperforming in domains two and three—by the time you average 
everything else—you are usually coming out at proficient. 
 
So, yeah that’s a long way to get to, I feel like it was easier for me to, if a teacher was 
under-preforming, to kind of use the evaluation tool and go at a specific area on the 
evaluation tool and not have to worry about all these other averages that are coming up. 
 
Joint committees created procedures to determine which students could be excluded from 
student growth calculations. Student characteristics such as special education, Title I services, 
and English-language learners, as well as attendance and the number of classes a student must 
attend, were factors considered by joint committees (ISBE, 2015). One participant—Corey—
described how the joint committee’s decisions in his district had the unintended consequence of 
reducing accountability, allowing educators to “cherry-pick” students: 
We have allowed on attendance . . . you can drop the student’s score if they were below 
80% attendance. But, what happens is you don’t have to, so you keep every kid who is 
proficient or excellent on your growth and then you drop the kids who weren’t. So, you 
pick and choose which kids below 80% attendance get to count [in your scores]. By the 
time all that stuff has factored and nobody is coming out below proficient on student 
growth. 
 
The exclusion rules were meant to protect educators’ growth scores that could be negatively 
affected by students who were absent for a significant portion of instruction. Ann displayed 
empathy for a neighboring district with a high mobility rate, explaining noting how mobility 
influences student growth measures:  
They have schools that have 100% mobility pretty much every single year. Imagine 
starting with 25 kids in August and you have a different 25 kids in May and you’re going 
to be evaluated based on the growth of some pool of those kids. The whole process, I’ve 
had issues and concerns with. 
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In contrast, five participants asserted the procedures in their districts did not negatively 
affect their ability to identify underperforming educators. For example, Dustin explained the 
decision grid in his district was adjusted after the district experienced student growth 
implementation. In identifying underperforming teachers, Glen explained, “I think it’s always 
been challenging, not necessarily just due to SB7 or PERA.” Molly stated the importance of 
documentation didn’t change under the reforms, stating “if you have something that is going to 
cause that person to get a ‘needs improvement’ in whatever area it is, you have to have that 
documented.” 
Evaluators’ workload and focus challenges their efforts to identify underperforming 
teachers. Decisions about procedures influenced the roles of school leaders while placing an 
additional workload on evaluators. The reforms required evaluators to spend more time in 
classrooms for formal and informal observations. Participants explained the benefit of greater 
evaluator awareness of classroom teaching practices. Jeffrey described how his focus changed 
following the reforms: 
I think it’s changed my role to some extent. Not that I wasn’t focused on evaluation 
before, but it just seems like it’s a lot more intentional than it was in years past. In some 
ways, it felt kind of like a to-do; I got to get this done and do it and it’s done, but now it 
feels like it has a lot more intentionality to it. . . . I feel like I know my teachers’ practice 
better from doing evaluations in this manner.  
 
Stephen conducted additional informal observations that yielded important information 
about teaching and learning in the classroom. Because the formal observation is planned and pre-
scheduled with the educator, an evaluator “might see something in the informal that you might 
not regularly see nor necessarily see in the formal observation.” Stephen felt so strongly about 
the value of unscheduled, informal observations that he preferred to conduct informal 
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observations prior to the first formal observation. He stated he could identify more problems 
during the informal observation that could be addressed prior to the first formal observation. 
However, the new evaluation plans required much more time for evaluators to complete 
the evaluation process. Eleven participants described problems with the increased workload. For 
example, Amanda described how the reform mandates impeded her ability to work with 
educators: 
They’re taking a lot more time, there’s a lot more paperwork. I believe the paperwork is 
cutting down on the actual quality and time that principals and teachers meet to discuss 
the actual performance and ways to improve, everyone seems to be just completing 
paperwork. 
 
Charlie elaborated on this point, focusing on the increase in face-to-face meetings required by his 
district’s evaluation plan: 
I have over 150 meetings in one year to evaluate approximately 14 teachers. And, when 
you really look at the amount of time being spent on the evaluation, that’s a lot of time 
being taken away from kids and staff and walking around the classroom. I still try and get 
out at least to visit three or four teachers a day, as much as I can, whenever I can. But, 
that gets harder and harder to do when you gotta have three or four meetings a day for 
evaluation. . . . This can be streamlined. And, at the end of the day, teachers that are I 
know are proficient are still proficient. And teachers that I know are excellent—because 
they’re just dynamic people and really do a great job—are still excellent. It doesn’t take 
150 meetings to determine what I already know is pretty much what it is. 
 
Eric managed the workload by increasing his worktime outside of regular school hours to avoid 
reducing the amount of time he spent in classrooms: 
It just means a lot more time that I spend outside of the school day. We’re not willing to 
give up what we do in the classroom or in the building, so I’m not doing evaluations at 
school or during the school day. So, my workday has increased. 
 
The increased documentation requirements also changed the workload for educators who 
spent more time producing evidence for their evaluator to document and prove their performance 
level on the framework. They gathered documentation and evidence to share with their 
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evaluator—especially in the Danielson Framework domains 1 and 4. Charlie explained how this 
additional work was detrimental to their classroom instruction: 
If they’re meeting a dozen times, 14 times in six months to try and prove themselves as 
proficient or better, they’re spending more time on the paperwork and the process than 
they are actually improving instruction. And that’s just the nature of it. They’re gonna 
spend more time on trying to prove it as opposed to actually doing it. 
 
Decisions by evaluators. Bridges and Groves (1999) described evaluation decisions as 
the judgments made by evaluators in rating teachers and the actions that result from those 
ratings. In this section, the subthemes regarding interrater reliability, deferral of low ratings, 
unwillingness to issue low ratings, conversations about teaching and learning, Reduction in 
Force causes, the intermediate lever of PDPs, and remediation plans are explored. 
Interrater reliability is important, and follow-up analysis and training is needed. When 
Illinois public school administrators completed training modules to become approved evaluators, 
the content focused on interrater reliability to improve the consistency of evaluation ratings 
statewide. Although the Danielson Framework was not mandated by ISBE, but it was 
recommended by education officials, and the statewide evaluator training utilized this framework 
and trained evaluators to achieve a high interrater reliability of evaluation ratings (ISBE, 2015). 
Nineteen of 20 participants worked in districts that adopted the Danielson framework.  
Amanda stated interrater reliability is more important now because “this new system puts 
more pressure on us as evaluators . . . just as the teachers are defensive of what they received as a 
score . . . we have to more or less prove to teachers.” Following the initial training, some school 
districts provided additional training to ensure interrater reliability. For example, Aidan’s 
administrative colleagues watched videos together and discussed whether they were “in 
agreement in terms of what we would constitute as needs improvement, whether it’s in one 
specific domain on the rubric or overall.” After the initial training, Emma continued to work with 
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her two assistant principals on interrater reliability. She led shared walk-throughs, including 
conversations to debrief about the observations. Eric shared the benefits of “area colleagues 
having those communications and conversations about best practices.” This past summer, 
Vickie’s school district conducted interrater reliability exercises with all district evaluators. The 
next school year, her school district provided similar professional development for educators in 
the Danielson Framework, building staff capacity for interpreting the framework. Diana 
described how her district has focused on interrater reliability for evaluators and educators: 
I feel that we’ve worked very hard to make sure that administrators have the support as 
well as the teachers. . . . We have several committees that work on interrater reliability 
and we look at our PERA practices every year, and changing what needs to be updated 
and tweaking. We listen to our teachers who are part of the union as well as social 
workers. 
 
Four participants cited problems with interrater reliability within their districts. First, the 
procedures were not consistently followed. Amanda believed principals did not follow the 
procedures of the evaluation tool, citing “complicated systems and processes” and the constraints 
of evaluators’ workloads. Second, low interrater reliability resulted in uneven distribution of 
summative evaluation ratings across schools in the same district. Emma observed discrepancies 
in ratings distribution, explained her superintendent discovered more elementary educators rated 
as “excellent” than at the middle school. Emma attributed this discrepancy to evaluators’ 
individual interpretations of the Danielson Framework. Corey described one meeting when the 
distribution of summative ratings from all the buildings in his district was shared, revealing 
problems with interrater reliability cross the district. Eric explained that his colleagues have not 
discussed interrater reliability for about five years. He feels it has become “more of a personal 
concern that it’s done with some fidelity than truly checks and balances on our end.” However, 
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because evaluators are now required to complete mandated retraining by ISBE, Eric anticipated 
an increased focus on interrater reliability in their districts. 
Participants were asked to estimate what percentage of educators in their school and in 
their district were underperforming. Their estimates ranged from 0% to 20% (Table 16). Further 
analysis of this data will occur in the integrated findings section of this chapter. 
Table 16 
Interview Participants’ Estimates of Underperformance  
Participant 
Estimate of 
underperforming educators 
in participant’s school (% 
of underperforming 
educators) 
Estimate of 
underperforming educators 
in participant’s district  
(% of underperforming 
educators) 
Aidan O’Brien 3% 2% 
Amanda Ashbee < 2% < 5% 
Ann Keaton 0% 5-10% 
Charlie Ramirez 10-20% 10-20% 
Corey Hammer 20% 20% 
Diana Legend 4% 8-10% 
Dustin Ross 5% 15% 
Emma Moore 10% 15% 
Eric Graves < 5% < 5% (*) 
Frank Steele 1-2% 1-2% 
Glen Tucker 10% 10% 
Harold Cooper < 2% 5% 
Jeffrey Shannon 3% 3% 
Jordyn Harris 20% No opinion 
Melody Roberts 10% 20% 
Michelle Hale 15% 15% 
Molly Martin 0% 0% 
Rebecca Silver 5% 15-20% 
Stephen Pierce 5-10% 5-10% 
Vickie Wells 2% 2% 
 
Low ratings are deferred due to retirement and/or seniority. Five participants deferred 
assigning a low summative evaluation rating due to the potential for the educator to retire and/or 
their seniority in the district. Aidan explained how he weighed various factors when deciding to 
not to assign a low rating for a senior educator: 
I think there are times where you feel like people are not up to snuff and you have those 
conversations. I think where I’ve been guilty of backing off a bit is it’s someone’s maybe 
it’s their last few years, they’ve already put in their retirement papers and you’re kind of 
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like, “Is it really worth it?” That probably sounds terrible, but I think it’s just trying to be 
respectful of where they are in their career and how do you coach ’em up a little bit and 
navigate that rather than, “Now we’re going to go after you here and you’ve got two and 
a half years left before you retire.” 
 
Corey used a practical lens when considering an underperformance plan. He explained, “When 
you are 3 years from retirement, by the time the (improvement) process would play out, you 
would be retired anyways.”  
Amanda described how seniority influenced her decision to decline issuing a “needs 
improvement” rating to a senior educator. In order to justify a higher rating, Amanda included 
language in the narrative evaluation that explained “needs improvement” performance but only 
scored a few specific components as “needs improvement” so the overall rating would remain 
“proficient:” 
I’ll be 100% honest and I will say, yes. If I’m here with a tenured teacher who’s been in 
our district 25 plus years. . . . This evaluation system is new . . . do I put a proficient or do 
I put a needs improvement on this teacher, who in the past before me evaluating them got 
nothing but excellent, nothing? Now, here I step in and I’m going to tell this teacher they 
need “needs improvement?” So, once again what will I do? I will put the proficient down 
but my statements will be statements of . . . needs improvement. . . . So, you have to be 
careful. It might do you more harm than good by putting a needs improvement in this 
category and just a proficient. Might not affect the overall rating at end but that teacher is 
going to see that needs improvement and that’s going to be like a bullet, and then you’re 
going to have the ripple effect. So, I’ll be honest: Yes, I’ve struggled with that. 
 
Michael evaluated an educator in her 43rd year of service. Although the educator’s 
instructional practices reflected underperformance, Michael deferred the low rating out of respect 
for her seniority and potential retirement plans: 
I knew she had already had some conversations with me about retirement; I knew that 
was on the horizon. I thought after 43 years she deserved the opportunity to go out on her 
own. She wasn’t doing any harm to kids. It was again that instructional practice. She 
knew her stuff, she knew her craft, she was still able to teach kids. Was she student 
centered? No, but the community embraced her, the kids embraced her, she still had 
strong relationships. I gave her a pass. If I was going strictly by the book, she would have 
been on a remediation plan. 
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Charlie described a case when he negotiated with an underperforming educator over her 
reassignment to a new grade level. He used the reassignment as leverage to obtain an earlier 
retirement by one year:  
Had we pushed a little bit further, probably could have continued on to get her out. But, 
she was close to retirement so on her second to last year, basically I went up to her and I 
said, “We’re still not changing, even though we went through a PDP process,” and 
eventually she did enough to get off of the cycle. The instruction is still not there. One of 
the things I told her was I was going to move her to a different grade, and she made a 
deal with me, in that if I could give her one more (year), she would retire at the end of the 
year, and I held her up to it and she retired. 
 
In contrast, Eric explained the process must be honored, noting that declining to issue a 
low rating would be unfair to other educators in the building. In addition, Ann has not avoided 
assigning low ratings when they were warranted. She explained, “Just because they’re retiring 
doesn’t mean that I would give them a free pass.”  
Evaluators are sometimes unwilling or unable to issue a low rating. Nine participants 
described situations when they were unable or unwilling to issue a low rating to an 
underperforming educator. First, when school leaders build relationships with staff, it can be 
difficult to separate personal feelings from personnel decisions. Charlie described the struggle 
evaluators faced when making difficult decisions about staff underperformance: 
Right now, I’m in a tough one because I have a teacher that’s very, very well liked. I 
think she’s very charismatic, very caring and involved, but her classroom performance. 
. . . I mean, barely proficient. I mean, it’s just proficient in third year and I think I’m 
going to have to let that teacher go. It’s not anything to do with PDP or anything, but 
that’s where I struggle. I struggle with teachers when they’re good people. They’re hard 
working people. They just don’t have the skillset to bring it up to the level we need in 
order to get our kids where they need to go, and it’s really tough because it’s a very 
amiable person. That’s where I struggle, because I want to see this person be successful, 
but after three years, I’ve got to make a call. 
 
Second, evaluators may issue a higher summative rating to avoid conflicts, either with an 
individual educator or within the overall building, which could affect the school culture and/or 
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good will within the community. Corey described a popular educator in his school who “does all 
the intangible things that you need.” However, Corey feels her instruction is problematic. He 
feels using improvement levers from the evaluation process could backfire, as he explained she 
is “not a safe person to do that with . . . because she has a lot of respect in the school and a lot of 
credibility beyond the school.” In this case, he preferred to use improvement levers outside the 
evaluation process to avoid the political problems and potential negative effects on the building 
culture it would create.  
Third, evaluators may adjust their ratings to reflect the summative ratings inflation in 
their district. Corey cited an example of a new educator whose performance reflected the “needs 
improvement” descriptors. However, due to summative ratings inflation in his district, very few 
educators ever were identified with “needs improvement” language, and he felt assigning the 
accurate rating was unfair when comparing her performance to summative evaluation ratings 
issued to other educators in the district. Corey concluded, “To get proficient should be hard, and 
it’s not anymore.”  
Finally, evaluators may be influenced to retain an underperforming educator for reasons 
other than their teaching performance. As a new principal, Jeffrey was sensitive about diversity 
on his staff. Midway through his first year, he recommended rehiring an underperforming 
educator for a second-year contract—based upon the person’s ethnicity from an 
underrepresented demographic group: 
This goes back a few years ago, and at the time, and yeah, I’m not real proud of it, but I 
did change my view on the whole thing. I was in a building that had no African-
American presence whatsoever. Our district is always looking at trying to increase the 
number of African-American teachers in our buildings, and so I was assigned someone 
by HR. I got this guy, and I’d known him for quite some time . . . he was a good guy, but 
he was just not a good teacher.  
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I think my initial evaluation the first year that he was there, I was probably kinder than I 
would have been otherwise. I did assign him a mentor teacher, but as far as a reflection 
on his evaluation, I would say it was probably not as reflective of his performance. I 
wasn’t real happy about making that choice, but I think in the second year that he was in 
my building, I just could see it wasn’t going to be a good fit. Ultimately, teaching was not 
his thing, so I ended up not renewing his contract the second year.  
 
Conversations about teaching and learning have improved under reforms. Evaluation 
reforms increased the number of conferences between educators and evaluators. With the aligned 
focus on improving teaching and learning, evaluators increased their need to hold difficult 
conversations with staff members about their performance. Nine participants described how 
conversations about learning, student data, and instructional performance improved following the 
reforms. Amanda explained how these meaningful conversations were more important than the 
evaluation process itself: 
I do not think that the system itself has improved instruction or teaching, I believe it has 
to do with the evaluator and the administrator who offers the support and has those 
meaningful conversations. I don’t think a system or a documentation improves 
instruction. My teachers have always been open and willing to improve instruction. They 
do not like the new evaluation system any more than I do, but we both take it for what it 
is, and we both complete it the best we can and we do it meaningfully. 
 
Michael found his professional conversations were “much deeper, both about their 
practice and their individual students.” He explained educators shared data with their evaluators 
and discussed performance of individual students. He described this dialogue as “transformative 
. . . causing shifts in individual practice.” Diana felt the framework provided objective criteria for 
professional practice that depersonalized difficult conversations about underperformance: “I 
really think just having a research-based place to start helped with that communication.” Her 
district revised the Danielson framework to create a local framework for early childhood 
education, because many educators felt the framework had limited application to developmental 
levels and practices of early childhood education. A local committee was formed to create the 
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new framework that included early childhood teachers, administrators, and union leadership. She 
credited this work with reducing stress on educators, “because it’s clearer to teachers. They don’t 
feel they have to guess what to do to be where they are on the rubric.” 
In contrast, Amanda felt educators are too focused on their summative ratings. When 
meeting with their evaluators, they might minimize the importance of their professional 
conversations and the opportunity to obtain feedback—choosing to primarily focus on the 
summative rating instead: 
To me it’s horrible, because my teachers in the past, they can have a conversation about 
what has gone well and what needs to be improved upon. But it’s a stupid rating of either 
“excellent” or “proficient.” Excellent and proficient—they get hung up on the word and 
not what led to that rating. All they look at is that word. Whatever that score is . . . the 
final word. I have teachers that turn right to that back page and just want to know what 
the final score is and what word they got, whether it was “excellent” or “proficient.” And 
if they got “proficient” instead of “excellent,” or they got “needs improvement” on a 
category (component) instead of just “excellent,” their whole world falls apart! 
 
Michelle agreed that professional conversations are difficult when educators realize they have 
received an underperforming rating: 
As soon as you give somebody an “unsatisfactory,” they’re done. That’s like the anti-
Holy Grail in the Austin district. If you issue an “unsatisfactory” in any component, the 
person is looking for a job the next day, which is probably fine, because it’s pretty hard to 
get “unsatisfactory.” That then deteriorates the ability to coach. 
 
Reduction in Force was seldom used. The state’s Reduction in Force (RIF) reform was a 
seldom-used lever to remove underperforming educators. Five participants discussed 
circumstances that lead to a RIF action in their district. District finances were one reason 
educators are released—positions were eliminated due to funding. Program changes were the 
second reason—changing needs in the school necessitated the employment of educators with 
different certification. The third reason was declining enrollment that necessitated staff 
reductions.  
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Dustin’s school district experienced two RIF actions due to the economic recession: 
The recession hit our county quicker and harder than others, so we had a decrease of 
enrollment because of that. We also had a tremendous amount of people who were at the 
very top of the salary schedule, so we had some expenses that were not controllable. 
 
The economic and enrollment situation was known to his staff ahead of the RIF action, and 
Dustin explained how staff members were discomforted by the effects of the unknown outcomes: 
I just think people were always tense and wanting to make sure that they were in the 
necessary group as far as evaluation ratings go. Then they also were conscious of how 
many cuts did we have to make, and where would we make those. 
 
Michelle’s school also experienced financial challenges that resulted is staff reductions:  
The Austin district, over the last seven or eight years, has had some real trouble with 
finances and things like that, so I’ve had . . . three teachers who have been laid off due to 
budgetary reasons. . . . In the Austin district, [educators] who are rated the same are then 
listed by seniority . . . last-in/first-out. So, anybody who’s in the “basic” [“needs 
improvement”] summative rating, they’re all looked at together and then the proficient 
people are all looked at together, the excellent people are all looked at together. The 
unsatisfactory people are the first to go. . . . Two of the three . . . it was crushing to reduce 
force. 
 
Due to programming changes Corey experienced a RIF situation at Ferndale school. His 
tenured educator had been identified as underperforming, but the district modified her position. 
Later, the position was eliminated, resulting in her permanent release: 
I had a teacher who . . . went on a Professional Development Plan, and then we were 
going to do the remediation plan. A change of position was then made. She was assigned 
to a different position in the district—in the same building. It was a unique position, it 
was only for her, and she would then have fallen into group two at that point. She was 
continuing to underperform in this new role, and then we got to a point where we decided 
to eliminate the position. Because she was in group two, we eliminated the position, 
which caused her to be RIF’d. . . . At that time . . . members of the union in group two did 
not have recall rights. So, she was eliminated. Sandy (pseudonym) was the teacher that 
we released through the RIF. She was on our remediation plan and Professional 
Development Plan and multiples over the years and then it was the RIF that finally was 
able to . . . help us to get her finally out. But honestly that’s the only employee I have 
done this with, where the goal was to get them out. 
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Changing enrollment resulted in a RIF at Michael’s school. A non-tenured educator was 
in a lower evaluation tier because of her “needs improvement” summative evaluation. Consistent 
with the new state policy, she was released instead of other educators with higher evaluation 
scores. Diana experienced two RIF actions; both educators had been issued “needs 
improvement” summative ratings and were non-tenured. 
Professional Development Plans were an intermediate improvement lever—yielding 
mixed results. Eleven participants created a PDP for one or more educators. Corey described 
PDPs as “a fair process . . . to give the teacher a chance to improve.” Participants shared cases of 
successful and unsuccessful PDPs they participated in.  
Melody described two successful PDP cases she supervised. First, Melody described a 
25-year, tenured educator who was “stuck in her ways of teaching and had a hard time adjusting 
to the . . . new challenges that we’re having with the students.” Melody integrated building-wide 
professional development into the goals of the PDP, including trauma-informed care training for 
the entire staff. She reported the plan was successful, as it gave the educator “the tools and 
strategies to be able to support the children that she has in her classroom now.” Second, Melody 
described a case involving a social worker who successfully completed his PDP. Melody 
described using professional development from internal and external sources to successfully 
improve the weaknesses, including time management and parent interaction. Rebecca also shared 
positive outcomes of a PDP that resulted in teaching improvements: 
The teacher is now really spending time on lesson planning, including higher-level 
questions, materials . . . communicating with parents, attending professional 
development, teaching lessons, instead of just giving an open-ended, free-for-all, go-play-
in-the-center-you-want-all-day. It’s become more learning-based, standards-based. 
 
Other participants shared mixed results from PDPs. Michelle implemented a plan for an 
educator she described as her “worst performing teacher.” The plan was started, but the educator 
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attained a subsequent evaluation rating of “proficient”—meeting the expectations of the PDP—
which allowed her to continue in her position, despite “still being a bad teacher.” Michelle 
explained the criteria for earning a “proficient” rating in her district was easy to meet—but the 
criteria did not reflect her own professional expectation for satisfactory teaching performance. 
Glen’s experiences with PDPs resulted in one educator who improved but two educators who did 
not improve to the district’s minimal performance expectations.  
The PDP could be used as an intermediate improvement lever when an educator needed 
to improve—but the inadequate performance was not deficient enough to warrant an 
unsatisfactory rating and placement on a remediation plan. Michelle described how an educator 
with an unsuccessful PDP experience transitioned to a remediation plan in her district’s 
evaluation process. Jeffery illustrated how he used a sequence of steps, including developing a 
PDP: 
I issued him a Notice to Remedy, and the following year we entered into a Professional 
Development Plan. We set some targets. Most of them were related to classroom 
management and his ability to just follow through with grading and planning and those 
kinds of things. We set those targets. He had a mentor teacher, or actually, no, I take that 
back. He didn’t during the Professional Development Plan. That’s not part of our district 
plan when they have that Professional Development Plan, but certainly we offered 
support within the building. He failed to meet those goals, so then we entered into a 
remediation plan where he had 90 days to make changes in all of the identified areas. 
 
Charlie implemented two PDPs for educators. His first educator successfully completed 
the plan. Charlie suggested the plan “made a big difference and made a great improvement.” In 
Charlie’s second plan, he felt the process had a positive but “minimal impact,” because the 
educator learned they could “only go so far and not push anything lower than that.” Because this 
second educator continued to struggle, Charlie proposed moving her to a new grade level. 
Instead, she asked to remain at her current grade level in exchange for retiring in one year, to 
which the district agreed. 
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Remediation plans usually result in the educator’s separation from district 
employment. Among participants, 12 had implemented one or more remediation plans. In 
describing their experiences, only three participants described cases that resulted in the 
educator’s improvement and continued employment. The others ended in resignation, a 
negotiated settlement, or dismissal. In Ann’s district, the board and educator negotiated a 
separation agreement that included a lifetime agreement to not seek teaching employment in 
Illinois. An educator in Corey’s school retired upon learning a remediation plan was imminent. 
Molly’s employee resigned with 20 days remaining on the 90-day remediation plan. In Melody’s 
school, the teacher was allowed to voluntarily resign prior to board action for dismissal. In 
contrast, Dustin described how remediation helped his teacher turn around their classroom 
management skills. The district provided models and intense professional development that 
facilitated sufficient improvements in classroom performance.  
Actors and their access, interests, and power. Bridges and Groves (1999) defined 
actors as persons who “figure prominently in the politics of personnel evaluation” (p. 323). The 
following subthemes present data on the influence of teachers’ unions and their members, school 
board members, superintendents and central office personnel, parents and students, and educators 
and the overall building climate.  
Union influence: Balancing employee rights with a mutual interest in effective 
teaching. Eleven participants described neutral to positive influence from unions when educators 
were identified as underperforming. Union representatives followed the procedures of the 
evaluation plan but shared a mutual goal shared with the school leadership: the desire to support 
quality teaching the classroom. In many cases, union representatives were helpful and 
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supportive. According to Diana, the union representative shared the district’s vision of educator 
quality: 
I got the feeling that the union representative clearly saw the weakness in the teacher and 
we have heard in our joint committees that the union’s goal is also to not have weak 
teachers in our district because it is such a drain on the district and, so not a good idea to 
keep supporting bad teachers. . . . I felt very comfortable having the union president sit 
there because I’ve been in meetings with them, so we’ve already talked about, “This is 
what we’re going to be looking for. This is what we would like to see in our classrooms.”  
 
Glen described how his union acknowledged the need for underperforming educators to 
improve “for the betterment of the entire building.” Emma also shared how the union supported 
her efforts to improve instruction: 
I think they understood that at the heart of the plan we were trying to improve instruction 
and make sure that the individual was maintaining appropriate professional relationships. 
And so, I think on behalf of the union as a collective whole, they wanted what they saw 
was best for like a safe and healthy building environment. So . . . my perception was that 
they were in support of it. 
 
Jeffrey felt the union reinforced his efforts to address underperformance, including counseling 
the educator to consider a different profession. 
During a PDP experience, Charlie worked closely with a union representative who 
attended most meetings with him and his underperforming educator. During these meetings, 
discussions included reviewing and updating the plan, debriefing about observed lessons, and 
delineating the needed changes. Charlie described how this representative engaged the educator 
in tough conversations about practice, assuming the role of an instructional coach: 
To be honest with you, the guy that’s still here in my school today, the reason he’s still 
here today is because his union representative basically told him to shape up or ship out. 
And, she was done. She basically told him—which I really appreciate her. . . . She was 
mentoring him, and she basically told him “Dude, either do this and do it right, or I’m out 
of here and you’re on your own.” And so, she basically told him he needed to shape up, 
that everything I was putting up, it was the truth—that I wasn’t exaggerating anything, it 
needed to change. Because she was pushing him, she was basically mentoring him. That 
was a great way of leadership from union representative coming through and coaching 
another teacher. It’s about as close to a coaching model as you can get without a coach. 
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But, she was very knowledgeable, and she basically told him how to change, and he did. 
But, if it wasn’t for her, I think he probably wouldn’t have made it on his own. 
 
Positive union relationships are important to maintaining the building climate. Diana 
welcomed union involvement, because she “would prefer the union president to be there to 
support a teacher who’s failing in my opinion, underperforming . . . so that she can get the help 
and be a better teacher.” Jeffrey believes his relationship with the union was strengthened by 
approaching the underperforming educator with a respectful demeanor: 
My union president actually was very complimentary to me and actually shared that with 
the superintendent just because, I don’t know, I didn’t get pissed off. I think that can be 
the case. I treated him with dignity and respect, and I think that’s a key. At the end of the 
day, he was a great guy. I probably would’ve gone for a beer with him, but he stunk as a 
teacher. I just was very respectful in how I dealt with it. . . . You can be an asshole, and 
yeah, that would give you the same results, but you might as well just be respectful. It’s 
frustrating as all get up, don’t get me wrong, but I just continued to be respectful. That’s 
my personal philosophy. I just try to be respectful of whatever position you have in my 
building. If you’re not performing, I’m still going to be respectful, but I’m still going to 
expect that you’re going to continue to do your job. 
 
When union advocates or representatives were involved, these individuals were impartial 
to positive in their influence. Diana described a neutral relationship with the union 
representative: 
He never said anything to me. We never went there. He and I kept it very professional 
and neutral. Now what he said to the teacher when I wasn’t in the room, I have no idea. 
But I did not get any fallout behind the scenes or in any other way. . . . I know he was 
emotionally supportive of her because it was a very emotional time. We went through 
lots of boxes of Kleenexes and he was very emotionally supportive. 
 
Melody shared a similar impartiality with the union representative in her previous district—
describing how the representative would “mediate the process:” 
They do not try and sway administrators in either direction. They will just sit and go 
through the facts between the teacher and the administrator. I know they meet a lot with 
the teacher behind the scenes, and they work with them a lot. . . . I think they’re a positive 
support when it comes to remediation plans or underperforming. 
 
This previous district had a weaker union presence, according to Melody.  
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Michael described the importance of building positive and respectful relationships with 
the union: “I know what they’re doing and I know what their role is. I’ve always affirmed that 
and acknowledged that with them. That’s allowed us to grow as professionals and have deeper 
relationships and very respectful relationships.” Michael also shared the importance of union 
representatives having direct knowledge of the educator’s performance problems. When the 
observed teaching practices conflict with their professional values, the union and its 
representatives are likely to support efforts to improve underperforming educators: 
They were in the building so they had a firsthand, first witness account to what was going 
on in terms of why that teacher needed to be remediated. It wasn’t coming to them 
through hearsay. I think that was something that was really in my favor or in the 
processes’ favor to have someone at the ground level to know that yes, what they’re 
doing and their instructional practices and how their speaking to children, is not right . . . 
.  
I’ve been fortunate to work with unions that held pretty student centered beliefs in their 
philosophies and their approach to education. I think that went a very, very long way, the 
fact that they were able to see that. They saw that one of their own members were in 
violation. It’s not to say that they’re going to go out publicly and say that but they knew 
that member was in violation of what their own values were as an organization. They 
knew it firsthand. And they knew that it wasn’t because somebody got into a 
disagreement or this evaluator was doing this to be punitive or anything. This really was 
going against their own, as I said, values and norms. 
 
Molly described working with the Illinois Education Association regional director to 
select a consulting teacher for the remediation plan. All parties agreed to find a special education 
teacher from outside the county to mentor and assist the struggling special educator. Despite the 
improvement efforts, the consulting teacher shared with Molly her frustrations about the lack of 
improvement shown by the underperforming educator: 
I was having candid conversations with . . . the mentor. She was coming to me and she 
was actually opening those conversations. . . . One time, she said, “I don’t understand. I 
don’t know why she doesn’t just do what you’ve asked her to do. You haven’t asked her 
to do anything that is out of the ordinary.” She said, “This is what all of us do in special 
education. I don’t understand why she is fighting it so much. She should be able to do 
this, but she is not going to.” She told me about halfway through, she said she is not 
going to meet the remediation.  
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Ann also felt the union was supportive during a challenging remediation case. After 2 years of 
documentation and remediation efforts, both the state and national union representatives 
suggested the educator negotiate a separation agreement with the district and agree to leave the 
teaching profession:  
We gathered evidence over a 2-year time and it took us then about seven months of legal 
battles. Then finally, the IEA—and actually NEA—finally told him, “Look bud, your 
best chance is to go into what’s called a separation agreement.” The district agreed to 
give him any accrued sick days and he had to agree to giving up tenure and never seeking 
employment in an Illinois school again. 
 
Frank shared a case in which the union created friction over comments an evaluator 
included in the summative evaluation notes. Although the educator earned an “excellent” rating, 
the evaluator noted “specific behaviors would need to continue to be maintained for that person 
to continue on receiving an excellent rating in the future.” According to Frank,  
The association had come in and demanded that that be removed. While it didn’t 
necessarily try to influence a higher rating on that one, there was some definite friction 
between what the association and we, as administrators felt to be included in evaluation 
and observation document. I think it had some long-term effects, specifically between the 
(evaluator) and that teacher. I think it continued a pattern of friction between the 
association and the district leadership. I think it was symptom of a larger problem. 
 
School boards supported the evaluators—but navigating the political terrain helps. 
None of the participants cited the school board as a hindrance to the identification of 
underperforming educators. Board members may have provided information but did not direct 
the evaluator on how to use the information. Michael noted board members may “provide insight 
but never once tried to influence me one way or the other . . . never once talked about 
performance ratings or anything.” Vickie concurred, explaining board members “think they 
always like to throw their two cents in but it’s not to persuade you to do anything. Certainly not 
with any leverage.” Glen shared how a board member provided information heard from parents 
or the community but did not attempt to influence decision making:  
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I have had a board member that was also a parent in my building. He had, obviously, 
first-hand knowledge of some of the teacher performance issues that I had in my 
building. I think he would have fairly candid conversations with me, about what he hears 
in the community, but at no point did he ever explicitly try to influence anything I was 
doing. I think maybe, implicitly, he just wanted to me know, “This is the word on the 
street. You’ve got your finger on the pulse of this.” 
 
Though school boards may not interfere with the process, skillful political navigation is 
required when relationships exist between board members and underperforming educators. 
Molly described a challenging case that required political navigation of community relationships 
and board politics. She expressed unwavering confidence in her independence as an evaluator, 
explaining “no one has ever tried to influence me because they all know me . . . they are not 
going to influence me.” Her resolve was tested, however. The underperforming educator was 
friends with a board of education member; consequently, the board took an active role: 
It was hard to let (the teacher) go because she had a friend on the board, and this friend 
on the board just really did not want to let her go but (the teacher) was a mouthpiece and 
she collected information here, inside the building, and shared with that board member. 
Stuff (the teacher) wasn’t supposed to be sharing for sure, so that was . . . the tricky part 
of all of that.  
 
Through this experience, she learned the necessity to keep the board informed about 
underperforming teachers, especially in a small or rural community, and having the full support 
of the board president: 
After I talked to the attorney, I called the board president at that time, the same day, and 
explained to him what had happened. And he said, “Well, if that is what it is, that’s what 
it is, and we’ll do whatever we have to do.” And from that moment on, which the board 
president pretty much led the board meetings with me just making reports. We tried to 
keep it as hush-hush as possible, but it’s a small community. 
 
The school board took an active role in Molly’s case due to the sensitivity and involvement of 
the community. For example, Molly was asked to present data to the school board and created 
spreadsheets illustrating how many students earned failing grades. During the process, the board 
asked to meet with the underperforming educator in closed session. However, the board 
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ultimately supported Molly when they released the non-tenured educator, with the educator’s 
friend on the board abstaining from the vote. 
Support from the superintendent and central office administration is essential. In most 
cases, the superintendent and central office were supportive of evaluators’ efforts to improve 
educator effectiveness. Only one participant described the central office as a hindrance to the 
identification of underperforming educators. In larger districts with large central office staff, 
human resources staff provided the principals support as they developed and finalized their 
evaluations and improvement plans. When asked about central office support, Michelle 
responded, 
Yes, 100%. I mean so much so that when a person is on a remediation plan, you get a call 
from central office and they make sure you know how to do the process and they’ll walk 
you through all the paperwork and everything. Like you don’t have to initiate that call, 
they’ll call you. 
 
Charlie explained his human resources director often keeps track of educators on his 
evaluation “watch list”—those who demonstrate some level of performance concern to Charlie. 
These conversations with human resources are not meant to influence his evaluation decisions, 
but rather to keep the central office from being “blindsided” by a low rating. Charlie felt 
supported by his superintendent and central office: 
They always come back to, “It’s your building. You’re running the show. You’re the one 
that’s going to be accountable for the scores and everything else happening in your 
building, so if you’re good with it, understand that it’s your call.” So, they pretty much 
put it on us to kind of decide how we want to shape our building within the district 
expectation. So no, I have not seen that from anybody for that matter. 
 
Aidan and Stephen described similar support from the central office, such as sharing information 
perceived as informative—but not intended to directly influence the principals’ determination of 
summative evaluation ratings. Aidan explained, 
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People (central office) have conversations with me and say that “Wow, this teacher is 
really impressive in some of these district-level meetings,” or “Wow, they had a really 
bad attitude,” or “I’ve gone in their classroom and it was really poor.” Then you just have 
to follow up and get in the classroom yourself or have conversations. 
 
Vickie described the vision of her superintendent regarding underperforming teachers. 
The superintendent supported several remediation plans and backed the evaluators’ decisions to 
address underperformance: 
The superintendent I’ve always had in this district has always encouraged you to “call a 
spade a spade”—and if the person’s not doing what they need to be doing, to take the 
necessary steps to make them a better teacher. We’ve gone through quite a few 
remediation plans within our district. I can think of at least one at the junior high and 
another one from another related service person that was also shared that went to 
remediation at the junior high. I think the high school principal took another person 
through a remediation plan at the high school. We haven’t been told not to do it. 
 
Vickie also shared an anecdote she has heard about superintendent support in general for 
remediation plans. She was frustrated that a central office leader might factor in the financial cost 
of remediation when determining whether to pursue an improvement plan: 
I hear about superintendents who say, “We’re not going to do remediation plans because 
they’re just too expensive and time-consuming and costly for the district.” What good is 
SB7 and student growth if it’s a financial decision—in the end—if we’re going to take 
finances over what’s best for kids in the end? 
 
In contrast, Glen experienced varying levels of support when he was first hired by Crater 
Bay school district. He identified three teachers whose performance warranted PDPs, but his 
central office prevented him from starting a plan for two educators. The superintendent and 
central office administrators cited concerns about potential disability claims that could be leveled 
against the school district due to the teachers’ age and/or disability status. Therefore, Glen did 
not identify these two educators for underperformance, based upon central office directives. 
However, in Glen’s fourth year, a new superintendent was hired who shared a firmer stance 
regarding addressing underperformance, and Glen started PDPs for the two educators: 
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Once the superintendent changed, it was clear by what he was communicating—not only 
to me individually but also to all of us as administrators at district leadership team 
meetings—that the whole tenure was going to change in our district. And so I think it was 
my fourth year then, that I put two more teachers on a Professional Development Plan, 
because I felt I now had the support to give them a rating that was more reflective of their 
performance. 
 
Glen now felt supported by his central office. He explained, “I have reached out to our assistant 
superintendent of curriculum instruction, or personnel, to come in and do additional 
observations, or to provide additional feedback on overall work performance.” Jeffrey’s human 
resources department provided sample plans, while Harold received support for the timelines and 
procedures. 
Parents and students provide helpful information to evaluators. Participants described 
the influence of parents and students as indirect influence—by providing information that 
evaluator might choose to more fully investigate. None of the participants described parents and 
students as a hindrance to the identification of underperforming educators. As Aidan explained, 
“The outside public, students and parents don’t know what teacher ratings are, but they are 
certainly not shy to share information, whether they think the teacher is doing a great job or they 
are not.” Glen speculated, “When you’re a principal and you become established, I think parents 
feel more freedom and more opportunity to share their candid thoughts on particular teachers. 
That does occur, but I don’t know if it’s intended to change ratings necessarily.” Jeffrey 
explained may investigate a parent complaint, but the complaint doesn’t directly influence his 
evaluation. Emma suggested that some evidence from parents may influence one evaluation 
component related to parent communication, but not the evaluation overall. 
Several participants shared accounts of parents whose information provided data that was 
helpful to them as they addressed underperformance. For example, Corey described a case when 
parent information indirectly influenced his evaluation: 
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I had so many parent complaints before I even ever observed her, that I am positive that 
had an influence on what I saw in that classroom. But it really was that bad. . . . The 
parent complaints also supported me in being able to pull her out of that traditional 
classroom setting. . . . The district supported me moving her out of a regular teaching 
position at the semester because of the parent volume happening around, so it was 
helpful. 
 
In another example, Ann described how parents shared information with her during a 
challenging case with an underperforming art teacher: 
I certainly never had a parent tried to influence how I evaluated any of my teachers. . . . I 
had a lot of parent complaints—and valid complaints—that influenced her evaluation. 
The parents certainly didn’t ask for it to be a part of the evaluation. They were just calling 
more in kind of, “Hey, my 3rd grader used to love art and now every Wednesday he has a 
stomach ache and doesn’t want to go to school because he has art.” It influenced it from 
that standpoint, but I’ve never had any one directly tried to influence it. 
 
Finally, Michelle described a case in which parent feedback provided valuable 
information that helped her persuade an educator to resign: 
I had a teacher last year who was phenomenal at the dog and pony show, but terrible 
otherwise. So she actually rated out fairly well. She was a probationary teacher. She rated 
out fairly well, so when it came time in the spring to decide whether or not to renew or 
non-renew her, I didn’t have the opportunity because her ratings were good enough that 
she wasn’t even in range to be non-renewed. But we had so many parent complaints and 
so many other issues from her class, that I was able to convince her that teaching was not 
her calling, which was good, but I had lots of parents ask me why she was teaching in our 
building, and I think they were right. 
 
Evaluators in rural areas of the state must be careful navigating the sensitive politics of a 
small, connected community. Vickie described a case with an underperforming educator when 
both parents and community members would share helpful information with her, fueled by the 
teacher’s poor reputation in the community: 
We’re a very small town. Everybody in Abbidale, Illinois (pseudonym) knows everybody 
and people know who the good teachers are—according to the community—and people 
know who the bad teachers are—according to the community. You have those teachers 
that are requested and teachers that aren’t requested.  
 
When you have a teacher that’s being inappropriate outside of school you know who that 
is. It’s interesting every now and then you’ll get a phone call from a parent that says, “Do 
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you know what so and so did this weekend?” It’s like, “If it’s not affecting their job 
performance, it’s really none of my business.” It does make you look at that teacher a 
little harder on some days and say, are the lesson plans written and you may not have 
done that had you not gotten that phone call.  
 
Influence from parents or students is not limited to negative feedback. Corey described 
how positive student feedback influenced his opinions of educators: 
If you are getting great feedback from students, does that change my view of a teacher? 
Very much so. If all I’m hearing from kids is that this teacher is mean and this teacher is 
not good, that influences how I see that teacher and I think it’s the same way from 
parents. 
 
Educators ultimately support improvement, but the school culture may suffer initially. 
Six participants reported the identification of underperforming teachers ultimately improved the 
overall culture in their schools once the problem had been remediated—either through teacher 
improvement or teacher removal. However, four of these participants reported the initial school 
climate became somewhat negative.  
Rebecca explained the initiation of improvement plans affected school culture negatively 
because many teachers—especially veterans—had deep friendships with an underperforming 
colleague. She reflected, “If you put someone like that into the (improvement) program, you 
might not be popular.” According to Frank, the process of remediation caused initial unrest 
among his staff: 
I would say during there is definitely some unrest among the staff specifically. I think 
there is also unrest when people recognize that things aren’t going well within a 
classroom, when they recognize that classroom management isn’t going well or they 
recognize those kinds planning issues are coming up within a classroom, I think there’s 
unrest regardless. So this was once that person had been informed that they would not be 
returning, I think there was some unrest among the staff, simply from a discomfort, not 
necessarily from an anger or hostility, but just a discomfort that there was someone who 
had been told that they would not be returning. 
 
Educators often supported their colleagues who were identified as underperforming. Glen 
described how teachers formed coalitions to protect their peers: “There was always kind of a 
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‘circling of the wagons’ whenever someone within the association is getting the attention of the 
administration about their performance. I think that’s something that you just have to weather 
administratively.” Harold also described a “circling of the wagons” as teachers rallied to support 
their colleague: 
That’s where we struggle, it’s the unspoken issue in school administration. As soon as 
you start identifying teachers for remediation, or you’re identifying that they’re not as 
proficient as they think they are. Teachers “circle the wagon” and they all become a little 
afraid that you’re just going to come after them for lack of a better phrase. It definitely 
has a negative impact on the climate and the culture of the school, especially with the 
person that is either working with, it can be toxic. They’re spreading lies or they’re 
making it out like they’re the victim. It’s not everyone (who) understands what’s 
happening in the individual teacher’s classrooms. I’ve seen it where it has impacted the 
climate of the school and if working with that individual is not handled appropriately, 
they take it personally. It’s definitely a breakdown in the relationship at that point. 
 
However, once the improvement plans concluded, the building climate seemed to 
improve as staff members ultimately acknowledged the need for remediation and subsequently 
worked to improve their own practice. Dustin felt the culture improved when effective educators 
observed underperforming teachers “who weren’t doing what they were supposed to receive the 
appropriate consequences.” Dustin observed an overall increase in staff professionalism. Jordyn 
believed the process made other teachers “alert and aware” because they knew the principals 
would “make sure that you are doing things that are best for kids.” Glen believes the 
improvement process was “attention getting” and “set a bar for expectations that had not 
previously been set” by previous school leaders in the school. He reported that high-performing 
educators expressed their appreciation to him for taking action to address underperformance. 
Jordyn felt staff respect for her increased because they saw her addressing problems in the 
school. Jeffrey agreed that staff respect likely increased because the problems had been ongoing 
and largely were unaddressed: 
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That was actually a positive for pretty much everybody in the building, because I think 
everybody in the building saw this and was kind of frustrated that it was allowed to 
continue for so many years. In some ways, I think that probably increased the respect I 
had. 
 
Michelle also described a case when the building climate improved during a PDP: 
Last year, we had probably our worst performing teacher on a Professional Development 
Plan and people were thrilled about it because she’s been taking kids out and being a 
terrible teacher for two decades now. And so finally she had rated low enough that she 
was on this plan. . . . I mean, people were happy that she was on a plan. 
 
Outcomes of policy reforms. Bridges and Groves (1999) defined outcomes as “the 
particular decisions that have been made with respect to the ground rules, the procedures under 
which evaluations should be conducted, and the actual evaluations of employee performance.” 
Participants were asked overarching questions to illuminate their overall opinion of the 
effectiveness of teacher evaluation policy reform and the value improvement plans. The 
following subsections describe participant responses when they were asked to reflect on the 
outcomes of improvement plans and policy reform and the influence of these on the 
identification of underperforming teachers. 
Improvement plans are a valued lever for educator improvement. When asked—in 
hindsight—if they would implement improvement plans or initiate dismissals again, all 20 
participants agreed they would. Corey felt the remediation plans were successful in improving 
classroom practices in his building, but not because the teacher improved their performance. He 
explained, “Has it resulted and improved instruction? Yes, because those were some of my 
lowest preforming teachers and they are gone!” Harold reflected on when he would use a 
remediation plan in his school: 
I would see myself using the remediation plans for any teacher that is demonstrating that 
they’re unable to provide sound instruction in the classroom almost immediately. 
Especially if you’re talking about a (non-tenured) teacher, not allowing them to get to the 
point where they’re in their third, fourth year. Growing those teachers and providing their 
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remediation plan. I don’t necessarily believe in automatically letting teachers go. I think 
if you see something, see the possibilities but they’re struggling in some areas, you 
provide a remediation plan for them. 
 
Despite the time commitment and workload, Jordyn felt remediation plans were best 
practice for students: 
I think it takes a lot out of the principal. It’s a lot to do when you have so many aspects of 
the building to run. But I think it’s worth it, because, in this first case, when the moment 
that it was determined that she was (going) on a plan, I was actually meeting with her; a 
data meeting. She was not prepared, did not have anything in terms of expectations of 
what needed to happen. I just told her, “I cannot allow you to be a disservice to kids,” 
because there were some other things that happened, too. She totally understood. I was 
like, “I just have to let you know. I’m going to put you on a plan.”  
 
For me, it’s all about kids. I can’t knowingly know that you are not doing what’s best for 
kids and say that’s okay. No matter how much work it is for me, it is my duty to do that. 
So yeah, I’d do it again, ’cause I’m giving somebody else who needs improvement, who 
will probably be on Professional Development Plan after this evaluation cycle. Yeah, I’m 
doing it again already. 
 
Ann concurred and expanded on the time commitment and workload: 
I basically didn’t have a life from March. I truly was not doing my job. My 
superintendent took over my building. Then I spent that whole summer. I didn’t have a 
summer that year. It was basically about six months of just constant work, mostly writing 
and gathering evidence, but I’d do it again. . . .The remediation plan ended up being 
about 80 typed pages. It was very, very lengthy. No human being could have ever met the 
requirements of it. We had very, very good legal counsel that guided me. I pretty much 
stopped teaching or stopped running my building and I was working with the attorneys 
from the March 1st almost on a daily basis. Just writing and rewriting and presenting 
things to him and then he’d show it to his counsel.  
 
Ann added that in the future she would “probably ask for time in order to meet all the demands 
of the building and the special education and discipline and so on.”  
Aidan concurred that improvement plans were time consuming, “but if you feel like the 
end result makes the organization a better place, then you are willing to do it.” He further 
expanded on the time commitment required: 
There is a limit to what an administrator can actually do, because it requires a huge 
amount of work and a lot of meetings. In my case—attorneys on the phone, assistant 
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superintendent in my office. It brings it to a whole other level of scrutiny once you do 
that. But in my case, these were some veteran teachers who were definitely 
underperforming and I had to make a decision: is the effort I’m going to put in going to 
result in improvement or removal? And am I willing to take that step?  
 
Despite the workload and time commitment, however, Diana explained how failing to implement 
an improvement plan is unfair to others: 
It’s not fair to have teachers underperforming in schools. It’s not fair to the children. It’s 
not fair to the teacher to not know how they’re performing. It certainly is not fair to the 
other teachers who have to work with them. So yes, I will do remediation and 
Professional Development Plans if it needs to happen. 
 
Molly shared the personal toll the plan took on her emotionally. The underperforming 
teacher was, at one time, a close colleague and personal friend when they taught together in the 
school district. Molly explained, 
In my opinion, it had negative effects on me. I wanted her to succeed and be successful, 
but I also wanted her to change the way she was teaching, and be a better teacher. In that 
respect, I was pretty much . . . disheartened or disappointed that she couldn’t make those 
adjustments. Clearly, they were easy adjustments to make, and they were on the original 
evaluation tool, so she knew what it was going to be asked. I don’t know. I just don’t 
understand why she wasn’t able to fix that problem.  
 
I didn’t enjoy any of it, but by the same token, everybody here knows and even the kids 
in my classroom, learning is a job, too. You do your job, and everything is fine. If you’re 
not doing your job, then we’ve got a problem, and I’m that way here in this 
administrative position, much the same as I was in the classroom as a teacher. 
 
Mixed perceptions of policy reforms and their local implementation. All 20 participants 
believed educators had been evaluated fairly overall, and issues involving bias and fairness were 
identified, joint committees revised their procedures. For example, after the student growth 
component was implemented, some joint committees reexamined their procedures and made 
incremental changes for fairness or consistency. Charlie explained his district first initiated 
classroom observation procedures that gave an “excellent” classroom observation rating to a 
teacher with just two or more domains rated “excellent.” Later, the joint committee changed the 
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scoring criteria and required four domains rated “excellent” in order to receive an “excellent” for 
the classroom observation portion. Diana described how the Rosedale school district revised 
their Danielson rubric to improve the alignment and job-fit for early childhood teachers.  
However, although the evaluations were perceived as fair, two participants shared how 
evaluators might resort to “gaming the system” to obtain an overall underperforming rating for a 
teacher who they perceived as ineffective. Jeffrey described how evaluators must utilize the 
procedures of evaluation to their advantage: 
If you have someone whose professional practices are very questionable, I think you 
definitely have to be very vigilant in identifying as many different areas (as) “needs 
improvement” or even “unsatisfactory” just to ensure that overall it comes out . . . as you 
need to move forward with some steps or plans to help remediate their performance 
issues. 
 
When assessing the individual components for a teacher who warrants an underperforming 
rating, Emma explained, “sometimes there’s a numbers game that you feel like you get trapped 
up in.” 
To address other problems of ratings fairness or consistency, participants offered 
suggestions for changes to their districts’ evaluation processes. For example, Corey 
recommended the classroom observation domains (two and three in the Danielson Framework) 
could be weighted more heavily in the summative rating. In his district, the four domains are 
weighted equally for the professional practice portion of the summative rating. However, Jeffrey 
offered a contrasting view, as he described how focusing on all four components of the 
Danielson Framework—intentionally focusing on planning and collaboration—improved 
collaboration in the Highlane school district.  
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Participants shared mixed perceptions of the effectiveness of the teacher policy reforms. 
Glen explained that local implementation has not met the legislators’ intended goals of the 
policy: 
I think (teachers) understand the spirit of the law, but I think when it comes to practice 
and putting that law in place, I think it’s met with a lot of resistance and a lot of 
confusion, and I don’t know if the legislation itself is really accomplishing what we had 
hoped to accomplish, when including things like student growth. 
 
However, Jordyn and Michelle felt the reforms had a positive effect overall in their districts. 
Prior to PERA, both participants worked in Austin school district, using an evaluation tool 
described as a mere “checklist” of teaching behaviors. Jordyn described the old tool as “a couple 
of boxes to make some comments, but nothing that really gave you an extensive look at that 
professional practice.” It was difficult to issue a low rating, and the tool did not reflect high-
quality teaching performance. After PERA, the Austin school district adopted much of the 
Danielson framework. Jordyn and Michelle agreed the evaluation changes were positive. 
Corey felt policy reforms were not responsible for improved teaching and learning. He 
explained how another improvement lever—instructional coaching—is more important to 
teacher improvement than teacher evaluation: 
Teaching and learning in my opinion improves as a result of trusted collaboration, 
whether that’s with your principal or another teacher . . . and experience. So, I’ve been 
here eight years, we have instructional coaches, and so to me those are the trusted 
collaborators and we really work hard to make sure that those people have a high level of 
our time. They are not required to report to me, we keep kind of some walls of separation 
and I have to trust that what they are doing all day long is working in classrooms with 
teachers, and providing feedback. 
 
Frank went further, questioning whether evaluation reforms motivated teachers to improve: 
I don’t think that most people who are performing at a proficient level or above find any 
motivation in their rating from the student growth perspective. I don’t think that on a day 
to day basis people look and say, “You know, if that 30 percent or 40 percent is part of 
my biannual, yearly summative evaluation is the driving force in me wanting to improve 
student learning.” I think that it’s something that most people don’t see as a huge 
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influence. I think if people have been looking to continuously improve in their instruction 
and help their students learn and grow, then that has always been there. If people have 
struggled in those areas, having that external force of law isn’t necessarily going to be the 
thing that changes it. 
 
Jeffrey was unsure about the policy impact on learning and wondered if other school districts had 
experienced improvement as a result of the reforms. 
Stephen explained the levers of reform were well-intentioned, but questioned how they 
were implemented. He reflected, “Our districts, our communities, our evaluators can use the 
mechanism to wipe clean all the individuals in education that are underperforming. I don’t 
necessarily think that’s going to happen.” Vickie discussed the correlation of student growth 
measures and other achievement tests as failure of the reform: 
In my building, based on our test scores and based on where we’ve been for the last six 
years, my data does not show our school system is getting any better since PERA. Our 
data has gone down. We’re one of those underperforming poverty districts where looking 
at student growth is not increasing our student achievement. 
 
Incremental improvements to teaching and learning were attributed to policy reforms. For 
example, Diana reported that using a teaching framework led to increased higher-order 
questioning, student ownership, and vocabulary level in her school:  
I think it’s turned more learning ownership to the children. Teachers have learned to 
move to the highest end of the rubric that they have to change their conversations with 
children and they have to make sure that that vocabulary and the expectations for students 
is higher. 
 
She elaborated, “PERA could use some work . . . but let’s just get a place to start and that was a 
good start.” Dustin also credited the teaching framework for describing high-quality teaching his 
teachers strived to meet:  
I would say teaching and learning has improved because teachers are using that 
framework, the Danielson framework, to get them to kind of make that move from 
“proficient” to “excellent.” That’s the biggest thing that I’ve seen, and in that 
(“excellent”) category, so much of that is based on what are the students doing in the 
class. Our classes are much more student-centered than they were before SB7. 
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Additional positive outcomes were noted. Ann and Aidan cited improved teacher analysis 
of classroom data because of the student growth component. Glen felt the reforms “started to 
change some of the conversations that we have amongst grade level teams, or between myself as 
an administrator and some teachers, which has been beneficial.” Jeffrey cited collaboration as an 
improved practice resulting from the reforms. Charlie explained that teaching and learning 
improved because his school focused on constructivist learning, while using teacher evaluation 
as a lever to support those efforts: 
I would attribute [improvement] . . . to getting away from the whole . . . behaviorist 
format of instruction into more constructivist and being more student-led. So, I think that 
focus has pushed teachers a lot more than the evaluation. Then we’ve used the evaluation 
to solidify and reward where it needs to be rewarded, but also comment where it needs to 
be commented. 
 
The success of the reforms may be influenced by the attitude and performance level of 
the teacher prior to implementation. For example, Melody felt strong teachers have improved 
and were “very happy with the change.” However, her struggling teachers were not “fully on 
board” and viewed the reforms negatively. Stephen also found high-performing teachers 
benefitted from the reforms: 
Where I really see the change is those teachers that really want to keep that excellent on 
the Danielson model. They really transform their practices in a more student-centered 
approaches. They’re setting up their routine. They’re setting up their structures. They’re 
setting up their classroom environment to really create structures and systems that are 
student driven, that have student ownership. . . . I see it from those teachers that are self-
driven and want that excellence. I think that some of the teachers that are perfectly fine 
with proficient, that’s not driving them over. It’s not the driving force to change their 
instructional practice. 
 
Michelle concurred, stating “teachers who want to be continually growing and continually 
learning appreciate the systems,” while teachers who were “happy with who they are as teachers 
and want to continue doing exactly what they’ve done year in and year out” preferred the 
previous system. 
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Despite the challenges presented by policy mandates, school leaders maintained a 
positive outlook on the potential of the state’s evaluation reform to improve teaching. Harold 
explained,  
I would say it’s definitely a step in the right direction. Is it the silver bullet? No, but I 
think it’s part of the process. I think there is still a way to go in terms of providing 
professional development to teachers about PERA, SB7 and what effective teaching is—
what learning looks like for students. I think it’s definitely a good move. I’ve seen 
improvements around conversations with teachers about what’s happening in classrooms 
and what is important in the classroom. We still have a way to go, but I think it is 
definitely a step in the right direction. 
 
Amanda was supportive of evaluation reforms. Reflecting on her leadership practice, she 
described how she continues to model perseverance through a shared responsibility for learning 
between the teacher and school leader: 
I want everyone to be the best they can be and I want my students to be the best they can 
be. And I think that like I said, if I can project to my teachers, we are in this together, I 
am not your superior, I am your leader, I am your cheerleader and our school is our 
school. Our students are our students. If kindergarten isn’t succeeding, it is not just that 
kindergarten’s teacher problem, that’s my problem, too. Those are our kindergartners. 
We need our kindergartners to be the best they can be so that when they go to 1st grade, 
they can take that next step. 
 
Those students are actually going to live in our communities. We’re going to get their 
children as our next cycle. So we need everybody to be successful so that our school is 
success. I am passionate about learning, I’m passionate about success. I grew up in a day 
and age where teachers had no problem telling you that you’re going to be a nobody. I 
don’t believe in that, so no teacher is going to say their student can’t learn and I don’t 
give up on my teacher either. I don’t want anybody to give up on me, so I don’t give up 
on my teachers. 
 
Participants offered suggestions on professional development supports evaluators need to 
improve their levels of understanding and implementation of the policy. Emma advocated for 
more professional development on the meaning of the framework language and coaching staff 
for improvement. Melody explained the need for professional development in interrater 
reliability: 
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I think that the continued, ongoing professional development . . . is huge to be able to 
collaborate with your evaluators, your co-evaluators, other administrators, just to keep the 
consistency across the board and to ensure that everyone’s fully understanding all of 
where they go (on the rubric). . . . We all have natural biases. You don’t want things to 
come through a bias. 
 
Finally, Glen concurred with Melody, suggesting evaluators need practice and feedback on how 
they apply the framework to classroom observations: 
I think a clear understanding of the tool that we use, whether that be Danielson or 
something else. I think providing professional development on interrater reliability when 
it comes to observation as a useful activity, or a professional development opportunity. 
When we’ve had videos brought in, what we are to rate the person and why and provide 
evidence, I think it’s always interesting to hear what other evaluators see in a given 
observation, because inevitably, it’s always a little different from each other. So I think, 
the more that practice can be done, the more precise our feedback can be to teachers. 
 
Integration of Results 
In this section, the results of the quantitative and qualitative phases will be integrated. 
The quantitative data are examined in alongside the qualitative data to address the influence of 
micropolitics on the data found in the quantitative phase. 
Participant estimates and reported frequencies of underperformance. In the 
quantitative phase, ISBE data (2017d) were obtained to examine the summative evaluation 
ratings report to ISBE by respondent districts for the 2016-2017 school year. ISBE reported that, 
statewide, 97% of educators received an “excellent” or “satisfactory” rating in 2016-2017, 
leaving 3% of educators identified as underperforming (Table 12). These data were also obtained 
for the school districts of the qualitative phase participants (ISBE, 2017d). During the qualitative 
phase, the 20 participants estimated the percentages of underperforming educators in their 
districts. The data are listed alongside the actual rates of underperformance ratings reported to 
ISBE in Table 17. 
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Table 17 
Integration of Interview Participants’ Estimates of District Underperformance and Reported 
District Evaluation Data from 2016-2017 
Participant Estimates of underperforming 
educators in participant districts (%) 
Reported underperforming educators in 
participant districts (%) 
Aidan O’Brien 2% 1% 
Amanda Ashbee < 5% 3% 
Ann Keaton 5-10% 0% 
Charlie Ramirez 10-20% 1% 
Corey Hammer 20% 1% 
Diana Legend 8-10% 1% 
Dustin Ross 15% 0% 
Emma Moore 15% 1% 
Eric Graves (*) < 5% 0% 
Frank Steele 1-2% 2% 
Glen Tucker 10% 2% 
Harold Cooper 5% 0% 
Jeffrey Shannon 3% 2% 
Jordyn Harris No opinion 10% 
Melody Roberts 20% 1% 
Michelle Hale 15% 11% 
Molly Martin  0% 0% 
Rebecca Silver 15-20% 5% 
Stephen Pierce 5-10% 17% 
Vickie Wells 2% 0% 
Note. Reported data from ISBE (2017).  
The data showed 11 participants underestimated their district’s underperformance rates 
by 5 percentage points or more than the actual rates of summative evaluation ratings reported to 
ISBE, with four of those 11 participants underestimating their district’s underperformance rates 
by 15 percentage points or more. Results from the qualitative phase could explain this 
discrepancy. First, many participants discussed the problem of summative ratings inflation—
noting that too many underperforming educators in their districts received a “satisfactory” or 
“excellent” rating. Though Jeffrey was within one percentage point of his estimate, his district’s 
experience with summative ratings inflation may explain why other participants’ estimation did 
not match the reported summative ratings: 
We didn’t have an excessive number of excellent (summative ratings prior to PERA), but 
then when we did the (student growth) process as a district, they shared with us that for 
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the first year, they said, “We have 80% of our teachers at excellent,” and that’s not a true 
reflection of what teachers are like. 
 
Second, summative ratings in other buildings may reflect low interrater reliability throughout the 
district. For example, in Corey’s school district, the central office administration shared the 
summative evaluation ratings for each building with all the district principals. Corey recalled, 
Seeing an elementary school where all but one or two teachers were rated excellent. 
When the other elementary schools . . . you see a normal distribution. Two years ago—it 
was the last time we met about it—in the entire district, one tenured teacher got a “needs 
improvement.” There is no way that could happen. . . . I think that school principal, for 
various reasons, was inflating a lot. 
 
Information gained through interviews disclosed many factors that could explain why 
participants’ estimations of underperformance are not aligned with educator evaluation data 
submitted to ISBE. Of most significance, the local implementation of PERA and SB7 restricted 
many participants from issuing underperforming summative ratings. First, the assessments often 
required minimal effort to earn a “proficient” or “excellent” rating, resulting in inflated student 
achievement gains. Second, targeted goals were easy to achieve. Third, the results from student 
growth measures often caused higher summative ratings than the classroom observation ratings. 
In addition, evaluators issued summative ratings that did not match the classroom performance 
due to deferral, low interrater reliability in applying the framework language, and potential 
concerns regarding building climate.  
Professional Development Plans are increasing in use—but are underutilized. The 
quantitative data illuminated two significant findings regarding PDP implementation. First, 
respondents implemented their plans at staggered times between 2010 and 2017. Among 
respondents, 14.61% had yet to implement the PDP requirement of evaluation reforms. Second, 
the linear trend showed an increase in the number of educators who started a PDP since 2010. By 
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2016-2017, one PDP was implemented for every 338 educators working in the respondent school 
districts.  
Among those interviewed, 11 had developed and monitored PDPs during their careers as 
evaluators in Illinois. These participants described mixed results to implementing PDPs, ranging 
from successful educator improvement to ongoing underperformance that resulted in separation 
via Reduction in Force. However, when asked if they would—in hindsight—implement a PDP 
again, all 11 participants who implemented PDPs responded in the affirmative.  
Participants were invited by email to participate in follow-up discussion. Twelve 
individuals responded and provided their insights on the frequency of PDPs from the 2016-2017 
school years as reported in the quantitative phase. Some participants felt the data underestimated 
the frequency of underperformance due to low identification practices. Aidan stated, “I suppose 
I’m not surprised at the numbers, yet I also feel they drastically underestimate the number of 
educators who are in need of significant professional development in order to demonstrate 
proficiency on the Danielson rubric.” Emma agreed, as she explained the changing needs of 
educators to improve: 
My gut tells me that more than 1 out of every 338 teachers have instructional practices or 
a lack thereof that would necessitate being put on a PDP plan. . . . I believe during the 
time in one’s career, there are periods of ebbs and flows where we all have practices that 
dip into basic practice areas where a PDP plan would be beneficial to lay out specific 
steps to work towards improvement. 
 
Glen described the low frequency as “shameful,” while Michelle and Rebecca agreed more 
educators should be identified as “needs improvement” and placed on a PDP.  
Participants described several reasons for the low reporting numbers. First, the data may 
have been underreported. Corey speculated the data may not have captured all underperforming 
educators because some teachers choose retirement or resignation before starting a PDP. Second, 
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Jeffery questioned if the data underreported educators engaged in PDPs—based upon his 
reflection of the practices in the Highlane school district:  
My experience would definitely suggest otherwise. In my district, in talking with my 
colleagues I know of several principals that have had at least one teacher on a PDP plan. 
My first reaction would be wondering how accurate this is given at least my discussions 
with my colleagues at the elementary level in Highlane.  
 
Second, procedures and other micropolitical factors may deter an evaluator from starting a PDP 
for an underperforming educator. Melody explained why evaluators might be influenced by 
workload and procedural challenges: 
At first, I was a little shocked that it was what I considered low, but then I thought about 
it and reflected on mine and colleagues regarding evaluations and Professional 
Development Plans, it made sense. I truly believe (there) are a lot of administrators (who) 
will not touch evaluating a certified staff member low to avoid having to process through 
their district’s policies for PDP.  
 
Next, Aidan reflected on the procedural, workload, and evaluator capacity challenges 
explain why PDPs are not implemented with more frequency: 
Why I’m not surprised is due to a number of factors that may play a role in the process: 
administrators who fear staff backlash or a negative shift in the building culture if more 
teachers were on PD plans, administrators who feel overwhelmed by the number of staff 
members whom they supervise and don’t devote the necessary time to adequately 
supervise and evaluate teachers, or possibly administrators who don’t feel adequately 
prepared or have the confidence in their own pedagogy of best practice in instruction. 
 
Finally, Stephen speculated that better hiring and new educator induction practices may have 
resulted in better educators getting hired. Therefore, the number of PDPs should be low, based 
on an increase in the hiring of quality educators. 
Remediation plans are rare, but the data reported may paint an inaccurate portrait 
of improvement efforts. The quantitative data reported low rates of remediation plan 
implementation. In the 2016-2017 school year, respondents reported issuing remediation plans at 
the rate of one for every 1,159 educators. Twelve years earlier, Reeder (2005b) estimated the 
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ratio was 1 remediation plan for every 930 educators in Illinois. Twelve participants in the 
qualitative phase had implemented a remediation plan, and when asked if they would—in 
hindsight—implement a remediation plan again, they unanimously responded in the affirmative. 
Twelve principals participating in follow-up discussions reflected on the frequency of 
remediations from 2016-2017 reported in the quantitative phase. Glen described the remediation 
data as “shameful.” Emma felt the remediation data did not reflect the range of educator 
performance she would expect to see in a school: 
Within every organization there are teachers at different performance levels. I feel if we 
are being honest with the current state of education in Illinois in regards to teacher 
performance and practice, there are more teachers who should be identified as needing a 
remediation plan to improve their practices and get them to a proficient level. I honestly 
believe administrators are sometimes afraid to communicate the reality of a teacher’s 
practices and put the work into the process that a remediation plan entails. 
 
Aidan explained how the data underreports the actual number of educators in need of 
remediation. He cited lack of central office support, the time and effort required to implement a 
remediation plan, the fears of educators’ reactions and potential negative effects on the building 
culture, and deferring the remediation due to retirement as reasons for the low frequency. Jeffery 
further clarified why remediation plans are rare:  
I have a colleague who had a teacher on a remediation plan and I also had a teacher on a 
remediation plan (who) was eventually released. I understand why this is not popular 
because it is very intense on the part of principals to collect evidence from multiple 
observations and requires a secondary evaluator. The process is grueling for evaluators in 
pulling all of the data together, presumably reviewing it with your HR department to 
make sure you are accurate—and then all of the meetings with the teacher and union 
representation. 
 
Corey believed the data underreports identification efforts due to retirements and 
resignations that may occur prior to the implementation of either plan. Thus, both PDPs and 
remediation plans may be used as levers by evaluators to encourage underperforming educators 
to resign or retire to avoid a “needs improvement” or “unsatisfactory” summative evaluation 
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rating and an improvement plan. Therefore, the data may not credit evaluators accurately for 
their efforts to employ the improvement strategies included in PERA and SB7 as they work to 
improve teaching quality.  
Summary 
 This chapter shared results of a study on the implementation of evaluation policy reform 
in Illinois and the influence of micropolitics on the identification of underperforming educators. 
A questionnaire completed by 89 superintendents found low rates of educators identified as 
underperforming. However, the data on PDPs showed an increasing trend line since 
implementation of the reform, partly due to the staggered implementation in districts. Interviews 
of 20 school principals described how the implementation of student growth measures hindered 
their ability to issue underperforming summative ratings. The joint committees created 
procedures that influenced higher summative evaluation ratings that did not reflect the educators’ 
lower ratings for classroom performance. When identifying an underperforming educator, 
participants described union influence as neutral to positive, reflecting a shared goal of having 
quality educators in the classroom. Evaluators deferred low ratings due to factors including staff 
retirement, avoidance, discomfort in holding difficult conversations, and the workload involved 
in implementing improvement plans. Despite the time and effort required to implement 
improvement plans, participants answered affirmatively when asked if they would implement an 
improvement plan again. Chapter 5 will discuss the conclusions from and implications of the 
findings reported in this chapter.  
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Chapter 5 
Discussion, Implications, and Recommendations 
This chapter begins with a summary of this research study, including a review of the 
research methodology and major findings. The discussion section expands on the results of the 
research findings and provides insights for practitioners and scholars regarding potential 
implications. Additionally, this final chapter concludes with recommendations for practice, 
policy, and future research in the area of micropolitics of personnel evaluation and education 
policy implementation. 
Overview of Research Methodology 
The purpose of this study was to examine the phenomenon of teacher evaluation, 
focusing on how micropolitics have influenced the implementation of teacher evaluation reforms 
in Illinois. Two conceptual frameworks framed this study: education policy implementation 
theory and micropolitics of personnel evaluation. The implementation of education policy is 
affected by local context, including the policies, people, and places (Honig, 2006). Micropolitics 
of personnel evaluation provides one lens for examining the interactions of local actors who may 
influence evaluators when identifying underperforming educators (Bridges & Groves, 1999).  
The methodology for this study involved an explanatory sequential mixed methods 
design with the follow-up explanation variant. In the quantitative phase, personnel and school 
demographic data from ISBE and 89 public school districts were collected and analyzed. In the 
qualitative phase, data from semi-structured interviews of 20 principals illuminated the 
quantitative findings. The following research questions guided this study: 
 143 
Research question 1. To what extent has the implementation of teacher evaluation 
reforms affected the frequency of identifying underperforming teachers in Illinois public 
schools? 
Research question 2. How have micropolitical factors influenced principals in the 
identification of underperforming teachers in Illinois since the implementation of teacher 
evaluation reforms? 
Findings 
Research question 1. To what extent has the implementation of teacher evaluation 
reforms affected the frequency of identifying underperforming teachers in Illinois public 
schools? At the start of this research project, I speculated there would be little or no difference in 
the identification of underperforming educators before and after the implementation of 
evaluation reform in Illinois. Although the number of underperforming educators identified 
remains small overall, trend lines showed small increases in the use of improvement levers and 
dismissals during implementation of the policy. By 2016-2017, respondents reported 0.296% of 
educators started a PDP and 0.086% had started a remediation plan. The study found districts 
implemented their PDPs at staggered times since the passage of PERA, with 14.6% of districts 
reporting they had not implemented PDPs by 2016-2017. During the 2016-2017 school year, 
respondents in the reported 0.431% of educators were dismissed. This resulted in a ratio of 1 
educator dismissed for every 232 educators in respondent districts. 
Research question 2. How have micropolitical factors influenced principals in the 
identification of underperforming teachers in Illinois since the implementation of teacher 
evaluation reforms? Throughout the qualitative phase, respondents described many factors that 
influenced the identification of underperforming educators. This information is organized into 
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four themes for analysis: (a) decisions about procedures of the evaluation plan; (b) decisions by 
evaluators; (c) actors and their access, interests and power; and (d) outcomes of policy reforms. 
Five procedures created by joint committees influenced the identification of 
underperforming educators. First, 19 of 20 districts adopted the Danielson framework for their 
evaluation plan. Participants found an evaluation framework helpful in specifying written criteria 
of teaching performance that could be communicated and understood—with training—by 
evaluators and educators. Second, Type III assessments showed growth but were easy to score 
well on. Third, procedures for choosing local assessments led to low-rigor assessments; 
educators could easily earn the highest student growth scores on these assessments. Fourth, when 
student growth scores were combined with classroom observation ratings, the student growth 
score often raised the overall summative rating to a rating higher than the classroom observation 
rating. As a result, identifying underperforming educators became more difficult, as a high 
student growth score could move a “needs improvement” classroom observation to a lenient 
“satisfactory” summative rating overall. Finally, participants experienced additional workload 
through frequent observation visits, lengthy paperwork requirements, and multiple meetings with 
educators during the evaluation process. 
Five factors influenced evaluators’ decisions when conducting evaluations and 
implementing the procedures of their district evaluation plan. First, low interrater reliability 
exists in districts and creates an uneven distribution of summative ratings when evaluators apply 
different interpretations of the framework and the procedures. Second, evaluators may defer low 
summative ratings due to an educator’s proximity to retirement and/or their seniority. Third, 
evaluators may be unwilling to issue a low rating. For example, a marginal educator may earn a 
higher rating to than deserved to preserve diversity among the school staff. Fourth, evaluators 
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may use a different improvement lever outside the evaluation plan when deemed more effective 
or less likely to affect the school culture. Finally, participants discussed the importance of having 
difficult conversations with educators. Some felt they were easier after evaluation reform, using 
the framework language to guide and “depersonalize” the conversations. 
Several actors were discussed by participants. Parents, students, and school board 
members provided information to evaluators but did not hinder the identification of 
underperforming students. In most cases, these actors provided information to the evaluator 
about underperforming educators, but stopped short of telling the evaluator how to conduct the 
evaluations. Central office personnel (including superintendents) were supportive, except for one 
case in which the superintendent blocked the identification, citing danger of legal action against 
the district. Participants felt the union influence was neutral to positive overall.  
Participants described the outcomes of the policy reforms. All participants stated they 
would initiate an improvement plan again if they needed to do so. Despite the challenge of these 
plans, participants felt they were best for the school and necessary to implement. However, 
participants shared mixed feelings about evaluation reforms overall. Some felt the reforms 
helped learning by defining quality teaching and improving conversations about teaching and 
learning. Some argued student growth improved educator skills in assessment, but others felt 
student growth led educators to “game the system” to earn the highest scores. Participants also 
discussed the need for ongoing professional development for evaluators. 
Integrated findings. Participants explained the quantitative data might not reflect actual 
underperformance because evaluators use other means to address underperformance, including 
negotiated separation agreements and other improvement strategies. In addition, the data may 
reflect evaluators’ unwillingness to initiate improvement plans due to time, workload, and 
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potential negative impact on the building climate. When participants were asked to estimate the 
number of underperforming educators, their estimations often overestimated the frequency of 
underperformance compared to the actual number of educators identified as underperforming. 
Discussion 
This section contains a discussion of selected findings from this study. In addition, the 
findings are explored through the lenses of education policy implementation theory (Honig, 
2006) and micropolitics of personnel evaluation (Bridges & Groves, 1999). 
Low rates of identification of underperforming educators. The quantitative data found 
low rates of underperformance identification in respondent districts. In the PDP data from 2016-
2017, when 84.27% of respondent districts had implemented the PDPs, one PDP was 
implemented for every 338 educators working in the respondent school districts. In the 
remediation data from 2016-2017, respondent districts implemented one remediation plan for 
1,159 educators. In comparison, Reeder (2005b) estimated one educator for every 930 educators 
received an unsatisfactory rating—resulting in a remediation plan. This finding is important 
because a decline in remediation plans may be explained by the availability of PDPs. With both 
PDPs and remediations available after evaluation reform, evaluators may choose to use a PDP 
instead of a remediation plan. First, a “needs improvement” rating is easier to issue than an 
“unsatisfactory” rating and uses softer language (Yariv, 2006) than remediation. Second, creating 
and monitoring a remediation plan is a more lengthy and time consuming process (Dandoy, 
2012; Menuey, 2007). Therefore, the PDP is an intermediate method evaluators might employ 
before implementing a more involved remediation plan. 
Respondents in this study dismissed fewer educators annually than has been reported in 
other states. For example, Thompson (2006) found 0.70% of educators were dismissed in 
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California. However, analysis of Illinois dismissal data from this study is somewhat problematic. 
First, non-tenured educators can be released by a non-renewal of their probationary contract 
(ISBE, 2015). Second, both tenured and non-tenured educators might resign before they are 
dismissed due to a negotiated settlement or desire to avoid the stigma of dismissal (Reeder, 
2005b). Third, the small number of dismissals reported by respondents is highly sensitive to 
small changes in frequency and may not be generalizable to the entire state. Fourth, the literature 
on Illinois’ dismissals is limited to those cases that reach a state hearing decision, which is a 
small subset of educator dismissals statewide (Henry, 2010; London, 1998; Seltzer, 1992; 
Thompson, 2010). Therefore, although the trend lines showed an increase in dismissals, 
dismissal data provides an incomplete narrative on the identification of underperforming 
educators and should be interpreted with caution (London, 1998). These findings highlight the 
need for more comprehensive and accurate statewide data collection on personnel evaluations so 
policymakers can study the results of policy implementation in Illinois. 
Data from ISBE (2017d) found 3% of all Illinois educators received an underperforming 
rating in 2016-2017. However, among respondents in the quantitative study, only 1.25% of 
educators received an underperforming rating in 2016-2017. The statewide results are consistent 
with the findings from two recent studies. Kraft and Gilmour (2017) combined data from 19 
states and reported 2.7% of educators were rated as underperforming. Second, aggregate 
evaluation data from Michigan from 2011-2012 and 2014-2015 found 97% of Michigan 
educators earned the two highest summative ratings on a four-rating system (Lenhoff et al., 
2017), which is identical to the statewide findings in Illinois from 2016-2017 (ISBE, 2017d). 
These findings are important because they show the summative ratings distribution in Illinois is 
similar to that found in other states, including comparable reform efforts in Michigan. Thus, 
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despite the efforts to implement evaluation reforms in Illinois, the evaluation ratings are about 
the same as other states. 
 Teachers’ unions generally were supportive of the improvement process. When 
unions represented underperforming educators, participants described union leaders as generally 
neutral to positive in supporting the improvement process. This finding was unanticipated, as I 
assumed unions were likely to aggressively advocate for the protection of their individual 
members and fight against the assignment of improvement plans. Unions have been 
characterized as being distrustful of school leadership, stemming from their history of advocating 
for basic rights such as job protections against arbitrary dismissal and/or discrimination that are 
provided in laws for all citizens today (Mead et al., 2012).  
When implementing an improvement plan, participants reported the unions and other 
educators initially may “circle the wagons” to protect their colleague. By the end of an 
improvement plan, however, participants shared that educators and union leaders were either 
pleased the educator improved or satisfied that an underperforming colleague was leaving the 
school. This is an important finding because the literature found evaluators often considered the 
negative consequences of union interaction before deciding to issue a low summative rating that 
triggered an improvement plan; evaluators may issue a higher summative rating than may have 
been justified to avoid union problems (Dandoy, 2012; Mitchell, 2011). In addition, teachers’ 
unions typically provide rigorous representation and legal defense when educators are facing 
dismissal or other negative job action, driving the school district to spend significant funds on 
litigation (Menuey, 2007; Reeder, 2006; Reuland, 2012). 
The findings of this study suggest evaluators in Illinois should rethink their concerns 
about potential objections from union leaders and other educators when addressing 
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underperformance with an improvement plan. One explanation could be the process used to 
create the policy reforms. Illinois policy makers intentionally engaged educators and their 
unions—both locally and in the statewide negotiations—as an intentional part of the change 
process to increase their support of PERA and SB7 legislation (Regenstein, 2011). Union leaders 
negotiated and compromised with legislators, advocacy groups, and other stakeholders to avoid 
harsher outcomes such as the reduction of collective bargaining rights (Lewis, 2011). I speculate 
the involvement of teachers’ unions in crafting the reform legislation may have created some 
degree of “buy-in” that has influenced regional and local unions to accept the processes of 
improvement plans. Since the union helped create the plans, they might feel obligated to carry-
out the procedures they agreed to implement. Alternately, Illinois teachers’ unions may have 
evolved in their organizational goals to promote quality teaching and learning for all students. 
Following this study, the United States Supreme Court recently issued a ruling on an 
important Illinois labor relations case in Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees 
(2018). The court struck down the Illinois law—known as an “agency fee” or “fair share”—that 
required Illinois governments to deduct collective bargaining fees from the compensation of any 
employee whose position was covered by the collective bargaining unit but who chose not to join 
the union. The majority opinion found the First Amendment free speech rights of non-members 
were violated by withholding these fees without their consent. More research is needed to 
explore the interaction of union leaders and educator improvement plans in Illinois and other 
states and whether the Janus decision will influence the power balance between school boards 
and teachers’ unions. 
Student growth calculations influenced the inflation of summative ratings. Many 
participants found local procedures for student growth measures made it challenging to assign an 
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underperforming educator a low summative rating. First, participants shared it was easy for 
educators to earn the highest score on their student growth measures, which is consistent with the 
findings from a study of evaluation reform implementation in the Chicago Public Schools. The 
study found teacher-created and teacher-graded assessments provided relatively simple, 
unchallenging pathways for educators to earn the highest scores on their student growth 
assessments—especially assessments measuring simple student growth (Jiang et al., 2015). In 
contrast, Darling-Hammond (2013) explained that evaluation plans should not use grade-level 
standards (such as classroom assessments) to measure student growth. She advocated for 
continuous scale assessments to show growth above and below grade levels. In addition, 
participants perceived educators could “game” the system by using the procedures to achieve 
high student growth scores. This finding was consistent with the Chicago Public Schools study in 
which educators also perceived the student growth measures as easy to “game” by simply 
assigning students a low score on the first assessment and giving them a higher score on the 
second assessment (Jiang et al., 2015). These findings are important because inflated summative 
ratings may explain the low rates of identification of underperforming educators. 
Conversations about teaching and learning improved following the reforms. Nine 
participants described how conversations with teachers improved following the reform. This 
finding highlights a positive outcome of evaluation reform and is supported by Danielson’s 
vision of her teaching framework—defining good teaching practices to facilitate professional 
learning conversations between the educator and the evaluator (2010). Because of reform, all 
evaluators completed training to become a qualified evaluator, including instruction on 
professional conversations with teachers in the pre- and post-conference model. In this study, all 
20 participants worked in districts that adopted a teaching framework as required by reform, and 
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19 of those districts used the state-recommended Danielson framework (ISBE, 2015). Frank 
attributed the improved conversations to the Danielson teaching framework, as it provided 
“definite observable actions and the framework for people to be able to have conversations to 
improve.” This finding is important because it highlights a positive outcome of evaluation 
reform—with the potential to positively influence student learning. Hattie (2009) found 
formative feedback to teachers had a .90 effect size on student achievement, and Tuytens and 
Devos (2011) found feedback offered in post-conferences leads to greater teacher engagement in 
improvement efforts. 
The problematic nature of evaluation consistency. Participants described challenges 
with inconsistent application of their evaluation plan. First, evaluators may not apply the rubric 
language with consistency or fidelity to the written criteria in the district framework. Second, 
some evaluators may have chosen to rate educators higher to avoid conflicts with individual 
educators and schoolwide conflicts and perceived discomfort that may result from low 
summative ratings and the monitoring of improvement plans. This finding of lack of consistency 
is consistent with the literature. Evaluators within the same school or district may vary in their 
application of evaluation criteria and/or procedures (Bernstein, 2004). Some may use softer 
language when providing feedback to avoid conflicts with staff or because of personal 
discomfort with providing candid, yet constructive feedback (Yariv, 2006). Also, the evaluator 
may decide to defer low ratings or be unwilling to assign low ratings. These decisions might be 
influenced by the educator’s seniority or retirement status, the evaluator’s discomfort with 
difficult conversations about improvement (Mead et al., 2012), or the evaluator’s lack of 
confidence in the effectiveness of improvement plans (Kraft & Gilmour, 2016).  
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These findings are significant for two reasons. First, summative evaluation ratings are 
used to determine Reduction in Force layoff sequences across the district (ISBE, 2015). If the 
evaluation plan is not implemented consistently by all evaluators, some educators could be 
ranked too high or too low on the layoff sequence. Second, if evaluators fail to rate 
underperforming educators with a “needs improvement” or “unsatisfactory” summative rating, 
the educator will not benefit from an improvement plan to address their performance. 
Teacher evaluation reforms brought about increased workloads for supervision, 
evaluation, and improvement plans. Participants described additional responsibilities and time 
pressures that resulted from policy reforms. Additional conferences with educators and increased 
frequency of formal and informal observations were described. These findings were consistent 
with the literature on evaluation reforms, which has noted that evaluation reforms, in general, 
have required evaluators to devote more time to evaluation processes (Donaldson & Papay, 
2014; Drake et al., 2016) and created additional work hours for evaluators (Lavigne & 
Chamberlain, 2017). In addition, evaluators who chose to implement improvement levers were 
challenged with additional hours and paperwork to create and implement improvement plans 
with underperforming educators (Kraft & Gilmour, 2017). This finding reinforces the need to 
reexamine the role and workload of school leaders (Grubb & Flessa, 2006). Without changes, 
evaluators are less likely to engage underperforming educators in improvement plans. 
Evaluators’ perceptions of underperformance rates do not match reality. 
Participants were asked to estimate the actual percentage of teachers who were underperforming 
in their school district. The study found 11 participants overestimated the actual percentage by 5 
percentage points or more when compared to the actual district evaluation rates reported by ISBE 
(2017d). The teacher evaluation literature also has reported wide gaps in administrators’ 
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perceptions of underperformance rates and the actual rates of identification. For example, Kraft 
and Gilmour (2017) found 6.5% of educators were rated as underperforming in one district, but 
evaluators estimated 27.8% of educators in their district were underperforming. Tucker (1997) 
suggested underreporting of ineffective educators within districts was caused by inflation of 
summative evaluation ratings. This finding is important because it suggests far more Illinois 
educators are underperforming than has been reported by the statewide summative evaluation 
ratings. These underperforming educators continue to teach in Illinois schools and engage 
students without the assistance of an improvement plan.  
The local context matters when implementing education policy. This section 
discusses the findings through the lens of education policy implementation theory. The 
implementation of education policy is affected by local context, including the policies, people, 
and places (Honig, 2006). In the context of this study, these three factors interacted to influence 
the implementation of evaluation reforms. Because the reforms relied heavily on local 
implementation, this theory was a useful framework to study how local context shaped the 
implementation and why implementation looks different in each school district. Three 
subsections describe the findings through three factors of education policy implementation. 
Unions and their joint committee members sought evaluation procedures favorable to 
their positions. The people who are responsible for the applications of policy in their 
organizations exert a large influence in shaping policy implementation (Honig, 2006). In the 
context of this study, joint committees created the local procedures to implement evaluation 
policy reforms at the local school district level. These committees included equal representation 
from the administration and teachers’ union. However, participants in this study spoke more 
often about the influence of educators on the joint committee. Participants described how some 
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educators on joint committees were defensive to protect educators from low summative ratings. 
This is consistent with the findings of Conley and Glasman (2008) regarding educators’ fears of 
the evaluation process and potential employment loss. In addition, some participants described 
educators who protected their interests by shaping procedures favorable to educators. These 
procedures included favorable procedures for student growth measures and the calculation 
methods for combining student growth scores and classroom performance rating for the 
summative evaluation. However, two participants described a collaborative joint committee 
process. These findings are important because understanding the motivations of people who 
shaped procedures helps to explain the outcomes. However, the framework could be 
strengthened by understanding more about the influence of relationships between the joint 
committee members in the outcome of the committee’s work. 
 The goals of evaluation policy were influenced by local joint committees whose 
educator members focused on their own interests over student learning. Policy can be 
described by the dimensions of goals, targets, and tools (Honig, 2006). In the context of this 
study, the broad goals of evaluation reform included increasing accountability and improving 
educator quality. The goals of Illinois evaluation reforms were influenced by the targets of 
reform—educators—who used the policy tools of local implementation and the joint committee.  
Participants generally perceived that joint committees were not focused on the goal of 
improved student learning as they implemented student growth measures. Instead, participants 
reported the joint committees developed procedures that resulted in minimal accountability for 
educators to improve student learning. These findings are consistent with research by Odden 
(1991), who explained state policy reforms have the potential to influence change at the local 
level, but he predicted most changes were unlikely to produce gains in student achievement. In 
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addition, Owen (2006) suggested that adult concerns regarding their own personal and 
professional needs would supersede the interests of student learning and classrooms in school 
micropolitics. These findings are important because they explain how educators on the joint 
committee used the tools of reform to shape reflect the interests of educators over the goal of 
improving student learning. 
Illinois was a challenging location to negotiate and implement evaluation reform. The 
site of policy implementation influences the outcomes of policy (Honig, 2006). Because Illinois 
has a long history of collective bargaining and influential teachers’ unions, evaluation reforms 
included union participation and voice in the crafting of legislation and the implementation of 
local procedures (Regenstein, 2011). This study found that local implementation often resulted in 
teacher-friendly evaluation procedures—with less focus on student learning than advocated by 
groups such as Stand for Children and Advance Illinois. This finding is aligned with reports from 
critics who predicted little change would result from teacher evaluation reforms (Russo, 2011). 
These findings are important to understand the historical labor context and why the reforms were 
shaped to include teachers’ unions in shaping local implementation.  
Micropolitics influenced the implementation of evaluation reform. This section 
applies the lens of micropolitics of personnel evaluation to examine the decisions, influences of 
local actors, and outcomes of the decisions when identifying underperforming educators (Bridges 
& Groves, 1999). Three subsections will discuss the findings through these factors. 
The actions of local joint committees were designed to protect the interests of 
educators. In the context of this study, the first level of decisions in this framework are the 
ground rules established by legislation and regulation. The second level of decisions are the 
procedures left to the local school district and its collective bargaining agent for implementation. 
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This study found educators used their power on some joint committees to influence procedures to 
protect their employment interests (Conley & Glasman, 2008). Participants explained how 
student growth processes in some districts thwarted their ability to identify underperforming 
teachers. The third level of decisions are the evaluations. Consistent with the literature, 
participants shared many reasons why they might issue a summative rating that inaccurately 
reports the educators’ performance. In this context, evaluators hindered the implementation of 
reform by their own evaluation decisions. Participants also shared success stories about decisions 
to implement improvement plans and the confidence in making that same decision again.  
In the context of this study, the micropolitics of personnel evaluation framework 
provided structure for the three kinds of decisions three levels of decisions impacting evaluation 
reform. However, it could be strengthened by including the new model of joint committees in 
Illinois. While some might classify joint committees as a collective bargaining process, the intent 
of the law was a nuanced collaboration model with educators and administrators holding equal 
power (Regenstein, 2011). 
Once the evaluation plan procedures were created, actors rarely interfered with 
evaluators’ duties when identifying underperforming educators. In the context of this study, the 
actors are the school board members, parents, teachers, students, superintendents and central 
office administrators, and educators. These actors influenced the identification of 
underperforming educators, but none were identified as hindering underperformance 
identification. In contrast, school board members, parents, and students engaged with evaluators 
to support their work. These actors sometimes provided information that was helpful to the 
evaluators, but they made no attempt to use their power to influence the evaluation process and 
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hinder underperformance identification. More research is needed to study and understand the 
role of school boards, students, and parents in identifying underperforming educators.  
Superintendents and central office administrators were helpful in providing resource 
supports, especially when the district leadership communicated a strong culture and vision of 
quality teaching. This support is consistent with prior literature on district culture (Bridges & 
Groves, 1999; Thompson, 2006). Participants stated their central office leaders and 
superintendent, in general, did not hinder their efforts to identify underperforming educators, 
except in one instance when an evaluator’s desire to identify two underperforming educators was 
rejected by the superintendent, citing concerns about potential litigation. Concerns about 
litigation costs are consistent with previous reports (Reeder, 2006; Reuland, 2012).  
Finally, educators influenced the building climate. In contrast to previous literature on the 
evaluation process (Thompson, 2006), many principals described how their building climates 
actually improved during and/or after implementation of an improvement plan—especially when 
underperforming educators separated from the district or improved their performance. Although 
educators may form coalitions early in the process in response to identification (Bridges & 
Groves, 1999), participants described how educators began to understand the need for 
improvement, even sharing strategic information with principals to inform them about problems 
with an underperforming teacher. More research is needed to understand this phenomenon. 
In this study, the micropolitics of personnel evaluation framework was useful for defining 
the actors involved in the evaluation process and noting their interactions. However, the 
framework could be strengthened to include how coalitions of educators act to either support or 
oppose the identified teacher. Given the findings in this study that unions were neutral to 
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supportive during improvement plans, the framework could explore how individuals and/or 
coalitions act to support underperformance identification. 
The outcomes of evaluation policy reform reflected limited use of improvement levers. 
Findings from the quantitative portion of this study showed that in respondent districts, most 
educators earned the highest evaluation ratings and the use of improvement levers continues to 
be limited. This finding is consistent with previous research conducted in Michigan (Lenhoff et 
al., 2017) and in 19 other states (Kraft & Gilmour, 2017). In addition, summative ratings 
inflation in Illinois was evidenced by the discrepancies of participants’ estimates of 
underperformance and the actual number of educators identified as underperforming; this finding 
is consistent with that found in other studies (Kraft & Gilmour, 2017; Thompson, 2006; Tucker 
1997). Several factors explain this discrepancy in Illinois. First, some underperforming educators 
could not be identified for an improvement plan because their student growth scores led to higher 
summative evaluation scores (Jiang et al., 2015). Second, evaluators may be unwilling to assign 
educators low ratings due to their seniority, impending retirement, and other factors. Finally, 
evaluators may avoid ratings that trigger an improvement plan because of the administrative time 
and workload requirements of an improvement plan (Donaldson & Papay, 2014; Drake et al., 
2016). These findings are important because Illinois policy makers need to understand the 
reasons why implementation of improvement levers was low.  
Implications 
Teacher evaluation policy continues to be an evolving topic for scholars, practitioners, 
and policymakers. This study is important because it investigated the implementation of recent 
evaluation reforms in Illinois to determine whether the reforms met their intended outcomes. In 
addition, this study contributes to our understanding of how micropolitical factors influenced the 
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identification of underperforming educators in Illinois public schools following evaluation policy 
reform. This section will discuss three implications of this study. 
First, participants described problems with the local implementation of the required 
student growth component. Although the legislators’ intent for the PDP lever was to improve 
teaching performance, this study found that local school districts developed processes that 
significantly diminished the influence of the student growth factor. When educators received 
inflated summative evaluation ratings that did not accurately reflect their performance, 
evaluators were challenged to implement an improvement lever. For example, if an educator 
received a “needs improvement” or “unsatisfactory” on the professional practice component but 
their student growth score raised their overall performance rating to a “satisfactory” summative 
evaluation rating, the educator would not benefit from the improvement opportunities and 
accountability of a formal PDP. Because of this challenge, an underperforming educator will 
remain in the classroom with no requirement to improve his teaching and learning practices and 
thus may cause long-term harm to students and student learning (Rivkin et al., 2005).  
Second, when administrators do not evaluate with consistency within their buildings 
and/or across their district, educators may question the value and credibility of the evaluation 
process. The effectiveness of the evaluation process may decline and educators may not fully 
engage with the process to improve their own performance and student learning. When educators 
observe lenient evaluation standards in one building but more stringent standards in another, 
their frustrations could prompt a loss in confidence of the fidelity of classroom observations by 
evaluators. If this confidence is lost, it could influence the trusting relationships that are 
necessary between educators and evaluators so that productive professional conversations and 
formative feedback can occur (Copland & Knapp, 2006; Fullan, 2014). Educators desire specific 
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feedback and consistent ratings (Bernstein, 2004). However, the lost trust could reduce 
educators’ receptiveness to feedback on their teaching performance (Mead et al., 2012), as well 
as their motivations to improve their practice.  
Third, Illinois schools demonstrated low rates of using formal improvement levers. State 
legislation created levers to improve teaching performance by change the procedures to make it 
easier to remove underperforming educators from the classroom when they failed to improve 
(Regenstein, 2011). However, if administrators fail to employ these levers, underperforming 
educators potentially will remain in the classrooms and continue to negatively affect student 
learning (Rivkin et al., 2005). This is important because having a high-quality educator is vital to 
students’ success (Guarino et al., 2006; Little & Miller, 2007). 
Recommendations for Policy and Practice 
This section contains recommendations for policymakers and educational practitioners. 
These recommendations may be useful for others interested in understanding how micropolitics 
influences the identification of underperforming educators. However, the results should be used 
with professional judgment. First, Illinois is a collective bargaining state with a strong history of 
influential teachers’ unions. The PERA and SB7 legislation negotiation included representatives 
from both statewide teachers’ unions whose voices were influential in shaping policy reforms 
(Regenstein, 2011). Second, local joint committees were given wide latitude to implement local 
evaluation plans. Participants noted how local plans were influenced by educators on these 
committees who were protecting their interests in achieving high summative evaluation ratings 
and continued job employment. Third, Illinois has an extensive history of tenure and job 
protections for educators that may not exist in other states. 
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In addition, the findings from this study must be viewed in the context of its limitations. 
First, member checks were conducted post-analysis. Second, a small number of school districts 
were represented by the quantitative data. Only 10.36% of Illinois public school districts 
completed the questionnaire, comprising only 6.37% of educators and 5.90% of students in 
Illinois public school. The quantitative data did not include the three largest school districts in 
Illinois. Second, the qualitative phase only interviewed 20 principals from Illinois schools. To be 
included in the study, participants were required to have at least seven years of experience 
evaluating in Illinois public schools and experience with at least one improvement lever during 
their career. Therefore, these findings may not be generalizable to all evaluators, educators, and 
school districts in the state. 
Recommendations for policy. PERA and SB7 represented significant shifts in statewide 
teacher evaluation policy. The implementation of this legislation has now provided an 
opportunity for policymakers to reflect on the outcomes of the policies, to determine whether the 
policies are having their intended effects, and to note whether the policies are meeting the needs 
of public schools in Illinois. Four recommendations for policy are presented in this section. 
Policymakers should consider the value of student growth measures in achieving the 
intended outcomes of teacher evaluation reform. The data showed student growth measures 
created additional responsibilities and added workloads for educators and students. Although the 
original goal was to create expanded accountability levels for educators, the local 
implementation of student growth appears to have had a different effect in some districts. Nine 
participants reported that their districts approved student assessments that required minimal 
effort to score a “proficient” or “excellent” student growth rating, while 15 participants described 
procedures that resulted in inflated summative ratings that are unmatched to educator 
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performance. In addition, in some instances the influence of student growth on summative 
ratings hindered evaluators from identifying underperforming educators. These unintended 
consequences have served to undermine the original goal of accountability. Consistent with 
extant research, Popham (2007) suggested poorly designed educator accountability systems 
could have a negative effect on the goal to improve educators. Murphy (2013) also questioned 
the overall effects of evaluation reforms, asking whether the additional time and efforts were 
worthwhile. Therefore, policy changes should be considered, such as untethering student growth 
scores from the summative evaluation rating and/or increasing the rigor of the assessments and 
scoring criteria. 
Evaluators and joint committees need additional support in designing and 
implementing the student growth component. First, members of joint committees and evaluators 
would benefit from training on the development and approval of student growth measures. 
Participants in this study described problems with procedures for combining classroom 
performance ratings with student growth scores to calculate the summative rating, as well as 
challenges with assessments that required minimal effort to show growth and earn a “proficient” 
or “excellent” rating. Unlike evaluators, joint committee members were not required to 
participate in training when reforms were enacted (ISBE, 2015). Because joint committees 
establish the local procedures for educator evaluation, engaging those committee member and 
the evaluators in conversations and professional learning about assessment practices may 
influence joint committees to reexamine and improve their local procedures for student growth 
measures. Evaluators also need support in approving student growth assessments and coaching 
educators in assessment. Evaluators would benefit from training to improve their knowledge of 
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assessment design principals to improve their confidence in approving assessments that 
challenge educators to improve student learning. 
Evaluators need additional training on conducting classroom observations. Reliability 
and consistency of evaluation processes and ratings within and across districts could be 
improved with additional evaluator training (Goldrick et al., 2013; Weisberg et al., 2009). Four 
participants described problems with interrater reliability in their districts. Participants in this 
study asked for more opportunities to observe live classroom settings with their peers to assess 
classroom performance and discuss with their administrative colleagues where their observation 
scores fall on the evaluation framework, so they could facilitate interrater reliability within their 
districts, and ideally throughout the state. This training could be offered regionally—throughout 
the school year—at host sites when students are in attendance. Removing this training from the 
responsibility of local school districts provides a space to define consistent teaching standards for 
all schools statewide, as opposed to local schools calibrating their own local vision of teaching 
quality. This training could complement the mandatory training modules required approximately 
five years after Illinois evaluators initially are approved to conduct observations. 
Implement annual statewide data collection from school districts to regularly review 
the distribution of all evaluation ratings and the frequency of teacher improvement levers. 
ISBE has initiated the PERA requirement to collect limited evaluation data on educator 
performance, but only the aggregate quantity of “proficient” and “excellent” summative ratings 
is reported on a public website (ISBE, 2017d). This study was limited by a low number of 
superintendents who responded to the questionnaire. Respondents represented just 10.36% of 
public school districts, 5.90% of students, and 6.37% of educators statewide. Having 
comprehensive personnel data would help Illinois policymakers understand the effects of 
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evaluation policy reforms at the local level—knowing whether Illinois school districts are using 
the statutory improvement levers provided within the school code to identify underperforming 
educators and seek to either improve their practices or dismiss them from employment. If district 
leaders were required to report this data annually, state education officials and policymakers 
could track the frequency of improvement plans, similar to the statutory process for the 
collection of summative evaluation ratings under PERA. 
Recommendations for practice. The primary focus of this study was on the 
implementation of teacher evaluation policy reforms in Illinois. Therefore, the findings of this 
study serve best to inform the practice of schools and school leaders in Illinois. The findings 
specifically focused on local implementation of teacher evaluation polices. Five 
recommendations for practice are presented in this section. 
District leadership must articulate and reinforce clear, rigorous standards for educator 
performance and adhere to them—regardless of political pressures. The expectations for 
educator quality vary from district to district. Despite statewide interrater training on the 
Danielson framework, evaluators and districts assess educators with differing levels of rigor and 
apply the evaluation framework inconsistently. Evaluators would benefit from a shared vision of 
teaching practice (Darling-Hammond, 2013), and it is incumbent upon central office 
administrators to ensure that these standards are consistently applied in schools throughout their 
districts (Bridges & Groves, 1999). With 19 participants describing positive support from 
superintendents and central office personnel, Vickie emphasized the importance for clear district 
leadership to support the work of evaluators in identifying underperformance. Because her 
superintendent shared a clear vision of improving teachers’ performance, several improvement 
plans had been implemented in her district.  
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Create mechanisms to support evaluators when implementation of a Professional 
Development Plan or remediation plan is warranted. The job of school leadership is 
increasingly complex, challenging, and time-consuming (Grubb & Flessa, 2006). However, the 
time commitment and workload of an improvement plan can be a barrier that affects the leader’s 
ability to fully carry out all responsibilities inherent within their job descriptions. Eleven 
participants described an increased workload following the Illinois teacher evaluation reforms, 
including the challenge of managing a time-consuming improvement plan. Flexible and creative 
assistance—such as providing job release time, hiring a temporary administrator to assume other 
duties, distributing leadership responsibilities to both formal and informal leaders, and/or 
assigning additional staff—should be considered to support and encourage evaluators in the 
challenging work of educator improvement.  
Participate in intentional professional development experiences to maintain and 
enhance evaluators’ skills. Evaluators benefit from training and support to improve their 
evaluation skills (Darling-Hammond, 2013; Goldrick et al., 2013; Weisberg et al., 2009). First, 
evaluators should continue to improve their knowledge and understanding of the Danielson 
Framework for Teaching (Danielson, 2013) and the research supporting the framework. Second, 
evaluators should collaboratively experience live classroom observations to increase their 
interrater reliability within their schools and districts. Meetings after these observations should 
include peer discussions led by a master evaluator skilled in collecting observational data, 
aligning observational notes with the teaching framework, and leading learner-centered 
conversations about teaching and learning. Finally, evaluators should build their capacity to hold 
difficult and challenging conversations with underperforming educators. The study found 
professional learning conversations improved since the reforms, and providing continued to 
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support to evaluators is essential. Central office administrators can provide professional 
development opportunities designed to assist evaluators with identifying areas of 
underperformance and surfacing these concerns with their faculty 
Reexamine the student growth assessments and evaluation plan to refocus on 
increasing student learning. Fifteen participants described problems with the procedures for 
calculating summative ratings with student growth scores, leading to ratings inflation that 
hindered the ability to identify underperformance. Educators and evaluators should focus on the 
intended goals of the legislation: improving student learning and improving educator 
effectiveness. As the policy has been implemented in local school districts, many educators are 
focused on the summative evaluation rating rather than using the process to reflect on their 
teaching practices and to improve student learning. Conversations with the joint committee and 
among evaluators in districts are crucial to developing a shared vision of how the evaluation 
process can be an effect mechanism to improve student learning. Student growth assessments 
should be reexamined for their ability to influence student achievement and educator quality, 
with revisions made for approval by the school district’s joint committee and/or evaluator. 
The procedures for determining the ratings for student growth scores and weighting of 
student growth scores in the summative rating should be studied to ensure the classroom 
observation ratings will drive the summative ratings for underperforming educators. As 
examples, districts could explore evaluation procedures that assign an overall “needs 
improvement” on the summative evaluation if one or more domains are rated as “needs 
improvement.” Districts could also explore scoring procedures to give more weight to domains 
based on their direct relevance to classroom performance. 
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Ensure evaluators have sufficient time and support to conduct fair and thorough 
evaluations. Because of the increasing complexity of the principalship, many evaluators are 
consumed with a myriad of non-instructional duties and must work longer hours to complete the 
time-intensive evaluation process (Kraft & Gilmour, 2017; Lavigne & Chamberlain, 2017). 
However, the role of the principal has evolved within the last few decades to intensively focus on 
student learning. Therefore, alternative leadership models—such as the models discussed by 
Grubb and Flessa (2006)—should be explored for their potential to increase evaluators’ ability to 
focus on teaching and learning. These models could include dual or co-principalships and/or 
distributing leadership responsibilities to staff committees and teacher leaders. By reducing their 
management tasks and other non-instructional responsibilities, school leaders will have more 
time to focus on student learning and educator improvement through supervision and evaluation. 
All districts must need access to all the improvement levers afforded to them by the 
policy. The study found nearly 15% of respondent districts had not implemented the required 
PDP component by 2016-2017. Yet, participants found PDPs were a useful intermediate tool for 
identifying underperforming educators. Policymakers must hold all school districts accountable 
for implementing the law, while also supporting districts needing assistance with creating their 
PDP processes. 
Recommendations for Additional Research 
Four recommendations for future research are presented in this section. 
Conduct follow-up studies of evaluation data with more respondents for analysis of 
longitudinal data. This study was limited by the small number of districts that provided 
responses to the questionnaire. If fewer years of data—and more recent data—were requested, 
perhaps more school districts would choose to participate in a voluntary research study. These 
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findings could be compared to the data from this study to more fully investigate changes in 
districts’ rates of identifying underperforming educators.  
Interview central office leadership—including superintendents—to provide 
additional information to expand upon the building-level perspectives of school 
administrators. Central office leaders provide crucial leadership that establishes a vision for 
policy implementation in their districts and, arguably, they are responsible to ensure that building 
administrators are trained and socialized into the expectations for evaluating educators and 
holding them accountable for their professional practices within the districts. Therefore, their 
perspectives could provide valuable insights. Central office leaders likely were involved in the 
work of joint committees who established the processes and procedures for evaluation policy 
implementation in their districts. Their insights could further illuminate our understanding of the 
micropolitical factors of the early implementation through the joint committees. Second, the 
perceptions of central office leaders could provide additional perspectives on the work of 
building-level evaluators and the supports evaluators need from central office leaders to identify 
underperforming educators.  
Study the influence of improvement plans on the school culture—before, during, 
and after the implementation of a plan for an underperforming educator. Several principals 
in this study described how addressing underperformance can improve the building culture, as 
other educators become aware that their administration is taking the appropriate steps to hold 
educators accountable and ensure that students have positive learning experiences. Filling this 
research gap could provide information to support evaluators considering the micropolitical 
consequences—both positive and negative—of implementing an improvement plan for an 
underperforming educator in their school. This research could illuminate strategies to mitigate 
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potential negative effects of improvement levers in schools. This research could expand upon the 
findings of this study regarding the responses of unions and educators when educator 
underperformance is addressed in their buildings. Researchers could study whether engaging the 
unions early in the policy creation process influenced these unions and their members to “buy in” 
to the implementation of the policies. 
Expand upon the findings of the qualitative phase through survey research. The 
generalizability of this study is limited by the low number of respondents in the quantitative 
phase (N = 89) and the small number of participants interviewed in the qualitative phase 
(N = 20). However, statewide or national survey research could examine whether the findings of 
the qualitative phase could be generalized to a wider population. The questionnaire could 
investigate the perceptions of evaluators on the strength or influence of the findings of this study 
across more districts statewide than were reached in this study. 
Conclusion 
Teacher evaluation reform remains a challenging political issue for public schools in 
Illinois, as well as throughout the nation. These legislative reforms were made with expectations 
for administrators to improve teaching and learning in public schools. This study was significant 
because of the need to evaluate the implementation of Illinois education policy reforms to 
determine if they met their intended outcomes. This mixed methods study investigated the 
phenomenon of teacher evaluation, focusing on how micropolitics have influenced the 
implementation of teacher evaluation reforms in Illinois. The study was framed by two 
conceptual frameworks: micropolitics of personnel evaluation (Bridges & Groves, 1999) and 
education policy implementation theory (Honig, 2006). This study fills a gap in the literature by 
providing quantitative data on the number of educator improvement plans issued in Illinois. In 
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addition, the voices of school principals provide policymakers with information to determine the 
direction for future policy changes. This study found decisions made by joint committees at the 
local school district level resulted in scoring procedures that inflated summative evaluation 
ratings. As a result, some evaluators were challenged to identify underperforming educators with 
a “needs improvement” or “unsatisfactory” rating—the ratings needed for a PDP or remediation 
plan. In addition, consistent with data from other states, low rates of educators were identified for 
improvement plans or dismissals. Illinois policymakers should review these findings to 
determine whether changes are necessary to meet the intended goals of the evaluation reform 
legislation. 
  
 171 
References 
Aaronson, D., Barrow, L., & Sander, W. (2007). Teacher and student achievement in the 
Chicago public high schools. Journal of Labor Economics, 25(1), 95-135. 
doi:10.1086/508733 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 [ARRA], 123 Stat. §§ 111-5 (2009). 
American Statistical Association. (2014). ASA statement on using value-added models for 
educational assessment [Executive summary]. Retrieved from 
https://www.amstat.org/asa/files/pdfs/POL-ASAVAM-Statement.pdf 
Amrein-Beardsley, A. (2008). Methodological concerns about education value-added assessment 
system. Educational Researcher, 37, 65-75. doi:10.3102/0013189X08316420 
Auguste, B., Kihn, P., & Miller, M. (2010). Closing the talent gap: Attracting and retaining top 
third graduates to a career in teaching. Retrieved from 
http://mckinseyonsociety.com/downloads/reports/Education/Closing_the_talent_gap.pdf 
Baker, B. D., Oluwole, J. O., & Green, P. C. (2013). The legal consequences of mandating high 
stakes decisions based on low quality information: Teacher evaluation in the Race-to-the-
Top era. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 21(5), 1-68. Retrieved from 
http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/1298 
Ballou, D., Sanders, W., & Wright, P. (2004). Controlling for student background in value-added 
assessment of teachers. Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 29(1), 37-65. 
doi:10.3102/10769986029001037 
Behrstock-Sherratt, E., Rizzolo, A., Laine, S., & Friedman, W. (2013). Everyone at the table: 
Engaging teachers in evaluation reform. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
 172 
Bernstein, E. (2004). What teacher evaluation should know and be able to do: A commentary. 
NASSP Bulletin, 88(639), 80-88. doi:10.1177/019263650408863907 
Bireda, S. (2010). Devil in the details: An analysis of state teacher dismissal laws [Research 
report]. Retrieved from https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2010/06/pdf/sabateacherdismissal_exec_summ.pdf 
Blase, J. (1993). The micropolitics of effective school-based leadership: Teachers’ perspectives. 
Educational Administration Quarterly, 29, 142-163. doi:10.1177/0013161X93029002003 
Blase, J., & Blase, J. (2002). The micropolitics of instructional supervision: A call for research. 
Educational Administration Quarterly, 38, 6-44. doi:10.1177/0013161X02381002 
Bogdan, R. C., & Biklen, S. K. (2007). Qualitative research for education: An introduction to 
theories and methods (5th ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon. 
Branch, G. F., Hanushek, E. A., & Rivkin, S. G. (2013). School leaders matter. Education Next, 
13(1), 62-69. Retrieved from http://educationnext.org/school-leaders-matter/ 
Bridges, E. M. (1992). Managing the incompetent teacher: Managerial responses (Rev. ed.). 
Philadelphia, PA: Falmer Press. 
Bridges, E. M., & Groves, B. R. (1999). The macro- and micropolitics of personnel evaluation: 
A framework. Journal of Personnel Evaluation in Education, 13, 321-337. 
doi:10.1023/A:1008182215705 
Brosky, D. J. (2011). Micropolitics in the school: Teacher leaders’ use of political skill and 
influence tactics (Doctoral dissertation, Oakland University). Available from ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses. (UMI No. 193660373) 
Burch, P., & Heinrich, C. J. (2016). Mixed methods for policy research and program evaluation. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 173 
Cameron, R. (2009). A sequential mixed model research design: Design, analytical and display 
issues. International Journal of Multiple Research Approaches, 3, 140-152. 
doi:10.5172/mra.3.2.140 
Chait, R. (2010). Removing chronically ineffective teachers: Barriers and opportunities. 
Retrieved from https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2010/03/pdf/teacher_dismissal.pdf 
Clayton, C. (2013). Understanding current reforms to evaluate teachers: A literature review on 
teacher evaluation across the career span. Retrieved from 
http://www.nyacte.org/documents/Clayton_2013_Teacher_Evaluation.pdf 
Conley, S., & Glasman, N. S. (2008). Fear, the school organization, and teacher evaluation. 
Educational Policy, 22, 63-85. doi:10.1177/0895904807311297 
Copland, M. A., & Knapp, M. S. (2006). Connecting leadership with learning: A framework for 
reflection, planning, and action. Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and 
Curriculum Development. 
Creswell, J. W. (2014). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods 
approaches (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Creswell, J. W., & Plano Clark, V. L. (2011). Designing and conducting mixed methods research 
(2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Dandoy, J. (2012). Principals’ perceptions of barriers to dismissal of poor-performing teachers 
(Doctoral dissertation, University of San Francisco). Available from ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses. (UMI No. 3508990) 
Danielson, C. (2010). Evaluations that help teachers learn. Educational Leadership, 68(4), 35-39. 
 174 
Danielson, C. (2013). The framework for teaching evaluation instrument. Retrieved from 
https://www.danielsongroup.org/framework/ 
Darling-Hammond, L. (2013). Getting teacher evaluation right: What really matters for 
effectiveness and improvement. New York, NY: Teachers College Press. 
Darling-Hammond, L. (2014). One piece of the whole: Teacher evaluation as part of a 
comprehensive system for teaching and learning. American Educator, 38, 4-13. 
Datnow, A. (2001). Gender politics in school reform. In N. Bascia & A. Hargreaves (Eds.), The 
sharp edge of educational change: Teaching, leading, and the realities of reform (pp. 
131–154). London, UK: Routledge Falmer. 
D’Augostino, J. V., & Powers, S. J. (2009). Predicting teacher performance with test scores and 
grade point average: A meta-analysis. American Educational Research Journal, 46, 146-
182. doi:10.3102/0002831208323280 
Donaldson, M. L. (2012). Teachers’ perspectives on evaluation reform [Research report]. 
Retrieved from https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/TeacherPerspectives.pdf 
Donaldson, M. L., & Papay, J. P. (2012). Reforming teacher evaluation: One district’s story 
[Research report]. Retrieved from https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/ReformingTeacherEvaluation.pdf 
Donaldson, M. L., & Papay, J. P. (2014). Teacher evaluation reform: Policy lessons for school 
principals. Principal’s Research Review, 9(5). 
Drake, T. A., Goldring, E., Grissom, J. A., Cannata, M., Neumerski, C., Rubin, M., & 
Schuermann, P. (2016). Development or dismissal? Exploring principals’ use of teacher 
effectiveness data. In J. A. Grissom & P. A. Young (Eds.), Improving teacher evaluation 
 175 
systems: Making the most of multiple measures (pp. 116-130). New York, NY: Teachers 
College Press. 
Elmore, R. F. (2000). Building a new structure for school leadership. Retrieved from 
http://www.shankerinstitute.org/sites/shanker/files/building.pdf 
Fine, J. (1997). School supervision for effective teaching in America, 1910-1930. High School 
Journal, 80, 288-294. 
Firestone, W. A. (2014). Teacher evaluation policy and conflicting theories of motivation. 
Educational Researcher, 43, 100-107. doi:10.3102/0013189X14521864 
Flessa, J. (2009). Educational micropolitics and distributed leadership. Peabody Journal of 
Education, 84, 331-349. doi:10.1080/01619560902973522 
Fullan, M. (2014). The principal: Three keys to maximizing impact. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass. 
Goe, L., Bell, C., & Little, O. (2008). Approaches to evaluating teacher effectiveness: A research 
synthesis [Research report]. Retrieved from 
http://www.gtlcenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/EvaluatingTeachEffectiveness.pdf 
Goldhaber, D., & Walch, J. (2011). Strategic pay reform: A student outcomes-based evaluation 
of Denver’s ProComp teacher pay initiative [CEDR working paper 2011-3]. Retrieved 
from http://www.cedr.us/papers/working/WP%202011-
3%20Procomp%20Strategic%20Compensation%20(9-28).pdf 
Goldrick, L., Zabala, D., & Burn, J. (2013). Cultivating effective teachers through evaluation 
and support: A guide for Illinois policymakers and educational leaders [Policy analysis]. 
Retrieved from https://newteachercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Illinois-Guide-Policy-
Makers-Educational-Leaders.pdf 
 176 
Greene, J. C. (2007). Mixed methods in social inquiry. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Grissom, J. A., Kalogrides, D., & Loeb, S. (2015). The micropolitics of educational inequality: 
The case of teacher–student assignments. Peabody Journal of Education, 90, 601-614. 
doi:10.1080/0161956X.2015.1087768 
Grissom, J. A., Loeb, S., & Master, B. (2013). Effective instructional time use for school leaders: 
Longitudinal evidence from observations of principals. Educational Researcher, 42, 433-
444. doi:10.3102/0013189X13510020 
Growth Through Learning. (2018). Newsline. Retrieved from 
https://www.growththroughlearningillinois.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=HG3mRIarGK
0%3d&portalid=0  
Grubb, W. N., & Flessa, J. J. (2006). “A job too big for one:” Multiple principals and other 
nontraditional approaches to school leadership. Educational Administration Quarterly, 
42, 518-550. doi:10.1177/0013161X06290641 
Guarino, C. M., Santibañez, L., & Daley, G. A. (2006). Teacher recruitment and retention: A 
review of the recent empirical literature. Review of Educational Research, 76, 173-208. 
doi:10.3102/00346543076002173 
Haefele, D. L. (1993). Evaluating teachers: A call for change. Journal of Personnel Evaluation 
in Education, 7(1), 21-31. doi:10.1007/BF00972346 
Hallinger, P. (2011). Leadership for learning: Lessons from 40 years of empirical research. 
Journal of Educational Administration, 49, 125-142. doi:10.1108/09578231111116699 
Hallinger, P., & Murphy, J. (2013). Running on empty? Finding the time and capacity to lead 
learning. NASSP Bulletin, 1(1), 5-21. doi:10.1177/0192636512469288 
 177 
Hanushek, E. A. (2009). Teacher deselection. In D. Goldhaber & J. Hannaway (Eds.), Creating a 
new teaching profession (pp. 165-180). Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press. 
Hattie, J. (2009). Visible learning: A synthesis of over 800 meta-analyses relating to 
achievement. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Hazi, H. M., & Rucinski, D. A. (2009). Teacher evaluation as a policy target for improved 
student learning: A fifty-state review of statute and regulatory action since NCLB. 
Education Policy Analysis Archives, 17(5). doi:10.14507/epaa.v17n5.2009 
Henry, J. D. (2010). Dismissal of tenured teachers in Illinois from 1990 to 2008 (Doctoral 
dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale). Available from ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses. (UMI No. 3408633) 
Hess, F. M. (2013). The missing half of school reform. National Affairs, 17, 19-35. 
Hill, H. C. (2006). Language matters: How characteristics of language complicate policy 
implementation. In M. I. Honig (Ed.), New directions in education policy 
implementation: Confronting complexity (pp. 65-82). Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press. 
Hill, H. C., Charalambous, C. Y., & Kraft, M. A. (2012). When rater reliability is not enough: 
Teacher observation systems and a case for the generalizability study. Educational 
Researcher, 41(2), 56-64. doi:10.3102/0013189X12437203 
Hill, H. C., Kapitula, L., & Urnland, K. (2011). A validity argument approach to evaluating 
teacher value-added scores. American Educational Research Journal, 48, 794-831. 
doi:10.3102/0002831210387916 
Holland, P. (2004). Principals as supervisors: A balancing act. NASSP Bulletin, 88(639), 3-14. 
doi:10.1177/019263650408863902 
 178 
Honig, M. I. (2006). Complexity and policy implementation: Challenges and opportunities for 
the field. In M. I. Honig (Ed.), New directions in education policy implementation: 
Confronting complexity (pp. 1-23). Albany, NY: State University of New York. 
Howell, W. G. (2015). Results of President Obama’s Race to the Top. Education Next, 15(4), 58-
66. Retrieved from http://educationnext.org/files/ednext_XV_4_howell.pdf 
Hull, J. (2013). Trends in teacher evaluation: How states are measuring teacher performance. 
Retrieved from http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/Evaluating-
performance/Trends-in-Teacher-Evaluation-At-A-Glance/Trends-in-Teacher-Evaluation-
Full-Report-PDF.pdf 
Illinois Education Association. (2011). Unions stand together to forge historic education reform. 
Retrieved from https://ieanea.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Sb7-fact-sheet-updated-4-
161.pdf 
Illinois State Board of Education. (2015). ISBE non-regulatory guidance on PERA and SB7. 
Retrieved from https://www.isbe.net/Documents/pera_guidance.pdf 
Illinois State Board of Education. (2016). Questions and answers for 03/09/16 employee 
evaluations webinar. Retrieved from https://www.isbe.net/Documents/emp-eval-webinar-
qa-160309.pdf#search=emp%2Deval%2Dwebinar%2Dqa%2D160309%2Epdf 
Illinois State Board of Education. (2017a). Directory of educational entities [Data file]. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.isbe.net/_layouts/Download.aspx?SourceUrl=/Documents/dir_ed_entities.xl
s 
Illinois State Board of Education. (2017b). Illinois interactive report card. Retrieved from 
https://iirc.niu.edu/classic/ 
 179 
Illinois State Board of Education. (2017c). Illinois report card: 15 year statewide trend data. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.isbe.net/_layouts/Download.aspx?SourceUrl=/Documents/rc-trend-data.xlsx 
Illinois State Board of Education. (2017d). Illinois report card 2016-2017. Retrieved from 
https://www.illinoisreportcard.com/ 
Ivankova, N. V. (2014). Implementing quality criteria in designing and conducting a sequential 
QUAN → QUAL mixed methods study of student engagement with learning applied 
research methods online. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 8(1), 25-51. 
doi:10.1177/1558689813487945 
Ivankova, N. V., Creswell, J. W., & Stick, S. L. (2006). Using mixed-methods sequential 
explanatory design: From theory to practice. Field Methods, 18(1), 3-20. 
doi:10.1177/1525822X05282260 
Jacob, B. A. (2007). The challenges of staffing urban schools with effective teachers. Future of 
Children, 17, 129-153. doi:10.1353/foc.2007.0005 
Jacob, B. A. (2011). Principled principals. Education Next, 11(4), 70-76. Retrieved from 
http://educationnext.org/files/ednext_20114_research_jacob.pdf 
Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U.S. (2018). 
Jiang, J. Y., Sporte, S. E., & Luppesco, S. (2015). Teacher perspectives on evaluation reform: 
Chicago’s REACH students. Educational Researcher, 44, 105-116. 
doi:10.3102%2F0013189X155755174. 
Jones, A. C. (1985). Content analysis of teacher dismissal cases for incompetence under the 
Illinois Tenure Teacher Hearing Officer Act, 1975-1983 (Doctoral dissertation, Loyola 
 180 
University Chicago). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. (ProQuest No. 
303357706) 
Keesler, V. E., & Howe, C. (2012). Understanding educator evaluations in Michigan. Retrieved 
from 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mde/Educator_Effectiveness_Ratings_Policy_Brie
f_403184_7.pdf 
Kersten, T. A., & Israel, M. S. (2005). Teacher evaluation: Principals’ insight and suggestions 
for improvement. Planning and Changing, 36(1/2), 47-67. 
Killion, J., & Hirsh, S. (2011). The elements of effective teaching: Professional learning moves 
vision, framework, and performance standards into action. Journal of Staff Development, 
32(6), 10-16. 
Kimball, S. M., & Milanowski, A. (2009). Examining teacher evaluation validity and leadership 
decision making within a standards-based evaluation system. Educational Administration 
Quarterly, 45, 34-70. doi:10.1177/0013161X08327549 
Kirst, M. W., & Wirt, F. M. (2009). The political dynamics of American education (4th ed.). 
Richmond, CA: McCutchan. 
Kraft, M. A., & Gilmour, A. F. (2016). Can principals promote teacher development as 
evaluators? A case study of principals’ views and experiences. Educational 
Administration Quarterly, 52, 711-753. doi:10.1177/0013161X16653445 
Kraft, M. A., & Gilmour, A. F. (2017). Revisiting The widget effect: Teacher evaluation reforms 
and the distribution of teacher effectiveness. Educational Researcher, 45, 234-249. 
doi:10.3102/0013189X17718797 
 181 
Labaree, D. F. (2010). Someone has to fail: The zero-sum gain of public schooling. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Lavely, C., Berger, N., & Follman, J. (1992). Actual incidence of incompetent teachers. 
Educational Research Quarterly, 15(2), 11-14. 
Lavigne, A. L., & Chamberlain, R. W. (2017). Teacher evaluation in Illinois: Schools leaders’ 
perceptions and practices. Educational Assessment, Evaluation, and Accountability, 29, 
179-209. doi:10.1007/s11092-016-9250-0 
Lavigne, A. L., & Good, T. L. (2014). Teacher and student evaluation: Moving beyond the 
failure of school reform. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Lavigne, A. L., & Good, T. L. (2015). Improving teaching through observation and feedback: 
Beyond state and federal mandates. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Leithwood, K., Lewis, K. S., Anderson, S., & Wahlstrom, K. (2004). How leadership influences 
student learning [Research review]. Retrieved from University of Minnesota, Center for 
Applied Research and Educational Improvement Web site: http://purl.umn.edu/2035 
Lenhoff, S. W., Pogodzinski, B., Mayrowetz, D., Superfine, B. M., & Umpstead, R. R. (2017). 
District stressors and teacher evaluation ratings. Journal of Educational Administration, 
56(2). doi:10.1108/JEA-06-2017-0065 
Lenhoff, S. (2012). Strengthening Michigan’s teacher force: How a new teacher evaluation 
system will better equip Michigan educators to improve student achievement. Retrieved 
from http://midwest.edtrust.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/10/Strengthening-
Michigans-Teaching-Force.pdf 
 182 
Levin, J., Mulhern, J., & Schunck, J. (2005). Unintended consequences: The case for reforming 
the staffing rules in urban teachers union contracts. Retrieved from 
https://tntp.org/assets/documents/UnintendedConsequences.pdf 
Lewis, K. (2011). Senate bill 7—Letter from President Lewis [blog]. Retrieved from 
https://www.ctunet.com/blog/sb7letter 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Little, P., & Miller, S. (2007). Hiring the best teachers? Rural values and the person-organization 
fit theory. Journal of School Leadership, 17, 118-158. 
London, H. N. (1998). An analysis of hearing officer decisions in cases of tenured teacher 
dismissal in Illinois from 1985-1994 (Doctoral dissertation, Northern Illinois University). 
Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. (ProQuest No. 304463588) 
Long, R. (2011, June 11). New force in Illinois quickly pushes state toward school reform. 
Chicago Tribune. Retrieved from http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-06-11/news/ct-
met-school-reform-20110611_1_school-reform-education-chairman-jesse-ruiz-new-
chicago-school-board 
Lubienski, C., Weitzel, P., & Lubienski, S. T. (2009). Is there a “consensus” on school choice 
and achievement? Advocacy research and the emerging political economy of knowledge 
production. Educational Policy, 23, 161-193. doi:10.1177/0895904808328532 
Malen, B. (2006). Revisiting policy implementation as a political phenomenon: The case of 
reconstitution policies. In M. I. Honig (Ed.), New directions in education policy 
implementation (pp. 83-104). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
 183 
Manatt, R. P., & Daniels, B. (1990). Relationships between principals’ ratings of teacher 
performance and student achievement. Journal of Personnel Evaluation in Education, 4, 
189-201. doi:10.1007/BF00126127 
Marsh, D. D., & Crocker, P. S. (1991). School restructuring: Implementing middle school 
reform. In A. R. Odden (Ed.), Education policy implementation (pp. 259-278). Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press. 
Marsh, J. A. (2012). The micropolitics of implementing a school-based bonus policy: The case of 
New York City's compensation committees. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 
34, 164-184. doi:10.3102/0162373711428354 
Marsh, J. A., & Wohlstetter, P. (2013). Recent trends in intergovernmental relations: The 
resurgence of local actors in education policy. Educational Researcher, 42, 276-283. 
doi:10.3102/0013189X13492193 
Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (2011). Designing qualitative research (5th ed.). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Marshall, C., & Scribner, J. (1991). “It’s all political:” Inquiry into the micro-politics of 
education. Education and Urban Society, 23, 347–355. 
doi:10.1177/0013124591023004001 
Marzano, R. J., Carbough, B., Rutherford, A., & Toth, M. D. (2014). Marzano Center teacher 
observation protocol for the 2014 Marzano teacher evaluation model. Retrieved from 
http://www.marzanocenter.com/Teacher-Evaluation-2014-Model.pdf 
Marzano, R. J., Frontier, T., & Livingston, D. (2011). Effective supervision: Supporting the art 
and science of teaching. Alexandria, VA: ASCD. 
 184 
Mason, R. W., & Schroeder, M. P. (2010). Principal hiring practices: Toward a reduction of 
uncertainty. The Clearing House: A Journal of Educational Strategies, Issues and Ideas, 
85, 186-193. doi:10.1080/00098650903583727 
McClellan, C. A., Donoghue, J. R., & Pianta, R. C. (2014). Optimizing resources to maximize 
student gains. In T. J. Kane, K. A. Kerr, & R. C. Pianta (Eds.), Designing teacher 
evaluation systems: New guidance from the Measures of Effective Teaching project (pp. 
529-582). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
McDonald, M. (1992). A study of the impact of Section 24 A on the identification, remediation, 
and dismissal of incompetent tenured school teachers in Illinois (Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and 
Theses. (UMI No. 303979439) 
Mead, S., Rotherham, A., & Brown, R. (2012). The hangover: Thinking about the unintended 
consequences of the nation’s teacher evaluation binge [Special report]. Retrieved from 
http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/-the-hangover-thinking-about-the-
unintended-consequences-of-the-nations-teacher-evaluation-binge_144008786960.pdf 
Menuey, B. P. (2007). Teachers’ perceptions of professional incompetence and barriers to the 
dismissal process. Journal of Personnel Evaluation in Education, 18, 309-325. 
doi:10.1007/s11092-007-9026-7 
Merriam, S. B., & Tisdell, E. J. (2016). Qualitative research: A guide to design and 
implementation (4th ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Mertens, D. (2009). Research and evaluation in education and psychology: Integrating diversity 
with qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 185 
Mette, I. M., Range, B. G., Anderson, J., Hvidston, D. J., Nieuwenhuizen, L., & Doty, J. (2017). 
The wicked problem of the intersection between supervision and evaluation. 
International Electronic Journal of Elementary Education, 9, 709-724. Retrieved from 
https://iejee.com/index.php/IEJEE/article/view/185 
Mitchell, R. (2011). Factors that influence an administrator’s decision to seek dismissal of 
tenured teachers (Doctoral dissertation, University of Kansas). Available from ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses. (UMI No. 3449984) 
Murphy, J. (2013, June 6). Teacher evaluation: A good bet? [Blog post]. Retrieved from 
http://pdkintl.org/blogs/learning-on-the-edge/teacher-evaluation-a-good-bet/ 
Murphy, J., Elliot, S. N., Goldring, E., & Porter, A. C. (2007). Leadership for learning: A 
research-based model and taxonomy of behaviors. School Leadership & Management, 
27, 179-201. doi:10.1080/13632430701237420 
Murphy, J., Hallinger, P., & Heck, R. H. (2013). Leading via teacher evaluation: The case of the 
missing clothes? Educational Researcher, 42, 349-354. doi:10.3102/0013189X13499625 
Murphy, J., & Meyers, C. (2008). Turning around failing schools: Leadership lessons from the 
organizational sciences. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press. 
National Commission on Excellence in Education. (1983). A nation at risk: The imperative for 
educational reform. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 
Newtown, Z. A., Darling-Hammond, L., Haertel, E., & Thomas, E. (2010). Value-added 
modeling of teacher effectiveness: An exploration of stability across models and contexts. 
Education Policy Analysis Archives, 18. doi:10.14507/epaa.vn18n23.2010 
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 [NCLB], 20 U.S.C.A. § 6301 (West 2002). 
 186 
Odden, A. R. (1991). New patterns of education policy implementation and challenges for the 
1990’s. In A. R. Odden (Ed.), Education policy implementation (pp. 297-327). Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press. 
Owen, J. C. (2006). The impact of politics in local education: Navigating white water. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Education. 
Palinkas, L. A., Horowitz, S. M., Green, C. A., Wisdom, J. P., Duan, N., & Hoagwood, K. 
(2015). Purposeful sampling for qualitative data collection and analysis in mixed method 
implementation research. Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health 
Services Research, 42, 533-544. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10488-013-0528-y 
Phillips, V. (2011). What makes a good teacher? (Stephanie Hirsh, Interviewer). Journal of Staff 
Development, 32(6), 18-22. Retrieved from https://learningforward.org/docs/jsd-
december-2011/phillipsqa326.pdf?sfvrsn=2 
Polikoff, M. S. (2014). Does the test matter? Evaluating teachers when tests differ in their 
sensitivity to instruction. In T. J. Kane, K. A. Kerr, & R. C. Pianta (Eds.), Designing 
teacher evaluation systems: New guidance from the Measures of Effective Teaching 
project (pp. 278-302). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Popham, W. J. (2007). Instructional sensitivity of tests: Accountability’s dire drawback. Phi 
Delta Kappan, 89, 146-155. doi:10.1177/003172170708900211 
Portin, B. S., & Knapp, M. S. (2014). Team-based leadership of instructional improvement in 
demanding school contexts. In M. S. Knapp, M. I. Honig, M. L. Plecki, B. S. Portin, & 
M. A. Copland (Eds.), Learning-focused leadership in action (pp. 23-51). New York, 
NY: Routledge. 
 187 
Range, B. G., Scherz, S., Holt, C., & Young, S. (2011). Supervision and evaluation: The 
Wyoming perspective. Educational Assessment, Evaluation, and Accountability, 23, 243-
265. doi:10.1007/s11092-011-9123-5 
Ravitch, D. (2013). Reign of error: The hoax of the privatization movement and the danger to 
America’s public schools. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Ravitch, D. (2016). The death and life of the great American school system (Rev. ed.). New 
York, NY: Basic Books. 
Reeder, S. (2005a, December 7). An “A” for everyone: Mandated performance review was 
designed to flag incompetent teachers; now it protects them. Daily Journal. Retrieved 
from http://www.daily-journal.com/news/local/an-a-for-everyone/article_da2e2123-9a09-
5c0a-8681-a5979dfc9047.html 
Reeder, S. (2005b, December 7). Remediation can address problems, but few schools use it. 
Daily Journal. Retrieved from http://www.daily-journal.com/news/local/remediation-
can-address-problems-but-few-schools-use-it/article_db1049dd-e2b3-5e68-9b60-
6e72a2e017b7.html 
Reeder, S. (2006, June 26). Firing tenured teachers burden on budget. Daily Journal. Retrieved 
from http://www.daily-journal.com/news/local/firing-tenured-teachers-burden-on-
budget/article_02783413-51a4-5e00-a3f6-58cf4df46134.html 
Regenstein, E. (2011). Illinois: The new leader in education reform? [Policy report]. Retrieved 
from https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2011/07/pdf/illinois_education.pdf 
Reuland, A. (2012). The differences between novice and experienced public middle school 
principals in the decision to remediate a tenured teacher (Doctoral dissertation, Loyola 
 188 
University Chicago). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. (UMI No. 
3518482) 
Rivkin, S. G., Hanushek, E. A., & Kain, J. F. (2005). Teachers, schools and academic 
achievement. Econometrica, 73, 417-458. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00584.x 
Robinson, O. G. (2013). Sampling in interview-based qualitative research: A theoretical and 
practical guide. Quantitative Research in Psychology, 11(1), 25-41. 
doi:10.1080/14780887.2013.801543 
Rose, D. S., English, A., & Finney, T. G. (2014). Hire better teachers now: Using the science of 
selection to find the best teachers for your school. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education 
Press. 
Russo, A. (2011, April 19). Teaching: Reform—or reform “lite”—in Illinois? [Blog post]. 
Retrieved from 
http://scholasticadministrator.typepad.com/thisweekineducation/2011/04/education-
week-in-illinois-teachers-join-lawmakers-in-drawing-up-reforms.html 
Ruzek, E. A., Hafen, C. A., Hamre, B. K., & Pianta, R. C. (2014). Combining classroom 
observations and value added for the evaluation and professional development of 
teachers. In T. J. Kane, K. A. Kerr, & R. C. Pianta (Eds.), Designing teacher evaluation 
systems: New guidance from the Measures of Effective Teaching project (pp. 205-233). 
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Sanders, W. L., & Horn, S. P. (1994). The Tennessee value-added assessment system (TVAAS): 
Mixed-model methodology in educational assessment. Journal of Personnel Evaluation 
in Education, 8, 299-311. doi:10.1007/BF00973726 
 189 
Sanders, W. L., & Horn, S. P. (1998). Research findings from the Tennessee Value-Added 
Assessment System (TVASS) database: Implications for educational evaluation and 
research. Journal of Personnel Evaluation in Education, 12, 247-256. 
doi:10.1023/A:1008067210518 
Sandholtz, J. H., & Scribner, S. P. (2006). The paradox of administrative control in fostering 
teacher professional development. Teaching & Teacher Education, 22, 1104-1117. 
doi:10.1016/j.tate.2006.07.006 
Savage, A., & Hyde, R. (2014). Using freedom of information requests to facilitate research. 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 17, 303-317. 
doi:10.1080/13645579.2012.742280 
Sawchuk, S. A. (2012, September 27). Report: Most Michigan teachers ace reviews [Blog post]. 
Retrieved from 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/teacherbeat/2012/09/report_most_michigan_teachers_.ht
ml 
Sawchuk, S. A. (2014, October 22). Steep drops seen in teacher-prep enrollment numbers. 
Education Week, pp. 1, 10. Retrieved from 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/10/22/09enroll.h34.html 
Scott, J., Lubienski, C., & DeBray-Pelot, E. (2009). The politics of advocacy in education. 
Educational Policy, 23(1), 3-14. doi:10.1177/0895904808328530 
Seidman, I. (2013). Interviewing as qualitative research: A guide for researchers in education 
and the social sciences (4th ed.). New York, NY: Teachers College Press. 
Seltzer, L. W. (1992). Remediation of unsatisfactory teachers in Illinois: Principal’s perceptions 
relating to preparation, process, and outcomes (Doctoral dissertation, Southern Illinois 
 190 
University at Carbondale). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. (UMI No. 
9239746) 
Spillane, J. P. (1998). State policy and the non-monolithic nature of the local school district: 
Organizational and professional considerations. American Educational Research Journal, 
35, 33-63. doi:10.3102/00028312035001033 
Staiger, D. O., & Kane, T. J. (2014). Making decisions with imprecise performance measures: 
The relationship between annual student achievement gains and a teacher’s career value 
added. In T. J. Kane, K. A. Kerr, & R. C. Pianta (Eds.), Designing teacher evaluation 
systems: New guidance from the Measures of Effective Teaching project (pp. 144-169). 
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Staiger, D. O., & Rockoff, J. E. (2010). Searching for effective teachers with imperfect 
information. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24, 97-117. doi:10.1257/jep.24.3.97 
State of Illinois. (2010). The State of Illinois Race to the Top application for initial funding 
[Funding application]. Retrieved from 
http://www.isbe.state.il.us/racetothetop/PDF/phase1/application.pdf 
Stoelinga, S. R. (2010). Pressuring teachers to leave: Honest talk about how principals use 
harassing supervision. Phi Delta Kappan, 92(4), 57-61. doi:10.2307/27922488 
Stronge, J. H., Ward, T. J., & Grant, L. W. (2011). What makes good teachers good? A cross-
case analysis of the connection between teacher effectiveness and student achievement. 
Journal of Teacher Education, 62, 339-355. doi:10.1177/0022487111404241 
Superfine, B. M., Smylie, M. A., Cummings, M. I., & Tozer, S. (2012). The challenge of 
coherence in education policy in Illinois. In The Illinois report 2012 (pp. 72-82). 
 191 
Retrieved from https://igpa.uillinois.edu/sites/igpa.uillinois.edu/files/reports/IR12-
Ch7_edpolicyW.pdf 
Teddlie, C., & Tashakkori, A. (2009). Foundations of mixed methods research: Integrating 
quantitative and qualitative approaches in the social and behavioral sciences. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Thompson, J. (2006). Barriers to the dismissal of tenured teachers: A study of high school 
principals’ perceptions (Doctoral dissertation, University of San Francisco). Available 
from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. (UMI No. 3217613) 
Thompson, J. (2010, February 15). Thompson: Correcting TNTP’s “Widget Effect” stats [Blog 
post]. Retrieved from 
http://scholasticadministrator.typepad.com/thisweekineducation/2010/02/thompson-tntp-
corrects-reconciles-inaccurate-data-in-the-widget-effect.html 
Thomsen, J. (2014, May 1). 50-state comparison: Teacher tenure/continuing contract policies. 
Retrieved from http://www.ecs.org/teacher-tenure-continuing-contract-policies/ 
Thurston, P. W. (1990). Dismissal of tenured teachers in Illinois: Evolution of a viable system. 
University of Illinois Law Review, 1, 1-94. 
Tracy, S. J. (1995). How historical concepts of supervision relate to supervisory practices today. 
Clearing House, 68, 320-325. 
Tucker, P. D. (1997). Lake Wobegon: Where all teachers are competent (or, have we come to 
terms with the problem of incompetent teachers?). Journal of Personnel Evaluation in 
Education, 11, 103-126. doi:10.1023/A:1007962302463 
 192 
Tuytens, M., & Devos, G. (2011). Stimulating professional learning through teacher evaluation: 
An impossible task for the school leader? Teaching & Teacher Education, 27, 891-899. 
doi:10.1016/j.tate.2011.02.004 
Van Driel, J. H., & Berry, A. (2012). Teacher professional development focusing on pedagogical 
content knowledge. Educational Researcher, 41, 26-28. doi:10.3102/0013189X11431010 
Walby, K., & Larsen, M. (2012). Access to information and freedom of information requests: 
Neglected means of data production in the social sciences. Qualitative Inquiry, 18(1), 31-
42. doi:10.1177/1077800411427844 
Wallace Foundation. (2013). The school principal as leader: Guiding schools to better teaching 
and learning [Research report]. Retrieved from 
http://www.wallacefoundation.org/knowledge-center/Documents/The-School-Principal-
as-Leader-Guiding-Schools-to-Better-Teaching-and-Learning-2nd-Ed.pdf 
Weisberg, D., Sexton, S., Mulhern, J., & Keeling, D. (2009). The widget effect: Our national 
failure to acknowledge and act on differences in teacher effectiveness. Retrieved from 
http://tntp.org/assets/documents/TheWidgetEffect_2nd_ed.pdf 
What the report card says about Illinois teachers. [Editorial]. (2017, November 24). Chicago 
Tribune. Retrieved from http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-
illinois-reading-standard-20171024-story.html 
Whitaker, T. (1999). Dealing with difficult teachers. Larchmont, NY: Eye on Education. 
White, B. & Brown, K. (2010). The state of leadership: Public school principals in Illinois, 
2001-08. Presented at the Illinois Education Research Council (IERC) Symposium. 
Retrieved https://ierc.education/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/2010_SYMP_BW.pdf 
 193 
Whitcomb, J. A., & Rose, T. (2008). Teacher quality: What does the research tell us? In J. Paone 
(Ed.), Shining the light II: Illuminating teacher quality, diversity, and attrition in 
Colorado (pp. 5-35). Denver, CO: Alliance for Teacher Quality. 
Yariv, E. (2006). “Mum effect:” Principals’ reluctance to submit negative feedback. Journal of 
Managerial Psychology, 21, 533-546. doi:10.1108/02683940610684382 
Yin, R. K. (2014). Case study research (5th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Zirkel, P. A. (2010). Teacher tenure is not the real problem. Phi Delta Kappan, 92, 76-77. 
doi:10.1177/003172171009200116 
 
  
 194 
Appendix A 
Data Collection Matrix 
Question Analysis Source Research Method 
RQ1: To what extent 
has the implementation 
of teacher evaluation 
reforms affected the 
frequency of 
identifying 
underperforming 
teachers in Illinois 
public schools? 
Tables and graphs, 
descriptive statistics 
FOIA request 
to ISBE and 
questionnaires 
of school 
districts  
Quantitative 
    
RQ2: How have 
micropolitical factors 
influenced principals in 
the identification of 
underperforming 
teachers in Illinois 
since the 
implementation of 
teacher evaluation 
reforms? 
Interviews of principals to 
identify codes and themes 
Interviews of 
principals  
Qualitative 
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Appendix B 
Visual Model of Study 
Phase Procedure Product 
 
↓ 
• FOIA requests from ISBE, to 
obtain school district contact 
information 
• Survey data collection from 
Illinois school districts in Illinois 
(N = 859) 
 
• Numeric data on 
remediations, PDP, 
dismissals 
 
↓ 
• Frequency counts 
• Descriptive statistics 
• Microsoft Excel 2013 software 
 
 
• Descriptive statistics 
• Tables and graphs 
• Discussion of findings 
 
↓ 
• Determine if data warrant further 
study 
• Purposeful sampling to select 
participants for cases 
• Develop interview questions 
• Interview protocol 
 
↓ 
• In-depth semi-structured 
interviews (N = 20) 
• Follow-up questions 
 
 
• Text data (interview 
transcripts) 
 
↓ 
• Coding and thematic analysis 
• HyperRESEARCH software v. 
3.7.3 
• Member checking 
• Codes and themes 
• Discussion of findings 
 
• Follow-up questions to 
participants 
• Interpretation and explanation of 
the quantitative and qualitative 
results 
• Discussion 
• Implications 
• Future research 
Note. Model adapted from Ivankova et al. (2006). 
 
quant Data Collection 
quant Data Analysis 
Connecting 
quant and qual 
phases 
qual Data Collection 
qual Data Analysis 
Integration of 
quant and qual 
Results 
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Appendix C 
Advanced Survey Request 
1050 Shawnee Court 
Bourbonnais, IL 60914 
September 25, 2017 
 
 
Dear Illinois Public School Superintendent 
 
 
Re: SURVEY ON TEACHER EVALUATION 
 
I am a Doctor of Education degree candidate in Education Policy, Organization and Leadership at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and am gathering data for a dissertation research study 
entitled A Mixed Methods Study of Teacher Evaluation and Micropolitics in Illinois. The purpose of this 
study is to explore how micropolitics influences qualified evaluators when identifying underperforming 
teachers. Dr. Donald Hackmann, Professor, is my dissertation director. 
 
On Wednesday, October 4, I will send you a link to a survey. The survey will request data regarding 
certificated teaching staff in your school district, including teachers, school psychologists, social workers, 
school counselors, and school librarians. Please exclude school administrators, such as superintendents, 
principals, assistant principals, and curriculum directors. Only include deans of students or other quasi-
administrative positions when these positions are evaluated under the same conditions as certificated 
teaching staff. Exclude paraprofessionals, cooks, administrative assistants, and other non-certificated 
positions.  
 
The survey will require district office personnel to gather information. To help you prepare, I am 
attaching a PDF file with the survey. When compiling the data, please provide as much data as you are 
able to. For the purposes of this research, we prefer as much data as possible but will accept 
whatever data you can provide. The survey will open on Wednesday, October 4 and close on 
Friday, October 20. 
 
If you have any questions, please contact me at (XXX) XXX-XXXX or dconr2@illinois.edu. 
Alternatively, you may contact Dr. Donald Hackmann at phone (217) 333-0230 or dghack@illinois.edu. 
 
Thank you for your assistance. 
 
Sincerely,  
David Conrad 
University of Illinois  
Doctoral Student in Education Policy, Organization and Leadership 
1050 Shawnee Court 
Bourbonnais, IL 60914 
dconr2@illinois.edu 
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Appendix D 
Quantitative Phase Aggregate Data Tables 
 
Quantitative data collected via questionnaires to school superintendents:  
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Number of Professional 
Development Plans (PDP) 
initiated 
           
Number of remediation 
plans initiated 
           
Number of teachers 
dismissed 
           
What year the district 
implemented PDPs? 
 
 
Quantitative data from Illinois State Board of Education: 
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Educators employed            
Student enrollment            
District Type (Unit, 
Elementary, Secondary) 
  
District size (small, 
medium, large) 
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Appendix E 
Superintendent Questionnaire 
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 203 
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Appendix F 
Email Confirming Study Eligibility and Soliciting Participation  
Hello! My name is David Conrad. I am the principal at Manteno Middle School in Manteno, 
Illinois. I am completing my Doctor of Education degree in Education Policy, Organization and 
Leadership at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  
 
I am conducting my dissertation research on teacher evaluation policy. My advisor, Dr. Donald 
Hackmann, is directing my study. The purpose of this study is to explore how micropolitics 
influences qualified evaluators when identifying underperforming teachers. I am contacting you 
because you were recommended by your superintendent as someone to interview for this study.  
  
If you are selected for inclusion in the study, you will participate in one interview lasting 
approximately 45-60 minutes. Follow-up interviews may also be conducted, lasting 
approximately 15 minutes. The interviews may be audiotaped with your permission. In addition, 
you will be asked to share any unused forms or policies related to teacher evaluation in your 
district. All forms will be blank and will not contain any personally identifiable information. 
  
To determine your eligibility for study participation, I need to confirm that you meet the 
following criteria: 
 
• Must be a currently practicing qualified evaluator in Illinois public schools who worked 
before and after the implementation of PERA/SB7 as evaluators of certificated staff; 
• Currently may hold any school position that evaluates certified staff—including 
principals, assistant principals, department chairpersons, directors, teachers, and others 
engaged in teacher evaluation; 
• Must have identified one or more teachers for a remediation plan, a Professional Growth 
Plan (PGP), or dismissal during your evaluation experience in Illinois. 
 
If you meet these criteria, and you are interested in participation in this study, please respond to 
me via email (dconr2@illinois.edu) or phone (XXX-XXX-XXXX). If you express a willingness 
to participate, an informed consent form will be delivered to you by email and we will set up a 
time for a brief 10-minute screening interview over the phone. The screening interview is 
designed to ensure you met the criteria necessary for participation in this study. If you have 
questions or comments regarding this study, please contact my dissertation advisor, Dr. Donald 
Hackmann (dghack@illinois.edu).  
 
Thank you very much!!! 
 
 
David Conrad 
Doctoral Student in Educational Organization and Leadership  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
phone XXX.XXX.XXXX | email dconr2@illinois.edu 
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Appendix G 
Screening Interview via Telephone 
Introduction and Purpose 
 
Today, I am calling because you have agreed to participate in a study that seeks to investigate 
teacher evaluation policy in Illinois. As indicated on the informed consent form, I will be taking 
detailed notes of this interview and all personally identifiable information will be removed and 
replaced by pseudonyms. Should you wish to stop the interview at any time, you may do so. 
 
Questions 
 
1. How many years of have you worked as an evaluator of certificated staff in Illinois public 
schools total? 
 
2. How many years have you served as the principal of your current school, including this 
year as one full year? 
 
3. Did you work as an evaluator of certificated staff in Illinois public schools before and 
after the SB7 and PERA reforms? 
 
4. In what position(s) have you worked when you evaluated certificated staff in Illinois 
public schools (e.g., principal, assistant principal, department chairperson, director, 
teachers, and others engaged in teacher evaluation)? 
 
5. Have you identified one or more teachers for a remediation plan, a Professional 
Development Plan (PDP), or dismissal when you worked as an evaluator of certificated 
staff in Illinois public schools? Briefly explain.  
 
6. With which ethnicity do you identify? 
a. Hispanic / Latino 
b. Not Hispanic / Not Latino 
c. Choose not to identify 
 
7. With which race/s do you identify (choose one or more regardless of ethnicity status 
selected above)? 
a. American Indian or Alaska Native 
b. Asian 
c. Black or African-American 
d. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific-Islander 
e. White 
f. Choose not to identify 
 
8. With which gender do you identify? 
a. Male 
b. Female 
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c. Other 
d. Choose not to identify 
 
9. Is there anything else you would like for me to consider when determining your 
eligibility for the study? 
 
This concludes the screening interview. Should you and your district be selected for participation 
in the study, I will notify you by email as soon as possible. 
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Appendix H 
Informed Consent Documents 
Qualitative Phase Consent 
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Appendix I 
Semi-Structured Interview Protocol 
Introduction and Purpose 
 
Today, we are meeting because you have agreed to participate in a study that seeks to investigate 
teacher evaluations in Illinois. As indicated on the informed consent form, I will be recording 
this interview and all personally identifiable information will be removed and replaced by 
pseudonyms. Should you wish to stop the interview at any time, you may do so. 
 
I will start by asking you some questions about your school. 
 
1. In your opinion, what percentage of certificated staff in your school district are 
underperforming? 
2. Now I will share the data your district provided to me in a previous phase of the 
study. Please share your reactions to the data.  
 
I will now ask you about the ground rules and procedures for teacher evaluations (Bridges and 
Groves, 1999). 
 
3. How have your teacher evaluations changed since PERA / SB7? Have the rules or 
procedures in your current teacher evaluation plan made it easier or harder to 
issue an underperforming rating than prior to PERA / SB7? Please explain. 
4. Have you ever had an underperforming teacher receive a Reduction in Force 
notice? Please explain.  
5. What support would you need to improve the identification of underperforming 
teachers? 
 
Next, I will ask you about persons or interests that have predominated or been frustrated by 
PERA / SB7 (Bridges and Groves, 1999). 
 
6. How have teachers responded to the changes in teacher evaluation since PERA / 
SB7? Has teaching and learning improved? Please explain. 
7. What experiences have you had with remediation plans or Professional 
Development Plans? Have they improved teachers? Please explain. (Potential 
follow-up: knowing your experience, would you do it again?) 
 
Next, I will ask you about the sources and levels of power, coalitions, and strategies of various 
actors (Bridges and Groves, 1999). 
 
8. Has identifying underperforming teachers had any negative effects or 
repercussions? How did this effect the relationships you had with other teachers? 
9. Have you ever been in a situation when you were unable or unwilling to give a 
low rating to an underperforming teacher? Please explain. 
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10. Has anyone (such as a board of education member, supervisor, teacher, or the 
teacher union) ever tried to influence your decision to evaluate someone with a 
higher or lower summative rating than you felt was earned? Please explain. 
 
Next, I will ask about excesses or abuses (Bridges and Groves, 1999) 
 
11. Have teachers been evaluated fairly in your district? Have any changes to your 
evaluation process been made because of fairness or other issues? 
 
Next, we will talk the balance of interests of parents and students having quality teachers with 
the interests of employees in job security and fair treatment (Bridges and Groves, 1999). 
 
12. Has pressure from students or parents influenced your evaluation ratings? 
 
Finally, we will conclude our interview with a few wrap-up questions. 
 
13. Do you have any other issues or information you would like to share, that I 
haven’t asked you, that you want to ensure that I collect for this study? 
14. Is there any written documentation your wish to share? 
 
Thank you for your participation. I may be contacting for follow-up questions later and to give 
you the opportunity to review my findings regarding the study. Thank you! 
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Appendix J 
Institutional Review Board Approval 
 
 
 213 
  
 214 
Appendix K 
Interview Log 
 
Participant School District Date Method 
Aidan O’Brien Irving December 21, 2017 Telephone 
Amanda Ashbee Sunfields December 18, 2017 Telephone 
Ann Keaton Napa River December 20, 2017 Telephone 
Charlie Ramirez Churchill December 18, 2017 Telephone 
Corey Hammer Ferndale December 6, 2017 In Person 
Diana Legend Rosedale December 6, 2017 In Person 
Dustin Ross St. Paul December 18, 2017 Telephone 
Emma Moore Gregson January 16, 2018 Telephone 
Eric Graves Founders December 18, 2017 Telephone 
Frank Steele Bayview December 15, 2017 Telephone 
Glen Tucker Crater Bay December 15, 2017 Telephone 
Harold Cooper Kappel January 9, 2018 Telephone 
Jeffrey Shannon Highlane January 5, 2018 Telephone 
Jordyn Harris Hillman January 12, 2018 Telephone 
Melody Roberts Pittman December 8, 2017 Telephone 
Michelle Hale Austin December 15, 2017 Telephone 
Molly Martin Logan December 18, 2017 Telephone 
Rebecca Silver Jasper January 12, 2018 Telephone 
Stephen Pierce Maple Ridge December 18, 2017 Telephone 
Vickie Wells Abbidale December 20, 2017 Telephone 
 
